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Preface 
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sector" (in Dutch with a summary in English), we felt that a further study and documentation 
of pesticide use and pesticide policy in the Netherlands and the principles of a regulatory levy 
would be interesting, for various reasons. In many countries, increasing attention is being 
paid to the environmental impacts of pesticide use. This is one of the reasons for examining 
the policies and research results in other countries. Although the present study concentrates 
on the economic aspects of regulatory levies it is certainly not limited to that subject. Because 
of the attention to the 'technical side' of pesticides and agricultural production, it might be 
considered a multidisciplinary study, with economics as the main discipline. We decided to 
publish our results in English, to ensure we reach an international audience. 
Various people from different backgrounds kindly reviewed drafts of this book or particular 
chapters. We thank P. van Tilburg, H. Naber, A. Emmerman, A. Dubgaard, S. Rude, A.F. 
van der Wal, M.A. de Waard and J.C. Zadoks for their comments. Of course, the authors 
remain responsible for the contents of this book. 
The Departments of Agricultural Economics and of Farm Management of Wageningen 
Agricultural University collaborated in this research project. In addition to the authors, 
several persons contributed to the final result. A.J. Aaltink, A. de Buck, W. de Jong, J. Rus 
and L. Verschueren wrote MSc theses on subjects contained in this research project. 
Chapters 5 and 6 draw on their findings. W. van de Vendel helped make the database used 
in Chapters 2 and 9. A large part of the text was translated by Mrs. A. Kooijman-Timmers; 
Mrs. J. Burrough-Boenisch revised the translation and edited the English text. H. Smit 
assisted in making the computer program for the income calculations in Sections 
8.3., 8.4 and 8.5. J. Bijkerk drew the figures. The final typing and layout of the text was 
done by Mrs. A. de Vries and Mrs. O. Hitters; R. Aalpol of Pudoc advised us on these 
matters. We thank them all for their important contribution. 
Abstract 
Oskam, A.J., H. van Zeijts, G.J. Thijssen, G.A.A. Wossink and R. Vijftigschild, 1992. 
Pesticide use and pesticide policy in the Netherlands: an economic analysis of regulatory 
levies in agriculture. Wageningen Economic Studies 26, Wageningen Agricultural University, 
Wageningen, (xi) + 155 pages, 53 tables, 12 figures, 1 scheme, 5 appendices, 127 
references, summary. 
This study gives a broad overview of the use and application of pesticides in the Dutch 
agricultural sector. Compared with surrounding countries, pesticide application in Dutch 
arable farming and horticulture is very high, mostly because the production systems are 
intensive. The data used in the study are from a database partly compiled from an inventory 
study related to the Long-term Crop Protection Plan (LCPP) for the Netherlands. The targets 
of Dutch pesticide policy and the instruments available to implement this policy are 
explained. Pesticide use and policy in Sweden and Denmark is analysed, and information and 
research results for some other European countries are also presented. 
The main purpose of the study is to derive the level a regulatory levy needs to be to reach 
the targeted reductions in pesticide use formulated in the LCPP. A chapter on theory, 
discussing ways of investigating how prices affect pesticide use precedes the chapters devoted 
to the empirical research. Two different approaches have been used in this study: an 
econometrically estimated model, based on observed behaviour in the past and representative 
LP models that enable the effects of new technologies to be studied. These two models led 
to substantial differences in the levy that will be necessary to reach targeted levels by the 
year 2000. The range is about 25 to 100 guilders per kg of active ingredient. The income 
effects for different types of farms and different parts of the agricultural sector are derived. 
The estimated income effects are smaller than those estimated in the LCPP. 
As well as considering a policy based on reducing the volume of pesticide use this study also 
considers a policy of banning the use of certain compounds. The influence of the latter policy 
would be substantial, unless substitution of banned pesticides by remaining ones is possible 
or new pesticides are introduced. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
As agriculture has become more technologically sophisticated it has become increasingly 
dependent on pesticides. Some of these chemicals are emitted into the environment, which 
may lead to damaging effects. Pesticide residues are increasingly being found in drinking 
water, soil and surface water (RIVM, 1991). Recurrent reports of such discoveries make 
"people feel uneasy" (Goewie, 1990). Unless policies are changed, this unease will only 
increase. 
The mere confirmation that pesticides are having an effect on the environment is in itself 
not sufficient for tackling future environmental problems. A tightening up of crop 
protection policies is clearly called for. Usually, government policy on chemical 
pesticides is restricted to permitting the use of certain chemicals, regulating trade in 
pesticides, and issuing guidelines to users. It is difficult to check if, and to what extent, 
users abide by the directives. It seems likely, however, that apart from weighing up the 
economic risk of not using pesticides, producers aim at minimal users costs or maximum 
profits when applying these chemicals. It is here that the problem lies: unfavourable 
environmental effects are seldom taken into account by pesticide users. Moreover, in 
many countries the prices of agricultural products are being kept high artificially (OECD, 
1991), whereas prices of pesticides respond directly to the world market. There are 
therefore no incentives to cut back the use of pesticides, and this influences the techniques 
that are developed and applied in agriculture. 
The book 'Silent Spring' by Rachel Carson made the general public conscious of the 
important problems of a particular pesticide. Later on the 'green revolution' and the 
technological developments in crop production throughout the world induced an important 
increase in pesticide use (Harris, 1990). Although researchers such as Pimentai (1980) 
tackled the problem of calculating the social costs of pesticides, government policies gave 
little attention to using economic instruments in incorporating external effects of pesticides 
in production decisions (Just and Bockstael, 1991). 
Pesticides give 'non-point pollution'. Sometimes there is a delay between pesticide use 
and the appearance of pollution (for instance in groundwater). Moreover, little is known 
about the harmful effects of certain concentrations of chemicals in water, soil and air. 
Groundwater samples taken in the Netherlands not far under the surface have shown that 
EC guidelines for drinking water are often exceeded (RIVM, 1991). In our study we did 
not examine the relationship between the use of pesticides and any eventual emissions. 
In the past few years, willingness to reduce the use of pesticides has increased in various 
countries (Sweden, Denmark, US - California in particular). Concrete measures have 
either been implemented, or are being considered (Lantbruksstyreisen, 1989; Dubgaard, 
1991; Vulpen, 1991). This is also true for the Netherlands, where owing to intensive 
farming and the relatively high percentage of arable cropping, pesticide use per hectare 
has soared (see Chapter 2). Therefore, in the Netherlands, the problem is being tackled 
along several fronts. 
Introduction 
Recently, in the Netherlands the Long-term Crop Protection Plan1 (MJP-G, 1991), has 
come into effect. The LCPP's three main aims are: to reduce producers' structural 
dependence on pesticides; to cut pesticide use; to limit emissions. The LCPP was based 
on an extensive stock-taking of the problems in which pesticide use in each subsector of 
agriculture (and per sector for each product) was investigated. A broad and cohesive 
package of instruments is being deployed to carry out the LCPP. The LCPP strongly 
advocates the use of favourable and supporting policy instruments such as the stimulation 
of research, information and publicity, and education. 
The Dutch government anticipates that technological development (e.g. integrated crops in 
arable farming and closed systems in horticulture) will bring results by reducing 
dependence on pesticides. 
In the Netherlands, interest in using economic measures to reduce pesticide use has been 
growing since the mid-1980s, because of the ever-increasing environmental problems and 
the widespread belief that the potential of direct regulation is limited. The National 
Environmental Policy Plan (MVROM, 1989) and its successor, the NMP Plus (MVROM, 
1990), illustrate this development. In the NMP Plus (1990) a distinction was made 
between measures that influence behaviour and those aimed at securing funds for pursuing 
environmental policy. The first type of policy instrument is called a regulating levy, the 
second a financial levy. The extent of a regulating levy is linked to environmental targets. 
In order to provoke as little resistance as possible, the funds obtained are being restituted 
to the sector: they are not a tax. 
Our investigation into the efficacy of economic instruments for regulating pesticide use 
was largely based on the information available on the use of pesticides combined with 
detailed economic data from a stratified sample survey of farms, collected and processed 
by the Landbouw Economisch Instituut (LEI). In all, we had four sources of information 
to work on: 
1) the detailed information about pesticide use; 
2) the available information on present agricultural technology and new production 
techniques; 
3) the clear objectives formulated by the government that also consider the use of 
economic instruments (including a regulatory levy); 
4) the data from the stratified sample of the LEI. 
This is what makes the study of the pesticide problem so interesting. We have not heard 
of any comparable study in any other country. 
A central issue in this study is the question of the impact of regulating levies on pesticide 
use. Or, in more general terms: what is the relationship between the price of a pesticide 
and its use? Several approaches are possible to determine the effect of levies on both the 
use of pesticides and farmers' incomes. We did economic analyses using econometric 
1
 Throughout this report the name Long-term Crop Protection Plan with acronyms LCPP will be used 
for the Dutch equivalent 'MeerJarenPlan Gewasbescherming' (MJP-G). References, however, are to the 
MJP-G. 
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models and linear programming models (called LP models for short). 
The econometric models we used are based on historical data on a particular sector and 
directly link the observed purchased amounts of inputs (pesticides, fertilizers, energy and 
the like) with the prices of these inputs. So this approach fits in nicely with farmers' 
actual behaviour in the past. Since pesticide prices have not fluctuated greatly, statements 
advocating high levies on pesticides must be treated with great care. Technological leaps 
forward (for instance, a transition to integrated crop production) may also cause problems 
when using econometric models. 
An LP model is based on information about a sector or group of farms in a given year. 
The difference between gross revenues and variable costs is maximized, given a number 
of technological restrictions. New techniques can be included in such a model, provided 
the necessary information is available. This is also true for future regulatory measures. 
The behaviour assumed in the LP models will often differ from actual behaviour. One of 
the reasons is that farmers do not employ new techniques as swiftly as is assumed in the 
LP models (for instance, because of uncertainty and ignorance). Furthermore, it is 
difficult to include all data (different ways of crop production, restrictions) in the 
analysis. Therefore simplifications are necessary, which will also create differences 
between the normative model and reality. 
Organization of this report 
Chapter 2 gives an analysis of the volume of pesticide use in the Netherlands (in 
comparison with other countries) and of the problems observed. Furthermore, the policy 
proposed in the context of the LCPP is discussed. After an overview of the problems of 
pesticide use and policy proposals to reduce its use, Chapter 3 starts with an economic 
theory on the use of pesticides. Several approaches or models are discussed on the basis 
of a production function. Chapter 4 consists of two parts. First, there is a discussion on 
the experience gained in Sweden with levies on pesticides in recent years. Secondly, an 
overview is given of existing literature on the results of empirical study or the modelling 
of the relation between pesticide use and pesticide price or a pesticide levy. 
In Chapter 5 the econometric method is described and the results of the study on the 
sensitivity of pesticide use to the prices of pesticide and agricultural products in Dutch 
arable farming and horticulture are given. A distinction is made between short-term and 
long-term effects, and the effects on producers' income are indicated. From this, short-
term and long-term price elasticities of the demand for pesticides are derived. In Chapter 
6 the consequences of a regulatory levy are analysed, using LP models adapted for this 
purpose. Ample attention is given to pesticide use, new cultivation methods and crop 
rotation. 
A regulatory levy yields funds. Chapter 7 deals with the principle of such a levy and with 
the restitution of the money paid (less the administrative costs). Some restitution options 
are mutually compared. In Chapter 8 the results obtained from the study and the literature 
are listed, compared and interpreted, leading to conclusions about the possible 
consequences of a regulatory levy for pesticide use and incomes in arable farming and 
Introduction 
horticulture. Furthermore, a comparison is made with the economic analysis of the LCPP 
study, and the usefulness of regulatory levies and the need to have tools to meet the goals 
formulated for the years 1995 and 2000 are questioned. 
Finally, Chapter 9 returns to the information and problems sketched in Chapter 2. First, 
attention is paid to the policy on compounds: this policy incentive was dealt with briefly 
in Chapter 2, but its consequences were not considered in the other chapters. The possible 
effects of the proposed policy on compounds are discussed. In conjunction, we 
investigated the extent to which optimal cropping plans, as determined in Chapter 6, make 
use of compounds that will probably be phased out of production between now and the 
year 2000. The chapter ends with a synthesis of volume policy and the proposed policy 
on compounds. 
The terms of reference of this study 
In addition to their economic and technological aspects, regulatory levies also have legal, 
organizational and financial consequences. The following questions can be asked: 
- How can a levy be incorporated in the law, and is it possible to aim for a regulatory 
levy that is specifically geared to the Netherlands? 
- What aspect of pesticide use should be subject to the levy? 
- How can restitution of the levy be arranged and could this possibly cause legal 
problems with the EC? 
- Which organization can be put in charge of the levying and restitution? Is adequate 
control possible and what will be the costs of levying, restitution and control? 
- What are the effects of a regulatory levy (including restitution) on the government's 
share of national income? 
These matters are not discussed here, but are dealt with in a report commissioned by the 
Ministry of Housing, Regional Development and the Environment (MVROM), and the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries (MLNV) (DHV and LUW, 
1991). In our study the emphasis is on an analysis of the pesticide issue, the effects of a 
regulatory levy on the use of pesticides and on incomes in agriculture and horticulture, 
and the consequences of levies and certain other measures designed to combat the 
problems observed. 
Our study is directed at the use of chemical pest control (pesticides) in agriculture and 
horticulture in the Netherlands. Chemical crop treatments that do not fit into this category 
are ignored, as is pesticide use in sectors other than arable fanning and horticulture. A 
chemical pesticide is defined as: the active chemical substance intended to prevent or 
combat diseases and/or infestations. In addition to active components (denoted here as 
'active ingredients' or 'a.i.') a pesticide also contains carrier agents, which are considered 
to be not harmful to the environment. 
2. PESTICIDE USE: EXTENT AND PROBLEMS 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines in detail the composition of the package of pesticides and, in 
particular, the extent to which they are used in the Netherlands. A comparison with other 
countries shows the special position of the Netherlands in quantity and composition of 
pesticide usage. Attention is paid to trends in pesticide use over the past 20 years. 
Current use in the Netherlands is defined as the average amount used per annum during 
the years 1984-1988, although more recent data are available. Besides quantities, prices 
of different categories of pesticides are shown (Section 2.2). 
More detailed information about the arable sector is included in Section 2.3. Analysis of 
prices, quantities and trends at crop level forms a part of this. Various sources indicate 
different trends in pesticide usage. Section 2.4 describes the problems related to the 
current use of pesticides. Agricultural and environmental problems have forced the Dutch 
government to step in to regulate crop protection. Over the years the government has 
developed several legislative and policy instruments for controlling pesticide use. 
Section 2.5 illustrates the government's strategy for the 1990s. The government has set 
itself and the agricultural sector the task of cutting pesticide use back to an environ-
mentally acceptable level. Existing means of achieving this are being applied in new 
ways, or are being extended. The government is merely creating the appropriate condi-
tions so that farmers can bring about the reduction (MJP-G, 1991). Therefore, Section 2.6 
focuses on the progress the Agricultural Board has made so far. The chapter ends with 
some conclusions (Section 2.7). 
2.2 Volume and structure of the use of pesticides 
According to the LCPP (MJP-G, 1991, p. 29), more than 600 crops are grown commer-
cially in the Netherlands and these are threatened by 5000-6000 diseases and pests, 
comprising viroids, viruses, bacteria, fungi, weeds, nematodes, insects, acari (mites), 
snails and a number of higher order animals. 
The large number of specific crop-disease/pest combinations suggests that an extensive 
package of pesticides is required. But this is not so because, firstly, only the pests and 
diseases that cause economic damage have to be controlled and, secondly, broad spectrum 
pesticides that work on more crops and are effective against many organisms are used. 
The Netherlands compared with other countries 
As Tables 2.1 and 2.2 show, the Netherlands is a relatively large user of pesticides by 
comparison with other countries. Table 2.1 gives information on a global scale, if only 
roughly, because measured in tonnes of pesticides. There were no FAO statistics for the 
Netherlands; therefore the data used here are from the database (Vijftigschild, 1991; see 
page 10 and 11 for a short description). Because of the large amounts of nematicides used 
in the Netherlands, total pesticides is much larger than the sum of the first three columns. 
Note that Table 2.1 is in total volume of pesticides and not in active ingredients. 
Pesticide use: extent and problems 
Table 2.2 compares the Netherlands with some of its neighbours, and the US and Japan. 
From this table the special position of the Netherlands with regard to nematicide use, due 
to soil disinfection particularly in the potato-growing sector, is evident. 
Table 2.1 Annual use of three categories (and total use) of pesticide in kg per hectare of arable 
and horticultural land, in 10 countries 
Country 
Brazil 
Denmark 
Ecuador 
Hungary 
India 
Italy" 
Netherlands 
Pakistan 
Poland 
Yugoslavia 
Fungicides 
0.2 
0.2 
0.1 
1.7 
0.0 
4.9 
6.3 
0.0 
0.1 
1.0 
Insecticides 
0.2 
0.1 
0.2 
0.7 
0.1 
0.6 
1.3 
0.1 
0.0 
1.1 
Herbicides 
0.3 
1.3 
0.7 
3.8 
0.0 
2.3 
5.6 
0.0 
0.6 
1.6 
Total pesticides 
0.7 
1.5 
1.0 
6.1 
0.1 
7.8 
42.3 
0.1 
0.6 
3.6 
Source: FAO (Production Yearbook Vol. 42), 1989; Vijftigschild, 1991 
1) CBS (1991) gives much higher figures with a total use of 13.3 kg per hectare in 1986 
Table 2.2 Annual use of five categories (and total use) of pesticide in kg active ingredient per 
hectare of arable and horticultural land, in 10 countries 
Country 
Netherlands 
Belgium 
Germany 
France 
Denmark 
UK2» 
Ireland3» 
Sweden51 
U.S.A. 
Japan 
Nematicides 
9.6 
1.3 
<0.1 
0.2 
-
-
0.4"> 
0 
-
-
Herbicides 
4.5 
6.8 
2.3 
2.2 
1.5 
4.0 
2.3 
0.9 
1.2 
4.1 
Insecticides/ 
Acaricides 
0.6 
0.6 
0.2 
0.4 
0.1 
0.2 
0.2 
0.0 
0.3 
9.5 
Fungicides 
4.7 
3.0 
1.2 
2.9 
0.7 
0.7 
1.1 
0.3 
0.2 
3.9 
Others 
1.4 
0.5 
<0.1 
0.3 
0.2" 
0.8" 
0.3 
0.1 
0.5 
-
Total 
20.8 
12.2 
3.8 
6.0 
2.6 
5.8 
4.3 
1.3 
2.4 
17.5 
Source: MJP-G (1991, p.36); Vulpen, 1991; CBS (1991) Milieufacetten, p. 64 
1) Including nematicides 
2) Excl. Northern Ireland; data from 1982 
3) Data on pesticides for 1990 (Feeley, 1991); see Boer & Van Keulen, 1992 
4) Disinfectants 
5) See Tables 4.1 and 4.3; period 1988-1990 
Pesticide use; extent and problems 
There are four main reasons for the relatively large-scale use of pesticides in the 
Netherlands: 
1. Dutch arable farming and horticulture concentrates on crops usually grown intensively 
in narrow rotation. This way of growing is likely to encourage soil-borne diseases, 
which are suppressed by using appropriate chemicals. 
2 . Crop yields are relatively high (in kilograms) in the Netherlands. High yields mean 
that crop damage results in large losses. 
3 . Both the position of the Netherlands as an exporting country and the international 
phytosanitary regulations that have to be met contribute to the large-scale use of 
pesticides, especially in floriculture, seed potatoes and other propagation material. 
4 . Climate and weather contribute to the extent of pesticide use in total and per category. 
The maritime climate of the Netherlands generally favours the development and growth 
of fungi and bacterial diseases and weeds, but is less favourable for insects. 
Table 2.3 Annual 
Crop 
Cereals 
Sunflower 
Rapeseed 
Pulses 
(Fodder) maize 
Sugarbeet 
Potatoes 
Field horticulture 
Grapes 
Citrus fruit 
Fruit trees 
pesticide use per crop in kg of active ingredient per hi 
Vegetables under glass 
Nether-
lands" 
2.5 
-
1.9 
5.7 
1.9 
4.8 
12.54) 
29.1 
-
-
20.7 
105.0 
West 
Germany2' 
-
-
-
-
1.6 
4.1 
6.8 
-
-
-
-
-
France2" 
2.2 
2.7 
-
-
2.8 
4.8 
-
-
54.9 
-
-
-
Italy* 
0.8 
1.5 
0.4 
1.2 
2.2 
5.3 
5.1 
12.2 
42.2 
14.9 
-
-
ectare in 6 countries 
UK21 
3.4 
-
4.4 
2.7 
-
3.5 
5.8 
5.7« 
-
-
-
81.9* 
Denmark3' 
3.6 
-
2.7 
4.8 
1.3 
3.7 
5.7 
7.5 
-
-
-
-
1) Vijftigschild, 1991 and LEI/CBS, Landbouwcijfers, Table 41a 
2) Agrofarma, 1990 
3) Dubgaard, 1987, p. 70 
4) Excluding nematicides; including nematicides: 72.4 
5) England and Wales; MAFF Survey Report 64 
6) England and Wales; MAFF Survey Report 62 
The importance of the type of farming and the type of product is illustrated clearly by 
Table 2 . 3 . Differences between types of crops are much larger than between the same 
crop in different countries. Therefore, the share of a particular type of crop (horticulture, 
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grapes, potatoes, etc.) in the total area influences average use of pesticides considerably. 
And the greater the share of cereals in the total area, the more the average pesticide use 
at country level is depressed. The exceptional position of potatoes in the Netherlands is 
quite clear if all soil disinfectants are imputed to potato farming. 
Classification and purpose of pesticides 
Many categories of pesticide can be distinguished, depending on the aim of the classifica-
tion. Below and in the rest of this publication we have used a classification according to 
the LCPP. Pesticides may also be classified according to active ingredients or intended 
use: disease and weed control, haulm killing, soil disinfection, control of algae, growth 
regulation, and application in livestock farming, stock protection, disinfection of seeds, 
etc. Such classifications are based on agricultural purposes. Another classification is 
according to agreed use: crop treatment, soil treatment, row treatment, treatment of seed 
material, aerial spraying, dipping, etc. Moreover, one might use a biological classifica-
tion: bactericides and fungicides, insecticides and acaricides, and herbicides. Within this 
classification a further chemical subdivision is possible (dithiocarbamates, dicarboximides, 
phosphate compounds, triazines, urea compounds, etc.) (CAD-G and PD, 1987; NEFY-
TO, 1989). The LCPP opts for a mixture of classifications; a distinction is made between 
soil disinfectants, soil treatments, herbicides, insecticides, fungicides and others. 
Soil disinfectants are used to treat the soil in order to kill damaging organisms, or to 
reduce existing populations considerably, especially nematodes but also weeds. Nematodes 
are a particular threat to subterranean parts of plants and cause yield losses and 
degradation of crop quality. The use of soil disinfectants (in kilograms of active ingredi-
ent) is especially high in arable farming and bulb growing. Well-known chemicals used in 
these sectors are: dichloro propene, metham-sodium and ethoprofos. Other sectors where 
soil disinfectants are commonly used are field vegetable production and nursery stock 
industry. 
The category of soil treatment chemicals is varied and consists of nematicides, soil 
insecticides and soil fungicides. The latter are more specifically applicable than soil 
disinfectants. A major user is the flower bulb industry. In arable farming, soil treatment 
compounds are especially used in seed potato growing; relatively large amounts are used 
in the nursery stock industry and floriculture. 
Herbicides are used to control weeds because weeds depress yields by competing with 
crops for light, water and nutrients. Furthermore, they can cause problems with harvest-
ing and quality. Herbicides are used especially in grassland management and arable 
farming. The chemicals mecoprop, MCPA and glyphosphate are used in large quantities 
in pasture management, whereas compounds containing atrazin are mainly used for weed 
control in maize. Herbicides are also intensively used in the production of sugarbeets and 
flower bulbs. 
Insects can damage crops directly (biting damage, etc.) and also indirectly, by transmit-
ting viruses. Acarides are mostly included in the category of insecticides; they are used 
against mites. Mineral oil is an important insecticide in flower bulb growing. (However, 
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mineral oil is also a wetting agent for herbicide applications). Relatively large amounts of 
insecticide are also used in fruit growing, the nursery stock industry and livestock 
farming. 
Fungicides are used to control fungal diseases which can depress yield and quality. The 
potato growing sector is a major user of fungicides. The chemicals mostly used here are 
maneb/fentin-acetate and maneb. The latter is also used in large amounts in onion 
growing. Other sectors where fungicides are used both absolutely and on a relatively large 
scale are the fruit growing and floriculture sectors. 
Price movements 
Many factors influence the use of pesticides (see Chapter 3), the price being one of them. 
The importance of price varies per subsector of agriculture. We will come back to this 
later. Figure 2.1 shows a number of price indices that are important in trends of pesticide 
use. (For details see Appendix I, Table 1). 
140 
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100 
80 
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- a - Pesticides 
—o— Arable products 
—à— Horticultural products 
—•— General prices 
40 
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Fig.2.1 Price indices of pesticides, arable products, horticultural products and general 
prices in the Netherlands 
Between 1970 and 1980, the real prices of pesticides (= price of pesticides divided by the 
general price level) fell, while in the period 1980 - 1990 the prices of pesticides ended up 
at the same level as general prices. The price relation between pesticides and horticultural 
products has not changed significantly. The prices of arable products, however, increased 
less than those of pesticides, especially in the second half of the 1980s. 
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Use of pesticides on the basis of different data and for different categories of pesticides 
We will now describe the extent of pesticide use expressed in kilograms of active 
ingredient and in guilders. It is generally assumed that pesticide use in the Netherlands 
has increased over the years, but because of a lack of sales figures the extent of the 
increase is not known. Pesticide use used to be considered to be a solution rather than a 
problem. Although in the 1960s the drawbacks of pesticide use became clear this did not 
lead to registration of amounts sold and/or registration of use. The registration of 
compounds was considered sufficient. Reus (1990) has summarized the sales statistics that 
were available over the period 1974-1988. Table 2.4 shows the trends in pesticide sales. 
Table 2.4 roughly sketches trends in pesticide use. But it is impossible to say whether 
pesticide use peaked in the period between 1974/1976 and 1984/1990. What the figures of 
Table 2.4 do show is that pesticide use remained more or less constant in the periods 
1974-1976 and 1984-1986 and has since declined because of decreased soil disinfection. 
Table 2.4 
Year 
19743) 
19753) 
1976s 
19844' 
1985" 
1986*' 
1987" 
19884) 
1989* 
1990s 
1991" 
Sales of pesticides in Dutch agriculture 
1991 
Soil dis-
infectants 
8 914 
9 732 
11 330 
10 923 
10 784 
12 535 
8 423 
8 578 
9 830 
8 937 
7 679 
Herbi-
cides1' 
5 208 
4 804 
4 509 
4 075 
4090 
3 894 
4 026 
3 760 
3 330 
3 468 
3 312 
Insec-
ticides2' 
490 
455 
554 
653 
634 
561 
498 
575 
746 
731 
594 
in 1000 kg 
Fungi-
cides 
2 936 
2 235 
2 235 
3 958 
4 363 
3 575 
4 070 
4 147 
4 052 
4 140 
4 281 
of active 
Others 
54 
29 
32 
56 
68 
69 
76 
74 
1 189 
1 559 
1 440 
ingredient; period 1974-
Total sales 
17 6003' 
17 400" 
18 700" 
19 7004' 
19 9004' 
20 6004' 
17 1004' 
17 100" 
19 146 
18 835 
17 206 
Estimated 
use 
21600 
21400 
22 900 
21000 
21 300 
22 100 
18 300 
18 300 
-
-
-
1) Including growth regulators (e.g. haulm killers). 
2) Including acaricides. 
3) Source: Curatorium Landbouwemissie (1980), MVROM (1986); figures relate to part of 
authorized substances. Actual (real) total use is assumed to be 20 to 25% higher. 
4) Source: CBS (1989, 1990), NEFYTO (1989); figures relate to chemicals (compounds) sold by 
NEFYTO affiliated organizations. Actual total use is assumed to be 7% higher. 
5) NEFYTO (1991, 1992); discontinuity for the category 'others' mainly because of including 
mineral oil. 
A database on the use of pesticides in Dutch agriculture and arable farming has been set 
up (Vijftigschild, 1991) using the data from the LCPP. Data for this database were also 
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obtained from: Crop Protection Guide ('Gewasbeschermingsgids') (CAD-G and PD, 
1987), Report 'Pesticides and surface water quality' ('Bestrijdingsmiddelen en oppervlak-
tewater kwaliteit') (Berends, 1988), Manual 1987 (Handleiding 1987) (CAD-G, 1986) as 
well as from inside information. Starting points were the list of compounds authorized in 
January 1987 and the amounts of active ingredient derived from the sources mentioned 
above. Wholesalers provided data on prices. This database enables the chemical composi-
tion of each kilogram of pesticide to be traced (see Appendix II for an explanation of this 
database). This procedure yields a slightly lower estimate of active ingredient than the 
figures for pesticides given in the LCPP. The database gives estimated amounts of 
formulated product, active ingredient and their value in 1987 prices. The 40 324 tons of 
pesticide formulated cost 634 million guilders. From the database the total amount of 
active ingredient was calculated to be 20 258 tons (50% of the formulated amount). Table 
2.5 reflects how pesticide use (in kilograms and in guilders) is divided over the ten 
sectors distinguished in the LCPP. 
Table 2.5 Amounts of pesticides used in the Netherlands per sector per year 1984-1988 in kg 
of active ingredient and in 1987 prices (excluding VAT) 
Use Value Average price 
Sector 
Arable farming (incl. 
fodder maize) 
Field vegetables 
Flowers from bulbs and bulb 
growing 
Nursery stock industry 
Fruits 
Pasture 
Public parks and gardens 
Floriculture 
Vegetables (under glass) 
Mushrooms 
Total 
ltfkg 
13 979 
1 192 
2 138 
510 
466 
721 
117 
557» 
525 
53 
20 256 
% 
69.0 
5.9 
10.6 
2.5 
2.3 
3.6 
0.6 
2.7 
2.6 
0.3 
100 
mlngld 
358 
44 
55 
19 
21 
62» 
32 
28 
14 
2 
634 
% 
56.4 
6.9 
8.7 
2.9 
3.2 
9.8 
5.0 
4.5 
2.3 
0.3 
100 
per kg a.i. 
25.60 
36.90 
22.00 
37.30 
45.10 
86.00 
273.50 
50.30 
26.70 
37.70 
31.30 
Source: Vijftigschild (1991) 
1) The data set is incomplete 
Arable farming is a front runner in the total use of pesticides, both in kilograms and in 
guilders. The figures show relatively large differences between sectors in the average 
price per kilogram of active ingredient. The bulb growing and flowers from bulbs, arable 
farming and greenhouse vegetable growing sectors stand out for the low average price 
paid for pesticides. Other sectors such as the floriculture, livestock farming, and 
especially public parks and gardens show high average prices. The last two sectors are 
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also notable for their small share in active ingredient in the formulated product (35 and 
6% respectively while 50% is normal). 
Table 2.6 gives estimates per category of pesticide, which show large price differences 
between different groups of pesticides. Soil disinfectants and (to a lesser extent) fungi-
cides appear to be relatively cheap, whereas weed killers, insecticides and soil treatment 
chemicals are relatively expensive. Further it can be observed that the category 'other 
chemicals' is not very homogenous. The price of pesticides excluding soil disinfectants 
has been worked out as 77 guilders per kg active ingredient.1 
Table 2.6 Amount of pesticides used annually in the Netherlands, per category; 1984-1988; 
amounts in kg of active ingredient; in 1987 prices (excluding VAT) 
Use Value Average 
Pesticide ~~~ ~ " ~ ~ price lffkg % mlngld % (gid/kg a.U 
Soil disinfectants 12 866 
Soil treatment 559 
Herbicides 2 604 
Fungicides and bactericides 2 864 
Insecticides and acaricides 656 
Other chemicals0 710 
63.5 
2.8 
12.9 
14.1 
3.2 
3.5 
65 
75 
253 
114 
70 
57 
10.3 
11.9 
39.8 
18.0 
11.0 
9.0 
5.10 
135.00 
97.00 
39.70 
106.80 
80.60 
Total 
Total (excluding soil 
disinfectants) 
20 258 
7 392 
100 
36.5 
634 
569 
100 
89.7 
31.30 
77.00 
Source: Vijftigschild, 1991 
1) Including growth regulators (e.g. haulm killers) 
Share of pesticides in total revenue 
The costs of pesticides, measured as a share of total revenue, are an indicator of the 
degree changes in pesticide price influence profits. Table 2.7 shows the relation between 
the costs of pesticides and total revenue for a number of sectors distinguished by the 
Landbouw-Economisch Instituut. The larger the percentage, the more an increase in 
pesticide price will affect use (just like a fall in the price of agricultural products). 
From Table 2.7 it follows that arable farming is most sensitive to a change in pesticide 
price. Comparing the agricultural regions, it can be seen that expenditure on pesticide is 
highest in the Peat Colonies (a peat soil area in the north-east of the Netherlands; Peat 
1
 Here one might observe a difference with the DHV-LUW report (DHV-LUW, 1991, p. 124) and also 
with the price used by CBS (1989). The correction compared with the DHV-LUW report is due to a more 
complete set of prices in the database (Vijftigschild, 1991). 
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Colonies is a literal translation of 'Veenkoloniën'). Obviously the differences are 
determined more by the region (or rather the type of products grown) than by the size of 
the farm. As regards the use of pesticides per guilder of crop revenue, the field vegetable 
sector lies in between arable farming and greenhouse horticulture. In closed cultivations 
(such as vegetable growing under glass, growing of potplants and floriculture) the costs of 
pesticides form only a small share of total revenue. 
In a similar analysis, Stolwijk (1991), departed from the value added per kg of active 
ingredient. In his analysis it also appeared that arable farming and, to a lesser extent, 
flower bulb growing are affected most by changes in the price of pesticides or by 
restrictions on the use of pesticides. 
Table 2.7 Relation of costs of pesticides to total 
arable fanning: subdivided into regions); 
revenue (in guilders); different sectors (for 
average 1984-1988 
Arable fanning 
Farm size and region 
Larger farms ( > 158 SFTJsV» 
Northern clay area 
Peat Colonies and northern sand area 
Central clay area 
South-west clay area 
Smaller farms f>79 and < 158 SFUs) 
Clay area 
Peat Colonies and northern sand area 
Share (%) 
8.7 
11.8 
8.3 
9.0 
8.3 
11.9 
Horticulture 
Sector 
Fruit 
Flower bulbs 
Field vegetables 
Floriculture 
Nursery stock industry 
Vegetables (under glass) 
Potplants 
Share (%) 
5.8 
3.9 
2.5 
1.6 
1.5 
1.3 
0.7 
Source: LEI (several years), Bedrijfsuitkomsten in de Landbouw; LEI (several years) Rentabiliteit 
en Financiering (horticulture). 
1) SFU is a measure for standardized net value added of a farm 
2.3 Trends in pesticide use in arable farming 
Since 70% of the total amount of active ingredient of all the pesticides used in the 
Netherlands is used in arable farming, it seemed justified to study this sector separately. 
Recent research by Oskam (1992) gives some insight in pesticide use in Dutch arable 
farming over the years. That study (covering the period 1970-1987) was done using data 
acquired from a stratified sample survey. A distinction was made between specialized 
arable farming, where more than 80% of the area under cultivation is reserved for arable 
crops (including feed crops), and farms where 50-80% of the land is reserved for crop 
production. The remaining 20-50% is pasture. Oskam assumed the entire pesticide use 
was applied to the area of arable farming. 
In general, specialized arable farms use more pesticides per hectare. The average use is 
equivalent to 316 guilders per hectare, the standard deviation being 173 guilders per 
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hectare. For less specialized farms the average use and standard deviation are 216 and 
158 guilders per hectare, respectively. This difference partly relates to the cropping plan, 
because more cereals (excluding wheat), other marketable crops and feed crops, and less 
potatoes, sugar beets and onions are grown on less specialized farms. In the study all 
figures mentioned relate to 1980 prices. 
Oskam (1992) investigated the upward trend in pesticide use per hectare in two different 
ways: to what extent the difference in pesticide use can be explained by the farm's 
cropping plan (detailed analysis); and to what extent pesticides use per farm per hectare 
can be explained by the annual level of pesticide use and by factors such as cropping plan 
and location of farm (aggregated analysis). 
From the detailed analysis estimates were obtained for the use of pesticides per hectare 
for two types of farms. Table 2.8 shows the estimated annual increase or decrease in the 
use of pesticides per hectare for each group of crops. The category 'other crops' was 
excluded from the analysis. A trend of 11 for wheat means that the annual increase in 
pesticide use was calculated to be eleven guilders per hectare, based on 1980 price levels. 
This number reflects the development in pesticide use, in constant prices. The estimated 
standard deviation of 4 indicates the reliability of the estimated trend. 
Table 2.8 Annual increase or decrease in pesticide use in guilders per hectare, measured for 
two types of arable farms in the Netherlands during 1970-1987; analysis per crop; 
pesticides at 1980 prices 
Crop 
Wheat 
Other cereals 
Seed potatoes 
Ware potatoes 
Starch potatoes 
Sugar beet 
Onions 
Pulse crops 
Trade crops" 
Other marketable 
crops 
Average trend 
Specialized farms (80% 
Trend 
11 
-2 
34 
19 
21 
23 
50 
14 
14 
3 
12 
Standard 
deviation 
4 
3 
10 
12 
9 
6 
22 
8 
9 
5 
> area arable) 
Share area 
(%) 
13.9 
14.7 
6.4 
7.0 
9.5 
16.5 
1.8 
4.0 
1.8 
11.9 
Mixed farms (50-80% 
Trend 
5 
9 
29 
33 
10 
25 
-2 
21 
22 
-8 
9 
Standard 
deviation 
12 
8 
10 
17 
6 
8 
28 
23 
33 
9 
area arable) 
Share area 
(%) 
6.9 
18.7 
3.1 
3.8 
4.0 
9.8 
0.9 
3.2 
1.3 
18.2 
Source: Oskam (1992) 
1) Rapeseed, linseed, other oil seeds (incl. caraway), flax 
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It can be noted from Table 2.8 that nearly all crops show an upward trend in pesticide 
use. Many of these estimated trends (as far as the group of specialized farms is con-
cerned) also differ statistically significantly from zero. According to this approach, based 
on the assumption that use is crop-related, the average annual increase for both special-
ized and mixed arable farms is 12 and 9 guilders per hectare, respectively. 
The aggregate analysis yielded estimates about the annual increase in total pesticide use. 
Table 2.9 shows an increase in annual use by 14 guilders per hectare for specialized 
arable farms (this equals nearly 4% of average use per year for the period 1970-1987). 
For mixed arable farms pesticide use increases by 10 guilders, which is also nearly 4%. 
Table 2.9 Annual increase in pesticide use in arable farming in the Netherlands, in guilders per 
hectare, derived from the aggregate analysis during 1970-1987; pesticides at 1980 
prices 
Farms Trend Estimated standard deviation 
All 13.5 1.1 
Specialized (80% area arable) 14.0 1.1 
Mixed (50-80% area arable) 9$ U) 
Source: Oskam (1992) 
The data obtained from Table 2.9 support the conclusion drawn from Table 2.8 that for 
the farms investigated the costs (in constant prices) of pesticides per hectare are 
increasing considerably each year. A more detailed analysis investigating the upward 
trend per type of crop found that pesticide use was slightly less than in the aggregated 
analysis (Table 2.9). This difference might be caused by increased use of crop-
independent pesticides, which was disregarded in the detailed analysis. It might also result 
from leaving out 'other feed crops'. 
Note that there is a difference between measuring expenditure on pesticides in constant 
prices and measuring in kilograms of active ingredient. If farmers are going to use more 
pesticides containing a restricted quantity of relatively expensive active ingredient, then an 
increase in the total amount of pesticides used, in constant prices, need not necessarily 
mean that there is a proportional increase in the use of active ingredient. Given the large 
increase in pesticide use, an increase in use of active ingredient (in kilograms) is likely. 
This outcome does not correspond with the findings in Table 2.4. 
Poppe (1989) also studied the use of pesticides in arable farming in the Netherlands. 
Table 2.10 gives an outline of the costs of pesticide use per hectare of arable land for the 
period 1980/1981-1989/1990. 
In Table 2.10 the increase in the volume of pesticides used has been calculated to be 
1.7% per year, although it seems to have been somewhat less in recent years. The large 
fluctuations in pesticide use make it difficult to draw conclusions on the basis of short 
periods of time. 
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Table 2.10 Trends in costs of pesticides per hectare of arable land in the Netherlands; 1980/81 
1989/90 
Year 
1980/81 
1981/82 
1982/83 
1983/84 
1984/85 
1985/86 
1986/87 
1987/88 
1988/89 
1989/90 
Costs 
Total 
383 
423 
441 
509 
557 
611 
557 
589 
538 
541 
in guilders per 
Herbicides 
170 
193 
215 
229 
221 
226 
212 
212 
188 
185 
hectare 
Others 
213 
230 
226 
280 
336 
385 
345 
377 
350 
356 
Change in % per year 
Price 
2.0 
5.0 
5.0 
7.0 
7.0 
-3.0 
3.0 
0.7 
-5.2 
-0.5 
Quantity 
6.9 
4.8 
-1.0 
1.9 
1.9 
13.4 
-11.0 
5.0 
-3.7 
1.1 
Expenditure 
9.0 
10.4 
4.3 
15.4 
9.4 
9.7 
-8.8 
5.7 
-8.7 
0.6 
Source: Poppe (1991, p. 28) 
Share of pesticides per arable crop 
With the help of the Vijftigschild (1991) database a table similar to Table 2.7 was drawn 
up for the Dutch arable sector. The costs of pesticide use were related to the production 
value on the basis of the average production value for the period 1985-1989. Since the 
application of soil disinfectants depends on the whole cropping plan rather than on any 
individual crop, we left out the costs for soil disinfection (more than 46 million guilders). 
Table 2.11 shows the results of the calculations. It appears that a rise in pesticide price 
(excluding soil disinfection) is felt severely in the production of onions, ware potatoes and 
sugar beet, and most severely in the production of pulse crops. Analogously it holds that 
a price reduction of those products will affect pesticide use more than a price reduction of 
products with a low share of pesticide use. 
When soil disinfectants are excluded, the amount of pesticides used for starch and (to a 
lesser degree) seed potatoes is relatively small. This interpretation of the data follows the 
LCPP (Vijftigschild, 1991). 
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Table 2.11 Application of pesticides" for different arable crops 
relation between costs of pesticides and product value 
in the Netherlands and the 
Crops 
Cereals 
Ware potatoes" 
Seed potatoes 
Starch potatoes 
Sugar beet 
Onions 
Pulse crops 
Trade crops4' 
Fodder maize 
Other crops" 
Total 
Pesticides0 
Amount 
1000 kg % 
a.i. 
463 10.9 
1 279 30.2 
364 8.6 
459 10.9 
591 14.0 
307 7.2 
229 5.4 
23 0.5 
368 8.7 
149 3.5 
4 232 100 
Costs 
mln 
guilders 
38.2 
75.4 
19.2 
15.7 
75.4 
17.6 
21.3 
3.9 
24.9 
19.0 
311 
% 
12.3 
24.2 
6.1 
5.0 
24.2 
5.7 
6.8 
1.3 
6.0 
6.1 
100 
Product 
value2* 
(mln 
guilders) 
590 
587 
332 
297 
803 
124 
111 
44 
687s 
353 
3 927 
Pesticides 
in % 
product 
value 
5.4 
12.8 
5.8 
5.3 
9.4 
14.2 
19.2 
8.9 
3.6 
5.4 
7.9 
Source: Vijftigschild (1991) 
1) Excluding nematicides 
2) CBS, Maandstatistiek van de Landbouw, 1989, 1991; average value of total production over 
the period 1985-1989 
3) Including feed potatoes 
4) Rapeseed, linseed and other (incl. caraway) oil seeds, flax 
5) Quantities from Oskam (1991). An average price of 300 guilders per ton dry matter has been 
used 
6) Grass seed 
2.4 Problems with current use 
In addition to the aspects mentioned in Section 2.2, there is the fact that pesticide use 
causes problems. The LCPP distinguishes between agricultural, natural, environmental, 
and health and labour-related problems (MJP-G, 1991, Ch.3). 
The most important agricultural problems concern phytotoxicity, resistance, adaptation, 
the development of secondary pests and changes in quality. 
- Phytotoxicity is manifested as damaged crops. Damage may remain limited to a 
reduction in yield or quality, but can be more serious, for instance when mistakes are 
made in the application of pesticides. Damage to crop plants is especially likely to 
occur when using herbicides to control weeds. 
- Resistance occurs when a particular pesticide is used repeatedly. A pathogène or weed 
population's less sensitive individuals become competitively more advantageous. 
Continuous selective breeding may lead to sensitive populations being replaced by 
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insensitive (resistant) ones. Often such populations have become resistant to other 
pesticides as well. 
- Adaptation may occur when using soil disinfectants and soil treatments. Certain micro-
organisms live on substances from these compounds and quickly multiply when these 
chemicals are applied. After some years of soil disinfection and other soil treatment the 
chemicals used are decomposed before they can become active. 
- Using broad spectrum pesticides can allow other, previously harmless organisms to 
develop into secondary diseases or pests, because their natural enemies have been 
destroyed. 
- The presence of residues on products is in itself an undesirable quality aspect. More-
over, the desirability of production processes relying heavily on pesticide use is being 
called into question. The amount of residue present and the way of producing will 
therefore become important issues in the future. 
Before dealing with the effects of pesticides on nature and environment we shall first 
consider how pesticides can end up outside field boundaries (MJP-G, 1991, Appendix 5). 
Here, we assume that the water table forms the lower boundary of the field. Pesticide 
emission can be subdivided into emission into groundwater, surface water, air and 
adjacent soil. The order of volume of emission routes for outdoor farming is very similar 
to that for cultivation under glass. The most important routes are evaporation 
(vaporization in greenhouses) and leaching. Emission into the air by evaporation strongly 
depends on the formulation (i.e. composition) of the pesticide. As well as active 
ingredient, pesticides contain carriers and additives. Emission via evaporation is 
particularly likely if the active substance is or becomes gaseous and proper precautions 
are not taken. 
Leaching of pesticides may cause pollution of ground and surface water. The extent of 
leaching largely depends on the adsorption of a pesticide to soil compounds and on the 
rate of decomposition. Important factors in this process are the characteristics of the 
pesticide and of the soil and the way the pesticide is applied. 
There is insufficient knowledge about the damaging effects of pesticides on flora and 
fauna in the Netherlands. It is difficult to interpret the available knowledge because there 
are many other agents affecting flora and fauna (Hekstra and Van Linden, 1991). 
However, the LCPP does give some indications about effects on the basis of field and 
laboratory research done both in the Netherlands and elsewhere (MJP-G, 1991, Appendix 
6). The reported effects of pesticides are summarized below. 
- Insect life on or near plots where pesticides are used is strongly affected. 
- Diminishing butterfly and partridge populations can, in part, be directly attributed to 
the use of pesticides. 
- Occasionally, pesticide use causes the death of fish, bees and birds by poisoning. 
- Surface water in areas of greenhouse cultivation often contains such high concentrations 
of pesticides that aquatic communities are seriously threatened. 
- Locally polluted surface water in farming areas occasionally damages aquatic orga-
nisms. 
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Public health can be affected by pesticides in: 
- food 
- drinking water 
- air. 
It is the toxic substances in pesticides that are the hazard here. An important parameter 
for toxicity is the so-called acceptable daily intake (ADI). This ADI is the maximum 
acceptable amount of pesticide that a human being can ingest per kilogram of body weight 
during their lifetime without damaging their health. This norm is based on toxicological 
tests. As yet, the ADI norm has been set for food only and has not yet been established 
for all pesticides (see e.g. Hegeman and Vos, 1989). There have been no reports of the 
ADI norm being exceeded in the Netherlands yet. Residue tolerances are fixed on the 
basis of maximum residues from authorized pesticide use in agriculture. 
A recent overview of the maximum concentrations of pesticides in shallow and deep 
groundwater show that the European Guidelines for drinking water are exceeded (RIVM, 
1991, pp. 319, 320). On several occasions in recent years it has become clear that the 
drinking water supply in the Netherlands is threatened by different types of pesticides 
(Van der Vaart, 1987, pp. 106, 107; RIVM, 1991, pp. 325-328). 
There are virtually no data available about possible effects of pesticides in the air (MJP-
G, 1991; RIVM, 1991). 
Relative overrepresentation of toxicosis from pesticides in people working in the agricul-
tural sector indicates that these people run greater risks of damaging their health by 
pesticide use than consumers and people living near areas where pesticides are used 
(MJP-G, 1991, p. 59). 
2.5 Government policy 
In this section we deal with the increasing involvement of the Dutch government in crop 
protection, excluding activities at local and provincial level. International aspects of crop 
protection, though important, are only briefly discussed. The government has regulating, 
financial and stimulating instruments at its disposal to implement crop protection policies. 
Instruments 
Regulating instruments are enforced by laws. They particularly concern phytosanitary 
measures and measures to do with registration of pesticides and prescribing their use. 
Phytosanitary measures serve to avoid the outbreak (and spread) of diseases and infesta-
tions. In this respect the following Acts are relevant: Plant Disease Act ('Plantenziek-
tenwet'), Seed and Planting Stock Act ('Zaaizaad- en Plantgoedwet') and the Agricultural 
Quality Act ('Landbouwkwaliteitswet') (MLV, 1983). The 1962 Pesticides Act ('Bestrij-
dingsmiddelenwet') is important for the second group of measures. We shall return to this 
later. 
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Other relevant acts are: Pollution of Surface Waters Act ('Wet Verontreiniging Opper-
vlaktewateren'), Provincial Groundwater Protection Regulation ('Provinciale verorde-
ningen grondwaterbescherming'), Nuisance Act ('Hinderwet') Chemical Waste Act ('Wet 
chemische afvalstoffen'), Environment-threatening Substances Act ('Wet milieugevaarlijke 
stoffen') and the Soil Protection Act ('Wet bodembescherming'). 
The Pesticides Act of 1962 (revised in 1975) remains central in Dutch crop protection 
policy. This Act regulates the approval of pesticides, their use and their sale. The sale, 
transport, storage and use of a pesticide are prohibited unless explicitly admitted. The 
most important criteria for a pesticide being authorized are: 
- it must be suitable for the purpose; 
- it must not have unacceptable damaging side-effects on the environment, public health, 
etc. 
Since all pesticides have side-effects of some sort, beneficial and damaging side-effects 
will have to be assessed. This is done by the Commission for the Authorization of 
Pesticides (Commissie Toelating Bestrijdingsmiddelen CTB). Authorization of a pesticide 
will be granted for a maximum of ten years (often less) and is subject to regulations about 
the area of application, time of application, dosage, application methods and equipment 
(MLV, 1983). The CTB consists of representatives from the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Nature Conservation and Fisheries, the Ministry of Housing, Regional Development and 
the Environment, the Ministry of Welfare, Health and Cultural Affairs, and the Ministry 
of Social Affairs and Employment. Recently, the CTB has been reorganized, in response 
to criticism from the environmental movement and from industry. A major point of 
criticism, according to Hoeksema (1987), is the impossibility for environmental and 
consumer organizations to lodge an appeal against the authorization (or renewed 
authorization) of a pesticide. In "De toelating van bestrijdingsmiddelen" (Authorization of 
pesticides), Vogelezang-Stoute and Matser (1990) make a number of recommendations. 
Among others, they question the lack of openness in decision-making and the 
inaccessibility to records on authorized pesticides. Another point of criticism was that in 
the past, the CTB had ignored certain procedures. In addition, no data were available on 
the damaging side-effects of some pesticides. Industry's major complaint is the long time 
taken for new types of pesticide to be admitted to the market. Moreover, uncertainty 
about extending the authorization of old types of pesticides was said to be resulting in 
these chemicals being hoarded (Hoppenbrouwer, 1991). 
The financial instruments for controlling pesticide use include financial levies, regulatory 
levies, financial support, deposit money, creation of markets and preservation incentives 
(Hegeman and Vos, 1989). So far these instruments have played a minor role in Dutch 
crop protection policy. However, a financial levy for pesticides is currently being 
prepared. A regulatory levy, which has been mentioned in the LCPP (MJP-G, 1991, p. 
109, 130) forms the central part of our analysis. Pesticide use can be stimulated by 
research, extension and education. These and other measures, such as covenants (e.g. an 
agreement between the government and the Agricultural Board), jointly make up crop 
protection policy (MLV, 1983). 
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The crop protection policy 
Recent Dutch crop protection policy is largely the product of September 1983 Policy 
Document "Crop Protection in the Netherlands" (MLV, 1983), which takes stock of 
bottlenecks and possibilities, and proposes some policy incentives. The starting point was 
that only effective chemicals and methods that do not endanger man and nature would be 
authorized. Another constraint was that although pesticides use must be minimized, this 
must not be to the detriment of the international competitiveness of the Dutch agricultural 
sector. 
Unfortunately, this Policy Document did not lead to reductions in pesticide use (see 
Sections 2.2 and 2.3). This is probably because it lacked clear, quantified objectives. 
Therefore, in 1987, the Policy Document "Towards a goal-oriented long-term plan for 
crop protection" was issued. By presenting objectives, methods, starting points and 
preconditions as well as conditions for phasing in certain tasks, this Policy Document 
provided the instruments for a goal-oriented policy. In 1990, this led to the issuing of the 
"Long-term plan for crop protection - policy incentive" (MJP-G, 1990). This policy 
incentive is related to the Plan on the Structure of Agriculture (MLNV, 1990) which 
stresses the need for structural changes in agriculture as well as the importance of 
formulating intended policies. 
In brief, the strategy of the LCPP is: 
- reduced dependence on chemical crop protection; 
- reduction of the volume of pesticide use; 
- reduction of emission of chemicals into the environment. 
In addition, and as a result of the memorandum on environmental criteria (MVROM, 
1989), it was proposed to ban many compounds. The principles underlying this ban were: 
- groundwater intended for drinking water must meet EC norms before it has been 
purified; 
- surface water (including ditches separating fields must comply with generally accepted 
environmental quality; 
- compounds must not accumulate in the soil. 
This so-called compound-oriented approach is only indirectly considered in this discussion 
of the LCPP because the harmonization of authorization policies in the European 
Community after 1992 is creating uncertainties in current policymaking in the Netherlands 
(MJP-G, 1991, p. 123). 
Future targets 
In the LCPP, the main issues mentioned above were translated into tasks and measures 
for achieving the goals set. (For example, measures to bring about reduction of pesticide 
use, and measures to reduce emissions). For technical background information see the 
LCPP Background Documents. Ten sectors were distinguished in the LCPP. These are 
listed in Table 2.12, which also gives an overview of the statistics on pesticide use. Table 
2.13 gives information on targeted percentages of pesticide for the different sectors, 
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whereas Table 2.14 sketches the pesticide use (in guilders and in kilograms) for 1995 and 
2000 respectively, as targeted in the LCPP, expressed in 1987 prices. 
Table 2.12 Statistics on pesticide use (in kg a.i.) for the different sectors in Dutch agriculture, as 
estimated in the LCPP 
Sector 
Arable fanning (incl. fodder 
Field vegetables 
Flower bulbs 
Nursery stock industry 
Fruits 
Pasture 
Public parks and gardens 
Floriculture 
Vegetables (under glass) 
Mushrooms 
Total (excl. public parks and 
maize) 
gardens) 
Total (excl. public parks and gardens and 
pasture) 
Area (ha) 
751000 
45 200 
17 900 
6600 
23 400 
1 150 000 
700 000 
6 500 
400 
90 
2 005 000 
855 000 
Use of pesticides 
103 kg/year 
14 200 
1 300 
2 100 
500 
470 
720" 
120 
630 
470 
10 
20 400 
19 700 
Annual use of 
pesticides kg/ha 
19 
28 
120 
76 
20 
<1 
<1 
96" 
106" 
112" 
10 
23 
Source: MJP-G (1991) 
1) Excluding disinfectants and cleaning material 
As the LCPP puts it "a broad and cohesive package of instruments will be applied" to 
achieve a reduction in pesticide use. The need to apply stimulating policies and supporting 
measures which complement existing instruments is stressed. 
The LCPP identifies the following important changes to be brought about. First, a change 
in the 1962 Pesticides Policy Document, to provide a legal basis for tightening 
authorization requirements, targeted use, levies, tariffs and registration of purchases and 
sales. Fundamental research and research for integrated farming systems have been 
stimulated by additional funds (8 million guilders per year). To bring about a mental and 
behavioral change, the extension work done by the National Reference Centre which acts 
as an intermediary between the government and farmers and growers will be extended. Its 
counselling, services and training and educational programmes will be expanded. 
Additional funds and manpower will be provided for this. Furthermore, investment 
directed towards reducing pesticide use will be stimulated by contributions from the O&S 
fund (a fund for restructuring and developing agriculture). Finally, a change from 
conventional to biological and ecological farming will be encouraged by way of 
experimental farms, education, enforcement of market structures, subsidizing of the 
extension service and the imposition of a quality mark as well as the introduction of the 
EC extensification regulation. 
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Table 2.14 Projected trends in pesticide use in the Netherlands as targeted in the LCPP, 
expressed in 10* kg of active ingredient and in million guilders, per sector, in 1987 
prices" 
Sector 
Arable farming 
(incl. silage maize) 
Field vegetables 
Flower bulbs 
Nursery stock industry 
Fruits 
Pasture 
Public parks and gardens 
Floriculture 
Vegetables (under glass) 
Mushrooms 
Total 
Use (kg a.i.) 
1984-1988 
13 979 
1 192 
2 138 
510 
466 
721 
117 
557 
525 
53 
20 260 
1995 
8 750 
736 
1 195 
377 
340 
574 
83 
262 
245 
27 
12 590 
2000 
5 671 
545 
797 
323 
261 
562 
67 
178 
170 
21 
8600 
Value (mln guilders) 
1984-1988 
358 
44 
55 
19 
21 
62 
32 
28 
14 
2 
634 
1995 
286 
24 
32 
11 
19 
50 
23 
12 
8 
1 
466 
2000 
215 
20 
24 
8 
14 
49 
18 
9 
6 
1 
364 
Source: adaptation of LCPP and Vijftigschild (1991) 
1) The figures given for 1995 and 2000 are merely indicative, because per category of pesticide 
an average price was set for all sectors combined and this was then used to obtain the figures 
for 1995 and 2000. For the sectors public parks and gardens and flowerbulb farming, separate 
prices were set because of the different average price of pesticides used here. 
On 13 June 1991 an environmental criteria memorandum, based on the LCPP Govern-
mental Directive, was sent to the Dutch Lower House (MVROM, 1991*). The phasing out 
of the present list of authorized pesticides will be carried through in two stages. One 
hundred of the 250 authorized active substances are to be banned in principle before 1995 
(MJP-G, 1991, p.90). On the basis of the current environmental criteria it has been 
estimated that ultimately 65% of the list of authorized pesticides will have to be banned 
principally. In other words: about 100 compounds meet today's environmental criteria. 
On 17 June 1991 the final version of the Government Decision on the Long- term Crop 
Protection Plan (LCPP) was launched (MJP-G, 1991). In essence, this plan corresponds 
with the 1990 policy plan. Therefore, when in this publication we refer to the LCPP, we 
refer to both the Policy Incentive and the Government Decision. The minor changes in the 
final version included: 
- A declaration that integrated agriculture is the most desirable solution, with "biological" 
agriculture playing an important role. 
- Areas specially targeted as requiring extra strong measures to bring them up to average 
environmental quality, and other problem agricultural areas will be tackled by a more 
comprehensive approach. 
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- A ban (in principle) of compounds in two stages: before 1995 and before 2000. 
- Before 17 September 1991 a list was to be drawn up comprising compounds that will be 
exempt from banning (in practice: 6 April 1992). This list is to be evaluated in alternate 
years from 1994 onwards. 
- From January 1992, progress in pesticide reduction in the various sectors of agriculture 
will be assessed on the basis of compulsory sales administration. 
- The imposition of compulsory registration of pesticide use has been rejected. 
The instruments provided for in the plan are to be changed in accordance with the above. 
In the LCPP, the government worked out how a 56% reduction of pesticide use can be 
achieved in agriculture. In real terms this means that reducing pesticide use in agriculture 
to 8600 tonnes per annum should suffice for environmental quality to become acceptable. 
Whether this preventive policy will lead to acceptable, or even negligible risks to 
ecosystems (targeted standards) remains to be seen (MVROM, 1991b). 
2.6 Position of the agricultural sector and initiatives it has taken 
As already stated, the government has merely created the conditions necessary to bring 
about a reduction of pesticide use; the real effort will have to be made by the agricultural 
industry itself. An overview of that industry's progress to date follows. It is restricted to 
those activities that fall within the remit of the Agricultural Board. 
In May 1989 the Environmental Plan for Agriculture was published by the Agricultural 
Board. The industry came up with a sectoral action plan, of which the Integral Environ-
mental Action Plan is a summary. That plan goes into topics of environmental policyma-
king in more detail. The emphasis is on developing and stimulating environmentally 
benign production methods (Agricultural Board, 1989). Pesticide use is discussed under 
the heading 'dispersion of environment-threatening compounds'. The Agricultural Board 
aims at eliminating undesirable environmental effects of pesticide use in the 1990s. In 
greenhouses the emphasis is on closed farming systems (using an artificial growing 
medium such as rockwool), whereas the development of integrated farming systems and 
emission reduction are central issues in soil-dependent agriculture. The plan distinguishes 
between short-term measures (five years) and long-term measures (Agricultural Board, 
1989). 
A 1990 progress report calls for a consistent government approach. In that report, the 
Agricultural Board questions the instruments that are to bring about environmentally-
benign agriculture; these are policymaking, financial measures, covenants, research, 
information, education and coordination. It argues in favour of a more balanced and 
consistent crop protection policy that justifies long-term crop protection. For levies there 
the conditions in the plan by the Agricultural Board (1989) are referred to. According to 
the progress report, policy plans tend to favour financial instruments (subsidies and 
levies) over covenants (i.e. binding agreements). The Agricultural Board, however, 
prefers a more offensive approach and supports the use of agreements between the 
government and the Agricultural Board (Agricultural Board, 1990). 
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The 1991 progress report dwells on sectoral environmental action plans as well as 
environmental activities on a regional (provincial) scale. The general part contains an 
assessment of what has been achieved per environmental topic. Research on integrated 
farming systems has started for the field vegetable, flowers from bulbs, nursery stock 
industry and fruit farming sectors. The introduction of integrated arable farming has been 
a success. In the greenhouse and fruit farming sectors good results have been achieved in 
purifying process water (carbo-flo). In the Peat Colonies, a plan is being implemented to 
reduce the use of soil disinfectants by about 46%. Another ongoing project aims at 
promoting integrated pesticide use in apple and pear growing. Another point worth noting 
in the general section is the use of environmentally accountable systems of arable farming 
and horticulture. It appears that the flower bulb and mushroom sectors have made 
headway in this. Attention has also been paid to covenants (Agricultural Board, 1991). 
Concluding, it can be said that the agricultural sector seems prepared to take various 
measures against the undesirable environmental effects of pesticides. So far, the most 
important instruments used to do this have been: investigating and promoting integrated 
farming systems, covenants and environmentally accountable systems. All these 
instruments are still being perfected. 
2.7 Conclusions 
Pesticide use, measured in kg of active ingredient per hectare, is very large in the 
Netherlands. This is mainly, because of soil disinfection, the extensive use of fungicides 
and the relatively large proportion of horticulture. Although information about trends in 
pesticide use over the past two decades yields rather ambiguous results, it is clear that 
pesticide use has increased substantially, especially in the first part of the period 1970-
1988. The use of soil disinfectants both in terms of volume and in price per kg of active 
ingredient, is particularly striking. It might be necessary to distinguish between soil 
disinfectants and other pesticides, because of the large difference in price between them. 
Statistics on the amounts, costs and prices of pesticides show large differences between 
different sectors of Dutch agriculture. This illustrates the need for an analysis distinguish-
ing between arable farming and horticulture. The arable sector needs to be subdivided 
into regions and products. Differences between products are more important than regional 
differences. 
Because of the damaging effects of pesticide use, this use must be cut back substantially 
in various sectors of Dutch agriculture (including public parks and gardens). To achieve 
this the government designed the Long-term Crop Protection Plan, which consists of 
measures to tackle the volume of pesticide use and related problems. The agricultural 
sector endorses this volume-related approach. 
Information on the trend in pesticide use is patchy. But it is clear that the upward trend in 
pesticide use that continued throughout the 1980s must be pushed back. However, ever-
increasing horticultural production and the increasing area of arable farmland relative to 
pastures are among the developments that foster pesticide use (see Table 2.12). The 
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government has agreed to assess progress every two years. Before 1995 it will be investi-
gated if progress is according to schedule. 
The instruments of environmental policy can be: regulating, financial and stimulating, and 
communicative. However, it seems that the possibilities offered by financial instruments 
in cutting back pesticide use are not taken advantage of fully in the Long-term Crop 
Protection Plan. 
Later chapters (4-8) will examine the feasibility of reducing pesticide use and of deliber-
ately ignoring an approach focusing on individual compounds. The research will centre on 
whether a regulatory levy can achieve the desired reduction in pesticide use (and whether 
or not such a levy is required). The arguments will be supported by references to the 
literature and the use of different models. Special attention will be given to the research 
method chosen. Chapter 3, therefore, begins by placing the theory on the influence of 
pesticide prices on pesticide use within a general theoretical framework. Finally, in 
Chapter 9, we will come full circle and return to the effects of policy instruments on 
pesticide use. 
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3. THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO EXPLAIN THE USE OF PESTICIDES 
3.1 Introduction 
Similar to other inputs in agriculture, pesticides are used to increase the quantity and/or 
quality of production. Theoretical and empirical information on the relation between 
pesticides and crop output, however, is limited compared with the information available about 
the effect other inputs, such as fertilizer, have on output (Dillon and Anderson, 1990). This 
rather uncertain relation between input and output is reflected in the literature by the different 
methods used to analyse the question central to this research project: what factors determine 
the use of pesticides? More specifically: what effect does a levy on pesticides have on 
pesticide use in agriculture? Because a levy is assumed to be equivalent to a price change, 
this chapter concentrates on the relation between the price and the use of pesticides. 
Often, researchers have concentrated on one or more aspects of this relation (Feder, 1979; 
Moffitt, 1986; Schulte, 1983). The relationship between the price and the use of pesticide 
can be studied in terms of the level at which it is decided to use the pesticide. There are at 
least three such levels: 
- The crop. Here one can try to explain what factors determine the use of pesticides for a 
particular crop; 
- The farm. The choice of an optimal cropping plan and the use of other inputs can be 
considered in relation to the price of pesticides; 
- An average farm or a sub-sector of agricultural production. Here one concentrates on the 
functional relation between the price of pesticides and the amount used by the average 
farm or a group of farms. Such an approach is often less detailed on the effects of 
pesticide prices on the composition of outputs, sudden changes in production technologies 
and the use of other inputs. 
Although each of the above three levels defines a different decision situation, there are many 
similarities too, all starting from a concept of optimization and a production function (or a 
set of production functions). Whether a particular approach is relevant and applicable also 
depends on the available information. 
Pesticide use depends on various factors. The organization of the agricultural sector, the 
supplying industry and also research, development, extension and education provide the 
context for the use of agricultural inputs. Economic conditions, technical possibilities and 
government regulations, however, determine optimal input levels. 
The availability of pesticides is of prime importance: the types available, and the frequency 
and intensity of their use together with the expected results on quantity and quality of output. 
The second point is the interaction between the availability and the use of pesticides and the 
relevant technologies in agriculture. If particular types of pesticides are available, 
technologies which make use of these pesticides become interesting alternatives (for the 
decision maker (i.e. the farmer) and therefore the industries providing the farmers with their 
equipment). How interesting they are depends on the prices of other inputs, outputs, available 
labour and knowledge, capital equipment, etc. Here not only the combination of inputs and 
outputs that promises the greatest results to the decision maker might be the prime motive. 
A decision maker might settle for less ambitious results that vary less over time. In other 
words: there might be a trade-off between expected results and the variability of those 
results. 
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The yield of a particular crop or crops in a rotation could depend heavily on damage caused 
by insects, fungi, nematodes, weeds, etc. and on the application of pesticides. Indications 
about possible damage could be specific (such as the number of nematodes in a field) or 
more general (such as the weather that favours the development of particular diseases and 
infestations). Damage threshold models can be used to explain optimal behaviour under 
different conditions. Such models indicate the profitability of applying a dose of a pesticide. 
Focusing on the link between prices of pesticides and the optimal behaviour of decision 
makers within these types of models is one way of determining the relation between the 
prices of pesticides and their application. Section 3.3 focuses on this approach. 
Another approach is to concentrate on the different technologies that play an important role 
in influencing farmers to use pesticides, and to define several input/output relations that 
concentrate on alternative ways of applying pesticides and related issues. Here the search is 
for alternative and viable combinations of crops. Changing the prices of pesticides might give 
different optimal combinations of crops and/or different ways to grow and handle particular 
crops. Here one can use mathematical optimization techniques to derive the relation between 
pesticide prices and the use of pesticides under the assumption that producers try to maximize 
their expected results. See Section 3.4. 
Considering pesticides as a 'normal input' leads to an approach that explains the use of 
pesticides by output prices, input prices, level of technology and available quasi-fixed 
production factors in the production process (Chambers, 1988). This is the normal neo-
classical economic approach, which is developed further in Section 3.5. 
Section 3.6 deals explicitly with risk elements. Numerous types of risk elements can be 
therefore determined, that section discusses only the most important ones and their 
implications for the demand for pesticides, as derived from each of the approaches mentioned 
above. 
Because this chapter concentrates on theory, simplifications are often used. Except for 
Section 3.4, we consider only one output and one variable input besides pesticides. 
Moreover, pesticides are considered to be a homogeneous input. Decision makers try to 
maximize their profits under a number of conditions, such as the availability of a number of 
quasi-fixed inputs (labour, capital goods, technical know-how), the availability of 
technologies and the government regulations. Of course, in a particular setting some of these 
assumptions could be changed. 
3.2 General theoretical approach 
The use of an input, whether it is at crop, farm or sector level, may be analysed within the 
framework of a production function. Such a production function gives the level of output 
related to each level of inputs. Figure 3.1 depicts a possible production function. The 
horizontal axis is the input (pesticide); the output (crop or product) is along the vertical axis. 
Input and output are given per hectare, but the per hectare basis could easily be extended to 
a number of fixed inputs. Depending on the type of disease, insect or weed, etc. the pesticide 
is intended to combat, very different relations might be relevant: two quite different relations 
have been presented. 
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a. Two-level output functions b. Concave production functions 
Output/1» 
xK X . Input/ha 
Output/ha 
Input/ha 
Fig. 3.1 Production functions for pesticides (i.e. input) and optimal input levels under 
different price relations 
a. Two-level output functions b. Concave production functions 
Input prie* 
Pi 
Pi 
Input price 
x h x r Input/ha XK X r Input/ha 
Fig. 3.2 Demand functions for pesticides (input), related to the production functions of 
Figure 3.1 
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Figure 3. la gives a two-level production function, where the higher level can be reached with 
a sufficient amount of pesticides. Figure 3.1b illustrates a continuous, although decreasing, 
output effect of pesticides. Both figures incorporate two different technologies. 
The optimal application of pesticides can be derived from: 
^ = h (3.1) 
dx p 
with q = f(x,t) 
where: q = output 
x = input of pesticides 
p = output price 
px = price of pesticides 
t = technology 
Equation (3.1) states that in the optimum marginal revenue, (p.dq) should equal marginal 
costs (px.dx). 
For a given output price (p) it depends on the price of pesticide (pj which level of 
application is optimal. In Figure 3. la point B is optimal over a broad range of prices px. But 
if px increases substantially, point A would be optimal and no pesticides need to be used. All 
other points on this production function are suboptimal. If px is rather low compared with p, 
another technology might become interesting and C will be the optimal point. Here we 
assume that there are no differences in other inputs between the different technologies, but 
this is only a simplifying assumption, which will be dropped in Section 3.4. If present 
production is in C and prices of pesticides are increasing, then B is optimal at first, and later 
A is optimal. This illustrates a stepwise reduction in the use of pesticides, either because of 
the adoption of a new technology, or because input is reduced in line with a different 
optimum on the production function. 
The related demand function for pesticides is given in Figure 3.2a. It is a stepwise declining 
demand function with optimal input level xb when the price is between px and px. For a price 
lower than px, x,. is the optimal input level. No pesticides are used if the price is above px. 
The discontinuities of the production functions translate into the demand function. 
Figure 3.1b gives a very different production function for a large part of the price range 
between input and output. The production function is continuous. Discontinuities arise if 
pesticide prices are very high or when a shift to another type of technology is optimal. The 
related demand function for pesticides is shown in Figure 3.2b. Around price level p, this 
set of two production functions gives a discontinuous reaction in the amount of inputs. 
These two sets of production functions and their related demand functions for pesticides are 
illustrative of the models used in the sections below. 
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3.3 Threshold models 
The action threshold model and the economic threshold model have been applied in pest 
control management (Moffitt, 1986; Pannell, 1991). In these models pesticides will be used 
when the additional costs of using pesticides are outweighed by the damage prevented (i.e. 
the potential loss). The difference between these two models is that whereas in the economic 
threshold model both the application and the amount of pesticide applied are decision 
variables, in the action threshold model the amount applied is a fixed dose (Moffitt, 1986). 
In both models the damage prevented can be considered to be the revenue obtained from 
applying pesticides. 
The action threshold model is related to the production function of Figure 3.1a, with (say) 
a choice between two optima: A and B. The vertical distance between A and B times the 
product price is the potential loss of not applying pesticides. This potential loss is not fixed 
but depends on a variable D, which is related to the initial stage of a crop and two possible 
options for the use of pesticides: either no pesticides or a fixed dose. The economic threshold 
model is more general because the amount of pesticides used is a choice variable. This model 
reflects the decision making more closely when Figure 3. lb is relevant. We will demonstrate 
that the action threshold model is a special case of the economic threshold model. 
Figure 3.3 illustrates the relation between the number or size of an insect, fungi or weed 
population, etc. and the revenue from a crop. To simplify matters, these situations are 
summarized as 'initial level of infestation' (=D0). Consider first the functional relation (1). 
With a low level of infestation the damage is small and the crop revenue is large. The loss 
resulting from increasing infestation is reflected by the change in revenue (note that the 
revenue can increase slightly at a very low level of infestation). If pesticide application 
reduces infestation to the zero level, it will be profitable when Ro-R, exceeds the application 
costs: say at level T. This level of infestation is the damage threshold. For a crop infestation 
to the left of T, the application of pesticides is not justified economically. For functional 
relation (2) it will never pay to apply pesticides when application costs are RQ-RI. In the 
discussion we refer to function (1). 
The time factor in pest control management is a crucial element. It is too late to apply 
pesticides at the moment that the level of infestation equals T; damage has already occurred. 
Moreover, a pesticide can take some time to act. The best moment for application depends 
on the type of crop and the type of damage. This moment, represented by the level of 
infestation, is called the action threshold. The action threshold is a time-related concept: it 
takes into account the level of infestation, the development stage of the crop and the expected 
net revenue with and without applying pesticides. The action threshold merely interprets 
Figure 3.3 differently. It gives the functional relation between the final revenue from a crop 
in relation to the initial level of infestation at a particular moment. As a time-related concept 
the action threshold can be used in both the economic threshold model and the action 
threshold model. 
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Reve 
R0 
R, 
nue/ha 
T 
(2) 
(1) 
Infestation (D„) 
Fig. 3.3 Relation between revenue from a crop and the initial level of infestation 
Both models are based on the following simple economic model (Moffitt, 1986; Lichtenberg 
and Zilberman, 1986): 
T = p.q - (px.x + C J (3.2) 
q = q ( D ) (3.3) 
D =D(x ,D 0 ) (3.4) 
where: x = profit or gross margin 
p = price 
q = quantity 
px = price of pesticide 
x = amount of pesticide 
C, = pesticide application costs 
D = level of infestation 
D0 = initial level of infestation 
(all quantity variables are on a per hectare basis) 
Equation (3.2) gives the net revenue (or gross margin). The quantity of product in Equation 
(3.3) is related to the level of infestation which, according to Equation (3.4), is related to the 
initial level of infestation and the application of pesticides. 
If D0 is the present or observed level of infestation, which is related to future net revenue, 
a D0 larger than T implies that the application of pesticides is profitable. Now within the 
economic threshold model the following condition can be formulated. 
Calculate the maximum level of: 
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x = p.q(D(x,D0)) - (px.x + O (3.5) 
Here, x is the variable for finding an optimal level of r. With an internal solution (x > 0), 
the optimal level of T can be derived from: 
ÜI = 0 with — < 0 (3.6) 
dx 3x2 
This gives the demand function for pesticides: 
x = x(px,p,C.,D0) (3.7) 
and for given values of p, C, and D0: 
x = x(pj (3.8) 
If no internal maximum can be derived, then x = 0 and C, = 0. This value always has to 
be checked against the internal solution, because positive application costs (CJ might imply 
that a zero level of pesticide application is optimal. 
In practice, growers often apply standard amounts of pesticide. That enables a simplification 
called the action threshold model to be used: 
Max T = max (p.q(D(x,D0)) - (px.x + C.)} (3.9) 
X X 
in which x = x' or x = 0 
where: xf = standard dose of pesticide (per hectare) 
The action threshold T is the minimum infestation level for which the inequality (3.10) just 
holds: 
p.q(D(x',D0)) - (xf.px + O > p.q(D(0,D0)) (3.10) 
If D0 > T, then the application of the amount xf is justified economically. Observe that 
p.q(D(xf,D0))=R, and p.q(D(0,T))=Ro in Figure 3.3. 
Threshold models can be used to simulate farmers' optimal pest management control. An 
example for the Netherlands is EPIPRE (see Drenth and Stol, 1990). Although it is unknown 
to what extent farmers use such models in practice, they can be considered to be a basic 
framework for helping farmers to make decisions and for use by the extension services. 
Because of their usefulness in research and extension, these models might be used to derive 
the repercussions of changes in the price of pesticides on the amount of pesticide applied. To 
be able to do this, good data must be available on the present level of infestation and the 
distribution of these levels among the different crops and areas. In Section 4.4 we discuss 
research in Denmark using damage threshold models. If sufficient information is available 
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this is one of the ways a demand function can be derived for pesticides. Moreover, rather 
detailed results can be derived on the effects of technical developments on pesticide use. 
3.4 Input-output relations at crop level and choices at farm level 
Section 3.3 discussed the need of using pesticides for one particular crop. But farmers have 
to deal with more than one crop. Moreover, crops can be grown in different ways, and the 
rotation of crops influences the optimal use of pesticides at different price levels. At farm 
level, therefore, the relation between the price of pesticides and the amounts used depends 
on many factors. 
The leading principle in our analysis is the maximization of the expected gross margin 
between revenues and the variable costs of crops. Since the problem is not restricted to the 
choice of growing one (or more) crops and how to grow it (or them), we opted for a method 
in which an input-output relation is used for each crop or cropping variant. These are the 
'activities' whose input-output relations are known (although the size of these relations has 
not yet been determined). Furthermore, certain rotations - and their corresponding inputs and 
outputs - can be linked. In relation to Figure 3.1 the input-output relations used are given as 
points (e.g. A, B, C) along the production function. Points that have been chosen represent 
'interesting' input levels. Obviously, the corresponding gross margin depends on product 
prices and input prices. Hence, maximization of the gross margin runs as follows: 
Maximize x = c'z (3.11) 
z 
Subject to Az < b 
and z > 0 
where: z = vector of activities 
c = vector with gross margins per unit of an activity 
A = matrix of input-output coefficients (= technology set) 
b = vector of constraints 
This is a standard linear programming problem (LP problem), where the relation between 
the price of pesticides and its application follows from (3.11) by using different price levels 
(and therefore different c-vectors). Here the following relation holds: 
x = x(px,pv,p,A,b) (3.12) 
where: x = demand for pesticides 
px = price of pesticides 
Pv = prices of other variable inputs 
p = product prices 
A = technology set 
b = constraints 
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Equations (3.7) and (3.12) are clearly similar, except for some right-hand side variables. If 
pv,p, A and b are fixed at a particular level a simplified functional relation can be derived: 
x = x(p„) (3.13) 
This is the demand function for pesticides under specified conditions, which is equal to (3.8). 
Fig. 3.4 Approximated production fonction for fertilizer and two different levels of 
pesticides, representing two different technologies 
Two examples will illustrate how activities are defined under different conditions. If there 
is an interaction between two different inputs, say pesticides and fertilizer, this relation might 
be incorporated in composing the activities. In this example we assume two different 
technologies for the use of pesticides, and smooth production functions for fertilizer. In linear 
programming, smooth production functions are approximated by linear production functions 
over limited quantities of fertilizer (see Figure 3.4). 
For given prices of fertilizer and the product, only one point in the piecewise linear 
production function is optimal (say A, and BJ. The choice between the two technologies 
depends on: 
c. = P-q. - (Px-x. + Pv-vJ < or > q, = p.qb - (px.xb + pv.vb) (3.14) 
where: v = application of fertilizer 
pv = price of fertilizer 
For c, p, q, px and x see (3.11) and (3.12); 
a refers to pesticide level A (= x j ; b to pesticide level B (= xb) 
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Because xb > x„ it depends on px which of the two activities gives the highest gross margin, 
for given prices p and p,. 
Another example is related to two different sets of outputs. The use of pesticide can be 
influenced substantially by the rotation scheme, e.g. potatoes at a frequency of three or six 
years. Growing potatoes more frequently might result in a lower yield of potatoes and greater 
use of pesticides. This does not mean, however, that the activity with the highest gross 
margin (e.g. potatoes once per six years) will be included in the optimal solution of the LP 
model for a particular farm. Because of the rotation scheme, the activity with the highest 
gross margin is strictly related to the other crops. Therefore, the average gross margin per 
rotation scheme is the relevant indicator. 
Clearly, an LP model is suitable for deriving a demand function for pesticides, either by 
generating solutions for different price levels or by parametric programming (see Gal, 1979). 
Moreover, additional restrictions on the production process can easily be included, e.g. by 
means of additional constraints in the vector b. Moreover, new technologies might be added 
to the technology set (the matrix A). This allows us to analyse the effect of new technologies 
on the use of pesticides. 
3.5 Neoclassical production theory 
In Sections 3.3 and 3.4 we tried to explain the use of pesticides by investigating the 
underlying technical relations. However, pesticide use can also be explained by historical 
developments. Fanners' use of pesticides can be analysed in the same way as, for instance, 
their use of fertilizers, energy, seed or labour. The behaviour of agricultural producers can 
be analysed using neo-classical production theory. Key elements in this theory are the 
production function and the producer's aim to maximize income (see Section 3.2). 
Technology is crucial in neo-classical production theory. The production technology sets the 
technical limits to a farm's production process. Production technology consists of a number 
of alternative methods for transforming services and materials (inputs) into goods and 
services (outputs). According to neo-classical theory this set of production possibilities 
complies with a number of regularity conditions (Nadiri, 1982). The technology set is often 
represented by a production function which depicts technically efficient transformations 
between inputs and outputs, is abstract in nature and does not immediately fit in with existing 
knowledge of technology because the arguments underlying it do not sufficiently fit in with 
the technical relations. 
The inputs in the production function can be divided into variable inputs and quasi-fixed 
inputs. Variable inputs are those inputs that can vary in the short term and can be deployed 
to make the marginal costs of the input equal the marginal profits. Examples of variable 
inputs for agriculture include pesticides, fertilizers and energy. Quasi-fixed inputs can less 
easily be varied in the short term because of the organizational form of the agricultural 
sector. Most farms are family farms where the quantity of labour, land, and capital goods 
cannot easily be changed in the short term. These inputs are considered to develop gradually 
towards an optimal level. 
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The algebraic form of an production function with one output is: 
q = f(x,z,t) (3.15) 
where: q = output 
x = variable inputs (to be divided into pesticides and other variable inputs) 
z = quasi-fixed inputs (labour, capital goods, land) 
t = the level of technology 
(Compared to the production function of (3.1) two categories of inputs are to be 
distinguished, each with several kinds of inputs). 
It is assumed that in the relevant trajectory this function increases in all inputs and is concave 
in pesticides and other variable inputs, which means that for the variable inputs x, the matrix 
of second order derivatives (i.e. the Hessian) of f is negative semi-definite. On the basis of 
this the function f must comply with, e.g.: 
ÊL >0, - Ë s ï O a n d i ï < 0 (3.16) 
dx dz dx2 
These conditions imply that the relation between input and output is characterized by 
diminishing returns. Only the production functions of Figure 3. lb (between point A and the 
top of the curve) fulfil these conditions. 
The level of technology changes over time. By employing technological knowledge it is 
possible to produce more with the same inputs, or, the same production can be produced with 
less input. In terms of the production function this means that technological development is 
shifting the isoquant to the origin. An illustration of a technological advance (for a relatively 
low price level of pesticides) is given in Figure 3. lb with a shift from (1) to (2). Note that 
for high prices of pesticides, technological advance goes from (2) to (1). In our analysis 
technological development is represented by a trend term and develops in one direction only. 
The production function incorporates the restrictions relating to the economic behaviour. But 
production is not the random assemblage of a quantity of inputs. On the contrary, the volume 
of production and the use of inputs are the result of economic reasoning. The production 
function, therefore, cannot be separated from the farmer's aim to maximize his income. This 
aim can be algebraically formulated as follows. Income is the difference between the 
revenues and costs. It is assumed that the prices of inputs and outputs are given for the 
producer. No costs are ascribed to the fixed production factors: capital goods, family labour 
and land. They are considered to be fixed on the short term. On the basis of this the income 
function can be written as: 
x(p,r,z,t) = max p q - r x (3.17) 
q,x 
under the restriction: q = f(x,z,t) 
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where: T = income 
p = price of output 
r = price of variable input 
There is a dual relationship between the production function and the income function on the 
basis of duality theory (Chambers, 1988; Thyssen, 1992a). Both the production function and 
the objective to maximize income are used to derive the income function (Equation 3.17). 
Conversely, is it also possible to derive the relevant production function from the income 
function. (A relevant production function is taken to mean the production function for inputs 
and outputs chosen by a farmer aiming to maximize his income). According to duality theory 
the optimizing behaviour of farmers constrained by technology can equivalently be 
represented by the income function x. The following conditions have to be fulfilled by the 
income function: it increases in the price of the output, decreases in the price of the variable 
input, is convex in prices, and is linearly homogeneous in prices. Hence, the income function 
has to comply with: 
— > 0 — < 0 — < 0 — > 0 (3.18) 
dp di dp2 dr2 
The production function and income-maximizing behaviour can be used to derive the well-
known marginality conditions from which the supply and demand functions follow. These 
demand functions for the variable inputs and the supply function of the output comply with 
three conditions based on the assumptions made. The conditions are: homogeneity of degree 
zero in prices, restrictions on the coefficients of the prices and the symmetry restriction 
(Thijssen, 1989). 
It is also possible to derive the supply and demand functions from the income function. This 
has the advantage that the supply and demand functions can easily be determined. 
Differentiating the income function to the prices gives the desired functions. This is known 
as Hotelling's Lemma. 
q(p,r,z,t) = * ï (3.19) 
dp 
x(p,r,z,t) = - f£ (3.20) 
dr 
Given the duality relation, it is immaterial whether supply and demand relations are derived 
from a production function and income-maximizing behaviour or from an income function. 
The quasi-fixed inputs are fixed in the short term (1 year). After this year the quantity adjusts 
partially. The demand function of quasi-fixed inputs can be determined using the 'partial 
adjustment' theory (Thijssen, 1992b). Here, the demand for quasi-fixed inputs is a function 
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of the optimal quantity of quasi-fixed inputs and the quantity of quasi-fixed inputs in the 
previous period: 
z, = m z* + (1-m) z,., (3.21) 
where: m = adjustment parameter (between 0 and 1) 
z," = optimal quantity of quasi-fixed inputs 
A partial adjustment to the optimal quantity takes place. This is in contrast with the variable 
input, where the adjustment is complete within one year. The optimal quantity of quasi-fixed 
inputs follows from the marginality condition where the marginal profits of one unit of quasi-
fixed input equals the marginal costs: 
Aï = cz (3.22) 
dz 
where: cz = costs of one unit of quasi-fixed input 
The costs of one unit of capital goods consist of depreciation and interest, to be adjusted for 
government policies which result in a reduction of these costs. 
Adjustment of the quantity of capital goods, in turn, leads to a change in the use of 
pesticides, as shown by the demand function (3.20). 
3.6 Risk models 
In the preceding sections all relations have been derived under the assumption of certainty 
but there are various reasons why relations and variables are uncertain and this might 
influence optimal decision making. In a broad overview on risk and risk aversion with 
respect to pests and pesticides Pannell (1991) gives two sets of reasons why decision making 
differs between certain and uncertain situations: (1) for the 'risk neutral' decision maker the 
expected profit might differ from the profit derived from a model where parameters and 
variables are set at the expected or most likely value; (2) risk aversion causes the decision 
maker to evaluate uncertain profit levels lower (e.g. in terms of utility) than certain profit 
levels with the same expected value. 
The first set can be illustrated by means of uncertainties in the threshold model, such as: 
- the initial level of pest infestation; 
- the development of pest infestation and the yield (or quality) of the product without 
treatment; 
- the effect of pesticides on the development of the pest infestation, yield and/or quality 
of the product; 
- the product price. 
These uncertainties could have a large influence on generating maximum expected profits, 
compared with the certain situation. It is often believed that the more uncertainties there are, 
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the more pesticide will be applied, although field research is inconclusive on this (Pannell, 
1991). 
The second set of reasons is based on the assumption that the decision maker is averse to 
risk. Decisions are based on the utility of income (or profit) and a risk-averse decision maker 
prefers a more certain set of income options above a more uncertain set with the same 
expectation of income. Interestingly, this framework gives rise to different conclusions. 
- In the literature on the application of pesticides and integrated pest management, the risk 
aversion reason has been used to explain relatively high levels of pesticide use: above the 
optimal levels following from profit maximization (Carlson & Main, 1976; Feder, 1979; 
Zadoks, 1984); 
- In neo-classical economics, risk aversion has been used to explain low levels of input use 
and therefore production (Sandmo, 1971; Anderson, et al., 1977; Andréasson, 1989). 
We will elucidate those contradictory ideas later. We believe that differences in results follow 
from different assumptions about the production function. 
The second set of reasons mentioned by Pannell (1991) can be developed further, using the 
framework of diminishing marginal utility of income and relative risk aversion (see Smidts, 
1990, Ch. 3). This framework starts from the Bernoulli model where decisions are based on 
a utility function, which in turn is based on the assumption of diminishing marginal utility 
of income or net profit. Therefore in the Bernoulli model the utility of the same additional 
income at higher income levels is less than at lower income levels. Every decision maker 
with such a utility function of income is risk averse and prefers more certain outcomes above 
more uncertain outcomes with the same expected income level (see e.g. Smidts, 1990, p. 
35). The relative risk preference can be defined on the basis of the Von Neumann-
Morgenstern expected utility model (NM model). This model is not based solely on the 
diminishing marginal utility of income, and therefore a decision maker who receives certain, 
but fluctuating, incomes perceives a lower utility level than when his income is stable and 
of equal average size. The NM model incorporates the reactions to risky situations. The 
differences between evaluations according to the Bernoulli model and the NM model can be 
seen as a measure of relative risk aversion (Smidts, 1990, p. 49). 
Because of the heated discussion in the literature about the concept of relative risk aversion 
(Smidts, 1990, Section 3.3) and the impossibility of measuring relative risk aversion directly 
(Smidts, 1990, p. 240), we will confine our discussion to the Bernoulli model. 
To illustrate the consequences of incorporating risk in the analysis we start with a very 
simple example within the threshold model. It is also a good illustration of the intricacy of 
approaches incorporating risk. Therefore, the discussion in the rest of this section draws 
heavily on the literature. 
Risk in a threshold model 
The variable D0 was important in the action threshold model. It was e.g. the initial level of 
a pest infestation. If this initial level is known with certainty, Equation (3.10) applies. But 
let us assume that the decision maker is uncertain about the level of D0: it has a chance p, 
41 
Theoretical approaches to explain the use of pesticides 
of being DJ and a 1-p, change of being Dj. Now a decision maker who only looks at 
expected results uses the following rule. Apply pesticides if: 
p1.T(x',DÖ+(l-Pi).»(x,,no > p,.T(0>Di)+(l-p1).T(0,D02) (3.23) 
where: x(a,b) = profit level with infestation level b and application of pesticides a 
Left and right of the inequality there is the expected profit of an uncertain situation. Profit 
levels have also been illustrated (see Figure 3.5). We assume that in the situation where the 
standard dose of pesticide is applied the profit level does not depend on the initial level of 
pest infestation. This could be a reasonable assumption when infestation is detected at an 
early stage and a standard dose is sufficient to prevent any damage to the crop. 
Defining x,= x(xf,Dj) = x(xf,DJ,); x, = x(0,Dj) and x2= x(0,Do), and observing that the 
difference between x, and x, equals the costs of pesticide (including application costs), the 
expected results of using pesticides are better when: 
p, < Il^l =
 Pl* (3.24) 
Thus for p! smaller than p{, the standard dose of pesticides is preferred. However, one can 
imagine mat a particular farmer is not indifferent between the certain results when the 
standard dose is applied and the uncertain results of using no pesticides, when p, =pj. As a 
result of a concave utility function of income or profit, the certain situation might be prefer-
red, as illustrated in Figure 3.6. Here, vc=v(xj is the utility level of the certain outcome, 
while vu=p,.X! + (l-p,).x2 is the utility that belongs to the uncertain situation1. 
An expected profit level of at least x3 in the uncertain situation would be necessary for the 
farmer to decide to apply no pesticides. This is similar to a chance level of 
Pi = (TJ-T2)/(T,-T2). Therefore, in this situation the assumption of a concave utility function 
of the decision maker implies a more intensive use of pesticides compared with making 
decisions on the basis of expected profits. 
This example was only useful for illustrative purposes. It is intended to show why risk 
elements might be important. There are, however, many uncertain elements - even in 
decision making for one crop, as also mentioned in the introduction to this section: 
- the level of infestation, as illustrated above; 
- the development of an infestation if pesticide is not applied; 
- the relation between the dose and the effect of a pesticide; 
- the price level of the product. 
1
 The expected utility in the uncertain situation is the linear interpolation of the two utility levels v, and 
v2) which have weights p, and (1-p,) respectively. 
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a. Certain profit level (fixed dose) b. Uncertain profit level (no dose) 
Fig. 3.5 Profit levels in the threshold model with uncertainty about the initial stage of pest 
infestation (DQ) 
Fig. 3.6 Utility level of a certain and an uncertain profit level 
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Each of these elements might have different implications for optimal decision making based 
on maximizing utility rather than maximizing expected profits. 
Moffitt (1986) gives an illustration in which a risk-averse decision maker (which is similar 
to a decision maker with a concave utility function), is uncertain about the initial level of 
infestation. As a result of this uncertainty, however, the actual level of production with and 
without pesticide is also uncertain, and the optimal dose of pesticide becomes a chance 
variable too. Moffitt derives that under such conditions both the standard dose and the 
threshold for applying this standard dose are larger than under risk neutrality. Therefore the 
effect of including risk in this situation is unclear. 
In an uncertain situation farmers are reluctant to use pesticides, but if they decide to apply 
them, they will apply more than in a certain situation. Also, according to Pannell (1991), 
empirical studies indicate opposite reactions to more uncertainty, and there is no general 
justification for applying more pesticides in uncertain situations. 
Incorporating all relevant risk elements, however, makes it very difficult to derive optimal 
results analytically. Therefore researchers either use many simplifying assumptions or they 
shift to simulation methods. Using simulation techniques makes it nearly impossible to derive 
general conclusions. 
Risk in a whole farm programming context 
Many uncertainties surround the optimal use of pesticides at farm level. Risk elements might 
be particularly important at farm level because the decision maker balances better expected 
results against a larger variance in the results. Recalling the optimization in (3.11), several 
elements within the whole optimization process might be uncertain. In practice, however, 
most researchers assume variability in the elements of the vector c (the net revenues per unit 
of activity), either because of price uncertainty or because of uncertainties in the input-output 
relation (Anderson, et al., 1977, Ch. 7). 
If both expected net return and the variances and covariances of these returns can be 
specified for the activities in a programming context, one might generate a number of 
feasible cropping plans with different levels of expected profits and variances of those profits. 
A decision maker with a concave utility function of income and/or a risk-averse behaviour, 
has a utility function with respect to expected net revenue (E) and the variance of net revenue 
(V) as illustrated in Figure 3.7, where U links points with an equal utility level. The curve 
U2 illustrates a higher level than Ut. This means that a cropping plan with a lower expected 
profit but also less variance might be preferred above cropping plans with a higher expected 
profit and greater variance. Different cropping plans can generate an (E,V) frontier, as 
illustrated in Figure 3.7. Such a frontier illustrates that better expected results might be 
generated by more risky production methods. Therefore the optimal cropping plan has a 
lower expected value than some other solutions on the (E,V) frontier. 
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Fig. 3.7 Utility function and (E,V) frontier for a whole farm decision situation (Source: 
Anderson, et al, 1977, p. 201). 
Because variance is not incorporated in the LP optimization, there is a tendency to 
incorporate activities that are too risky, especially if these activities are based on new and 
more environmental-friendly technologies. The same holds for pest management schemes and 
rotation schemes to reduce pesticide inputs. Therefore, the methodology applied in Chapter 
6 will either underestimate the use of pesticides or overestimate the actual profit levels of 
farms. These conclusions will be reinforced if uncertainties about technical coefficients and 
restrictions were incorporated. Therefore a normative approach such as LP modelling 
underestimates the use of pesticides because uncertainty and risk are ignored. 
Risk in a neoclassical economic model 
Within the context of a neo-classical economic model producers are profit maximizers (see 
Section 3.5). However, one could incorporate the impact of risk on agricultural producers 
who are utility maximizers. The conclusions from such an approach are quite clear: if a 
producer is risk-averse he uses less input and produces less than in a situation without risk 
(Anderson et. al., 1977, Ch. 6; Andréasson, 1989, Ch. 2). As already mentioned, this 
conclusion is contrary to many results at the crop level, where uncertainty about parameters 
and variables and assuming risk-averse behaviour often give the opposite result. 
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If we check the assumptions in both approaches, we observe that neo-classical economics 
starts from a concave production function (such as in Figure 3.1b and even without the 
boundary point A). Models which start at crop level, however, could be based on quite 
different production functions such as illustrated in Figure 3.1a, which is not concave. 
Therefore we observe different conclusions from both approaches. The assumption of a 
concave production function, however, could be more justified at a higher level of 
aggregation of inputs and outputs. 
The observation that uncertainty and risk-averse behaviour shifts the demand function of 
pesticides to the left (see Figure 3.2b) has little influence on the results of the empirical 
econometric analysis, as applied in Chapter 5. The demand function for pesticides was 
derived under the historical conditions and reflects the producers' reactions to these 
situations. Only in circumstances which imply an important change of risk do the historical 
relations have to be considered with care. Shifts in the level of technology (as illustrated in 
Figure 3.2b), however, might be more important than changes in the situations of uncertainty 
and risk. 
3.7 Concluding remarks 
Different approaches can be applied to derive the relation between the price of pesticides and 
the amounts used. Which approach is most relevant depends greatly on the particular 
questions, and the information available. Applying different methods makes it possible to 
compare the results of such methods. But a good understanding of the theoretical background 
is necessary to be able to interpret results. 
Many uncertainties that might play a role in actual decision making could be mentioned, but 
it is very difficult to incorporate them in actual research. The discussion on uncertainties and 
risk clarified the conclusions that can be derived from approaches assuming certainty and 
ignoring risk-averse behaviour. The results of linear programming ignore risk elements and 
underestimate the application of pesticides. This underestimation could increase if the 
uncertainty surrounding the results increases as a result of technologies with a low use of 
pesticides. The results of an econometric approach, based on actual behaviour of farmers 
already reflect the effects of uncertainties. Here it is more difficult to incorporate new 
technologies. 
In a survey of the literature on risk and risk aversion with respect to pesticide use, Pannell 
(1991, p.361) writes: 
"Risk can affect pesticide decision making either because of risk aversion or because of 
its influence on expected profit. It is concluded that risk does not necessarily lead to 
increased pesticide use by individual farmers. Uncertainty about some variables such as 
pest density and pest mortality, does lead to higher optimal pesticide use under risk 
aversion. However, uncertainty about other important variables, such as output price and 
yield, leads to lower optimal levels of pesticide use". 
This demonstrates that the effects of risk and uncertainty are not completely resolved. 
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4.1 Introduction 
The most important issue in the investigation of the economic results of levies is the 
analysis of the effects of price changes on pesticide use. This chapter gives an overview 
of the literature available on this topic. 
One country that has some experience of imposing levies on pesticides is Sweden, where 
a system of product levies has recently been adopted. This system is discussed in Section 
4.2 and the findings of the Swedish action programme for reducing health and 
environmental risks from pesticide use in agriculture are given. The role levies have 
played in this is indicated. Furthermore, a Swedish study on reducing pesticide use by 
assigning quotas is discussed. 
Later sections contain an overview of economic research on the relationship between price 
changes and the amount of pesticides used. The studies discussed were done in the 
Netherlands (Section 4.3), Denmark (Section 4.4), and Germany (Section 4.5). It seems 
reasonable to assume that the situation in both Denmark and Germany does not differ 
very much from that in the Netherlands (see also Table 2.2). Among this group of three 
countries Denmark has most experience in reducing pesticide usage. In Section 4.6 we 
discuss the reduction targets of Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands and draw 
conclusions on the effectivity of the price instrument in reaching such targets. 
4.2 Levies and the Swedish crop protection policy 
Overview 
The total amount of pesticides used depends on the total area of crops and what crops are 
grown. Certain crops need specific sorts of pesticide. Table 4.1 shows the proportion of 
arable land in Sweden taken up by different crops as percentages of the total arable area 
(excluding fodder/feed crops). A notable difference from the Dutch situation is that a 
major part of the crop area in Sweden is under cereals, although less so in recent years. 
Rising prices for inputs and stagnation of grain prices have made it attractive to leave 
land fallow. This has resulted in 200 000 to 250 000 hectares of arable land being set 
aside in Sweden. Under current regulations, any land taken out of production in Sweden 
must be used for other purposes, for instance as a nature reserve. 
Table 4.2 shows the total amounts of three categories of pesticide, as used on various 
crops over the period 1981-1985. Amounts are given as hectares treated, rather than 
kilograms of pesticides used. Figures shown in brackets are the average number of 
treatments per crop. 
The greatest problem in crop protection in Sweden is the weed problem. This can be seen 
from the column 'herbicides' in Table 4.2. Fungus diseases and insects do not pose a big 
threat in the greater part of Sweden because of the climate. Nevertheless, fungicides are 
used in the south of Sweden, although this is not only because of the milder climate. A 
number of farms in the south of Sweden grow potato crops which are sprayed with 
fungicides an average of 5 to 6 times, as shown in Table 4.2. 
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Table 4.1 Crop areas in Sweden as a percentage of total arable land; total arable land (1000 
hectares); excluding fodder/feed crops 
Crop 1970 1975 1980 1985 1989 
Cereals 
Oilseeds 
Sugarbeet 
Potatoes 
Other crops 
Set-aside 
Total area 
82.7 
4.9 
2.0 
3.3 
3.4 
3.8 
1973 
79.4 
8.5 
2.6 
2.1 
3.5 
3.1 
2037 
79.8 
8.9 
2.6 
2.0 
3.6 
3.2 
2011 
78.5 
8.6 
2.6 
1.9 
4.7 
3.6 
2007 
70.8 
9.0 
2.7 
1.9 
4.5 
11.1 
1883 
Source: Swedish Agricultural Market Board, 1990 
Table 4.2 Area (1000 hectares) in Sweden treated with pesticides. Average for the period 1981-
1985. Figures in brackets indicate average number of treatments per crop" 
Crop 
Winter wheat 
Summer wheat 
Winter rye 
Barley 
Oats 
Oilseeds 
Sugarbeet 
Potatoes 
Others 
Set aside 
Total 
Fungicides 
100 (0.46) 
36 (0.45) 
25 (0.44) 
108 (0.16) 
0 (0.00) 
7 (0.04) 
2 (0.04) 
212 (5.44) 
10 
-
500 (0.27) 
Herbicides 
200 (0.92) 
75 (0.94) 
40 (0.70) 
570 (0.82) 
380 (0.80) 
55 (0.33) 
150 (2.94) 
16 (0.41) 
-
50 (0.67} 
1546 (0.82) 
Insecticides 
68 (0.31) 
21 (0.26) 
2 (0.04) 
168 (0.24) 
115 (0.24) 
164 (0.99) 
45 (0.88) 
11 (0.28) 
22 
-
616 (0.33) 
Seed treatment 
217 (1.00) 
46 (0.58) 
57 (1.00) 
402 (0.58) 
276 (0.58) 
140 (0.84) 
51 (1.00) 
-
-
-
1191 (0.63) 
Source: Petterson et al. (1989) 
1) Growth regulators were only used on grain, averaging 7% of the grain area. 
Use of nematicides is prohibited in Sweden. 
The Swedish action programme 
In 1984 and 1985, the Swedish Parliament drew up directives for future crop production 
policy which, in 1986, led to the Swedish "action programme for the reduction of health 
and environmental risks posed by pesticides use in agriculture". To achieve a reduction of 
these risks, the following three groups of measures were proposed (Lantbruksstyrelsen, 
1986): 
1. A gradual change to treatments that are less dangerous to health and environment. 
2. Measures to reduce overall use of pesticides. 
3. More education, enforced legislature, and other measures aimed at protection of health 
and the environment. 
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The main purpose of the action programme is to reduce the risks related to pesticide use. 
In the mid-1980s, Swedish crop protection experts indicated that a 50% reduction in 
kilograms was feasible. This conclusion was incorporated as a clearly formulated 
objective in the action programme that targeted achieving a 50% reduction by 1990, 
relative to the 1981-1985 period (Swedish Board of Agriculture, 1992). 
Levies 
In Sweden, the levies are imposed on the way crop protection treatments are applied. 
There are two different types of levies: administrative charges required when registering 
pesticides, and levies on the use of pesticides (product levies). In Sweden, the fixed 
component of the administrative levy is higher than in the Netherlands: varying between 
500 and 15,000 Dutch guilders per authorized chemical. Moreover, an additional amount 
of 1750 Dutch guilders must be paid annually for a chemical's authorization to be 
prolonged; this is higher than in the Netherlands (Reus, 1990). 
Since 1986, two different use-related product levies have been effective: the 
environmental levy (not applicable to the agricultural sector only) and the surplus levy 
meant to finance exports of surplus production. The current environmental levy on 
pesticides entails a price increase of 8 Swedish Kroner (2.60 Dutch guilders) per kilogram 
of active ingredient, which results in an average price increase of 10%. The money 
acquired through this levy is used for more general purposes, as well as for research and 
information. 
The surplus levy is the price that the farmer has to pay when buying any kind of 
pesticide, the basis of the levy being a fixed amount per standard dosage. By a standard 
dosage is meant the amount of a particular pesticide necessary to treat one hectare of 
crop. This standard dosage is indicated by the importer or manufacturer and has to be 
approved by the Swedish Agricultural Marketing Board1. This is also true for fertilizers. 
Funds resulting from surplus levies are used to subsidize exports of cereals and oil seeds. 
The surplus levy is related to the magnitude of the surplus to be exported. In 1986 the 
levy was 29 Swedish Kroner per treated hectare and it is currently 46 Swedish Kroner 
(14.70 Dutch guilders) per hectare. Using the standard dosage this is converted into a 
levy price per kilogram of active ingredient for each type of pesticide. Naturally, for 
chemicals that are applied in small dosages a higher levy is charged per kilogram of 
active ingredient than for those that are applied in large dosages (Swedish Agricultural 
Marketing Board, 1990; Eklöf, 1991 pers.comm.). 
At the moment the total average levy on pesticides (environmental and surplus levies) 
amounts to about 40% of the average pesticide price. Since the main purpose of this levy 
is to finance exports, research and information, etc., the Swedish levy can be considered 
to be a financial levy, because reduction of pesticide use was the secondary objective. 
The size of the levy has not been adjusted in accordance with the environmental 
objectives to be met (Hasund, 1991, written comm.). 
Since 1 July 1991 the Swedish Board of Agriculture. 
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Preliminary results of the Swedish policy 
Table 4.3 shows trends in pesticide sales (in kilograms) in Sweden from 1981 to 1990. In 
1986, the announcement of the surplus levy (as per July 1, 1986) led to hoarding of 
pesticides. The result was that the sales figures given for 1986 and 1987 differed 
considerably from the amounts actually used. Therefore, since 1988, pesticide use can be 
derived from sales figures (Swedish Board of Agriculture, 1992). 
Table 4.3 Sales of pesticides in Swedish agriculture, expressed in IP3 kg of active ingredient 
Years Fungicides Herbicides Insecticides Seed treat- Growth Total 
ment regulators 
1981-85 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
599 
869 
470 
662 
445 
608 
3536 
4207 
1781 
2029 
1871 
1658 
150 
160 
63 
112 
50 
38 
161 
199 
119 
101 
120 
97 
82 
243 
84 
75 
35 
49 
4528 
5678 
2519 
2982 
2521 
2450 
Source: Lantbruksstyrelsen et al. (1989); Swedish Board of Agriculture (1992) 
According to the Swedish Board of Agriculture, the targeted reduction of pesticide use 
has been reached. For the evaluation, 1990 totals were compared with 1981-1985 
averages. It was found that herbicides make up by far the biggest part of total pesticide 
use. Since the use of herbicides is relatively stable, it seems justifiable to take only one 
year (1990) as a reference year (Swedish Board of Agriculture, 1992). 
Pesticide reduction achieved the following results. The total reduction in use (active 
ingredients) has been 48% or about 2200 tons compared with the average use between 
1981 and 1985. A very large part of the reduction, 1900 tons, refers to the use of 
herbicides. Lower herbicide dose rates used against weeds in cereals correspond to about 
900-1000 tons. The other 1000 tons consisted of prohibitions and restrictions and farmers' 
substitution by herbicides with the less active ingredient (e.g. phenoxy acids to 
sulfonylureas). The extension service which includes pest forecast and warning had a 
major impact on reduction of insurance spraying (Swedish Board of Agriculture, 1992). 
However, other factors also contribute to the reduction of pesticide use. For instance, 
farmers' awareness of the negative effects of pesticides on the environment has been 
enhanced by educational programmes. Furthermore, Swedish farmers have been offered 
the opportunity of having their spraying equipment tested at a low cost, to improve the 
setting. Since January 1991 regulations have been enforced requiring mandatory testing of 
new sprayers (Swedish Board of Agriculture, 1992). Opinions differ about the set-aside 
schemes, which cover more than 10% of the Swedish arable area. Table 4.2 shows that 
although weed-killers are being used on land that has been taken out of production, they 
are applied much less intensively. On the other hand, the areas concerned are mainly in 
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mid-Sweden where pesticide use was already very moderate. The set-aside programme 
may have had some influence though. 
In Sweden levies at the current rate are believed to have been of minor importance in 
curtailing pesticide use and it is believed that adjusted crop protection would have become 
economically attractive to farmers even if no levies had been imposed on inputs. There is 
no consensus, however, on whether levies on herbicides have a different impact than 
levies on fungicides and insecticides. 
Gummeson (1991, pers.comm.) believes that putting a levy on herbicides is pointless. To 
prevent the seedbank (stock of weeds in the soil) from posing future weed problems, a 
farmer cannot tolerate too many weeds in crops. In Sweden, no alternative reliable types 
of weed control, for instance mechanical weed killers, are yet available. Therefore, 
farmers have to stick to preventive spraying; a levy cannot change that. As mentioned 
previously, the relatively large percentage of cereals is important here. 
As regards the application of fungicides and pesticides, in principle it is possible to use 
damage-threshold models (see Section 3.3). When product and input prices change, the 
damage threshold, or rather the economically optimal moment for treatment (damage 
threshold), will shift. As a result, levies on fungicides and insecticides will undoubtedly 
influence the use of these chemicals more than levies on herbicides (Sigvald, pers. 
comm.). A substantial rise in the levies on fungicides and insecticides was considered but 
was rejected on the grounds that product prices are expected to fall in Sweden. This will 
in itself bring about a reduction in the use of inputs, making an extra charge on 
fungicides and insecticides unnecessary (Johnsson, 1991, pers.comm.). 
It is difficult to forecast the future level of levies in Sweden. What seems likely is that the 
surplus levy will be reduced because of reduced sales cost. The tendency in current 
Swedish agricultural policy is for import levies on agricultural products to gradually 
decrease and, as a result, for internal prices of cereals to fall too. 
At present, research is being done on a levying system that distinguishes according to 
potential threat posed by the compound to the environment. The advantage of this 
approach is that a levy not only serves to reduce pesticide use but also stimulates the 
transition to less harmful treatments (Carlson and Dahl, 1991). The National Chemicals 
Inspectorate together with the Swedish Board of Agriculture are analysing this subject 
during spring 1992. The results will be published in an official report (Emmerman, 1992, 
pers.comm.). 
Swedish research into further reducing the use of pesticides 
By 1996, the use of pesticides must be reduced by a further 50% in Sweden, which 
means a reduction of 75% as compared with 1981-1985 (Swedish Board of Agriculture, 
1992). The government believes this can be achieved without considerable yield losses, by 
more drastic technical improvements aimed at the reduction of kilograms of active 
ingredient in pesticides. 
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When considering pesticide use in arable farming in Sweden, however, one cannot but 
conclude that it has increased in recent years (Petterson et al., 1989). The report 
"Minskad bekaempning i jordbruket" (Kungl. skogs- och lantbruksakademien, 1989) 
discusses the potential for a further reduction of pesticide use and the repercussions of 
this as expressed in the treated area. 
In that study, damage-threshold models were used, as described in Section 3.3, to 
establish the damage threshold for various crops, fungus diseases and insect infestations. 
Petterson and his colleagues distinguished three levels of product prices: the internal 
(Swedish) price, the world market price and the minimum price. The latter is the price 
corresponding to the most extensive level of pesticide use possible. At this level it is still 
possible to obtain a reasonable product yield (of acceptable quality). 
The calculations were done on the basis of data gathered from a large number of 
experimental fields at different locations in Sweden where crop protection experiments 
were being done and data were available on a large number of diseases, infestations and 
crops. Using damage-threshold models it was investigated whether or not pest control for 
a certain crop/disease combination is feasible for these areas. For an example, see Table 
4.4, which shows various thresholds for winter wheat. Low wheat prices imply high 
damage thresholds. Data similar to those in Table 4.4 were used to calculate on what part 
of the area pest control can be cost-effectively applied. 
Table 4.4 Cost of pest control (in Kroner per hectare) and levels of damage threshold (in 
kilograms per hectare) for three product prices: figures in brackets related to the area 
treated (%); winter wheat (example) 
Group of 
crop damagers 
and region 
Overwintering 
diseases 
Foot rot 
Insects 
Southern region 
Other regions 
Rust 
South Sweden 
North Sweden 
Costs of 
pesticides, 
Kroner/ha 
165 
315 
280 
280 
405 
405 
Swedish 
200 
300 
300 
300 
350 
350 
prices 
(30) 
(15) 
(40) 
(20) 
(40) 
(20) 
Damage threshold, kg/h; 
World market 
prices 
300 
800 
450 
450 
700 
600 
(20) 
(4) 
(30) 
(10) 
(10) 
(5) 
i 
Minimum prices 
800 
800 
1200 
1200 
1200 
600 
(4) 
(4) 
(2) 
(2) 
(5) 
(5) 
Source: Kungl. skogs-och lantbruksakademien (1989) 
This Swedish study did not use damage-threshold models for weed control. For weeds it 
was assumed that halving the number of treatments would result in a 5% yield reduction. 
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The Swedish researchers opted for quotas on pesticides (expressed in standard dosages) 
rather than levies. They did a quantitative analysis for one scenario. In this scenario, they 
halved the area treated with herbicides, and reduced the area treated with insecticides by 
40% and the area treated with fungicides by 70%. In the calculation they also assumed 
that the producers would receive compensatory payments for income losses incurred from 
the imposition of quotas on pesticides. The compensation could take place by adjusting 
product prices. The result would be an increase in domestic prices for farm products. 
An agricultural sector model was used to elucidate the aggregated economic effects of 
reduced application of chemical treatments. This model was an interregional, spatial 
linear programming model of Swedish food production. The results are summarized in 
Table 4.5. Table 4.5 shows that imposing quotas on pesticide use will cause production 
costs to increase by no less than 1000 Swedish Kroner per ha. Given that it was assumed 
that producers of cereals and rapeseed would be compensated for income losses, price 
increases were inevitable. Price increases for milk, meat and eggs were investigated. 
From Table 4.5 it appears that the prices of meat and eggs would have to be raised by 
10% to 15%. The price increase of milk will be smaller, because of the reduced share of 
cereals in livestock feed. Large-scale price increases like this are unrealistic, though. The 
current international trend of ever-increasing liberalization in trade in agricultural 
products also influences Swedish policy-making. Price increases like the ones mentioned 
in Table 4.5, therefore, are politically unlikely. 
Table 4.5 Summary of results from the sector analysis in Sweden; halving of the area treated 
with herbicides; the maximum area subjected to other treatments is 500 000 and 
250 000 hectares for cereals and winter rape 
Quota on standard dosages of 
Basic insecticides and fungicides 
Net costs primary production 
(mln Kroner) 
Budget costs of exporting grain surplus 
(mln Kroner) 
Selling price (Kroner/kg) 
Milk 
Meat 
Eggs 
Gain from treatment 
(Kroner/ha) 
situation 
22 970 
650 
2.40 
14.00 
7.80 
-
500 000 ha 
23 990 
230 
2.50 
15.80 
8.50 
850 
250 000 ha 
24 280 
100 
2.50 
15.90 
8.50 
1180 
Source: Kungl. skogs- och lantbruksakademien (1989) 
Furthermore, the term "gain from treatment" in Table 4.5 means the additional revenue 
that can be obtained by applying additional treatment. Imposing a levy that is equivalent 
to the value of this additional revenue will bring about the targeted reductions in pesticide 
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use. In terms of area sprayed, Swedish agriculture as a whole uses pesticides on about 4 
million hectares (mean for 1986-1988). The economic evaluation considered a decrease of 
1.3 million ha in the area sprayed. So, a levy of about 1000 Kroner per hectare (325 
Dutch guilders per hectare) will lead to a reduction of about 33% in area sprayed. Note, 
however, that with a comparable levy on kilograms of active ingredient, the reduction in 
pesticide use measured in kg active ingredient will be more than 33%, because a change 
to chemicals with a low dosage would then be stimulated, which would be impossible 
when levying per treated hectare. 
4.3 Results of Dutch research related to prices of pesticides 
Although not much research has been done in the Netherlands into the effects of changes 
in pesticide price on pesticide use, some conclusions can be drawn from data acquired 
from various studies. 
In a study on Dutch arable farming, Elhorst (1990) investigated the price sensitivity of 
fertilizers, pesticides and other variable inputs. He combined these inputs under the 
heading "non-factor inputs" and did not investigate them separately. The estimates were 
for the period 1980-1986. Elhorst (1990) found a price elasticity of -0.29 for non-factor 
inputs, which can be interpreted as being an underestimation of the price elasticity of 
pesticides for the following reasons: 
- Neither the effect of a price change of non-factor inputs on the cropping plan nor the 
production per hectare were included in the analysis. 
- Points of departure were a fixed amount of family labour and farm machinery. An 
increase in the price of pesticides is likely to affect the farm machinery. 
- By lumping all non-factor inputs together, substitution of the individual inputs - for 
instance pesticides for contract work - is impossible. 
The results found by Elhorst (1990) can largely be seen as a short-term adaptation to 
price changes. In view of the previous reasons, it seems likely that an increase in 
pesticide price of, for instance, 10% will reduce pesticide use by more than 3%. 
Recent research by Oskam (1992) on the use of fertilizer and pesticides in Dutch arable 
fanning reveals more about the price sensitivity of pesticide use. This research, 
concerning the 1970-1987 period, used data from a stratified sample of arable farms. A 
distinction was made between specialized arable farms (where more than 80% of the land 
is reserved for arable crops including feed crops), and farms where 50-80% is reserved 
for arable farming. Before discussing the price elasticities found we shall outline the 
factors which, according to Oskam (1992), determine the use of pesticides. 
Table 4.6 sheds some light on the factors accounting for the use of pesticides. The 
analysis concerned the period 1970-1987. So, some of the differences can be ascribed to 
pesticide use increasing over time (Section 2.3). 
The differences in pesticide use per farm per hectare relate to a large extent to the 
cropping plan. Reducing the share of onions, sugarbeet and potatoes in a farm's total area 
will considerably affect the use of pesticides, measured in guilders. Actual revenue per 
hectare and per crop consists of two elements: 
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- yield in kilograms per hectare; 
- the price realized (as compared with the average price realized by farmers). 
Higher revenue per hectare per crop play a role in explaining pesticide use. Factors such 
as increased quantity and improved quality of crops push up pesticide use. Regional 
differences in the use of pesticides are remarkably small. The differences that were found 
(see also Table 2.7) might be caused by differences in cropping plans. 
Another conclusion to be drawn from the analysis is that pesticide use is more easy to 
explain than the use of fertilizer. This means that differences in use caused by, for 
instance, differences in farm management, individual factors, chance factors and the like, 
are less profound. Yet, as much as one-third of the differences in pesticide use (per 
hectare) belong to the category 'unexplained'. This category includes factors such as 
differences in management, individual factors, chance factors, measurement error, etc. 
Table 4.6 Share (in percentages) of different factors in explaining pesticide use in guilders per 
hectare (against constant prices) over the 1970-1987 period in a sample of Dutch 
arable farms 
Factors 
Systematic differences during the period 
Cropping plan 
Quantity and quality of product 
Regional differences 
Schooling farmer, labour per ha, machinery, 
Unexplained 
fertilizer, etc. 
All 
19 
38 
6 
1 
2 
34 
Farms 
Specialized 
21 
36 
5 
0 
2 
35 
Mixed 
7 
39 
12 
1 
5 
36 
Source: Oskam (1992) 
Table 4.7 Price elasticities of the demand for pesticides on two types of Dutch arable farms; the 
estimated standard deviations are given in brackets 
Type of crop Specialized farms Mixed farms 
Cereals, oilseeds, pulse crops, other -0.4 (0.4) -0.5 (1.9) 
marketable crops 
Potatoes, onions -0.5 (0.5) -0.1 (0.3) 
Source: Oskam (1992) 
The price sensitivity of the different crops to the price of pesticides was determined, in 
the first instance, by an analysis that first estimated the volume (magnitude) of pesticide 
use per crop per year. With the help of regression analysis, these estimates were then 
used to determine to what extent pesticide use is increasing. In addition, the degree to 
which pesticide use is influenced by the prices of crops and pesticides was investigated. 
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Per crop, this method did not provide easily explicable results. Allocating crops to one of 
two groups, and assigning a special position to sugarbeet, gave the results shown in Table 
4.7. 
The results from Table 4.7 indicate a price elasticity of pesticide use in Dutch arable 
farming of about -0.4 to -0.5, although the price elasticity of potatoes and onions on 
mixed farms is slightly deviant. These price elasticities are to be regarded as medium-
term results, since the specified relationship between pesticide use and pesticide price 
incorporates short-term as well as long-term effects. Given the relatively unreliable 
results, the figure for the price elasticity of pesticide use mentioned above must be treated 
with great care. 
4.4 Results of Danish research on pesticide use 
An overview 
As illustrated in Table 2.2, pesticide use in Denmark is rather low, compared with other 
countries. Most important are herbicides and fungicides (see Table 4.8). Denmark has 
committed itself in the 'Action Plan' to reducing pesticide use. Both the volume and the 
number of treatments will have to be reduced by 25% in 1990, and by 50% in 1997 
compared with the period 1981-85 (Dubgaard, 1990). The Danish government has opted 
for a system of administrative taxes or financial levies. Moreover, there has been a study 
on the effects of incentive or levies on pesticides (Dubgaard, 1991). The administrative 
tax is too low to have any measurable effect on pesticide use. In 1990 the financial levy 
amounted circa 3% of the expenses on pesticides and was mainly used for research, while 
part ended up in the government budget. 
Table 4.8 Pesticide use in Denmark during the period 1985-1990 in 10* kg of active ingredient 
Pesticide 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Nematicides 
Herbicides 
Fungicides 
Insecticides 
Growth 
regulators 
Others 
Total 
113 
4 244 
2 373 
337 
329 
12 
7 408 
101 
4 031 
1 821 
311 
363 
11 
6 638 
48 
4 117 
1237 
215 
281 
9 
5 907 
73 
3 988 
1 310 
223 
236 
17 
5 847 
86 
4 276 
1516 
306 
335 
11 
6 530 
85 
3488 
1660 
313 
871 
10 
6427 
Source: Miljostyrelsens Kemikalienspektion, 1990 
Recently published statistics from the Environmental Protection Agency show that in 1990 
the amount of active ingredients used dropped by 18% (compared to the period 1981-85), 
but the calculated number of treatments had increased by 33%. This illustrates that the 
initial objectives of the Action Plan have not been reached. This could be one of the 
reasons that the Danish government is now trying to have the targeted 50% reduction in 
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the number of treatments removed from the Action Plan (Dubgaard, 1992, pers.comm.). 
The study into the effects of incentive levies departed from a fixed levy per standard dose 
applied per hectare (Dubgaard, 1991). The amount of this levy can, by way of a standard 
dosage, be converted into a levy (amount) per kg of active ingredient. There are large 
differences in taxes per kg active ingredient. Toxicity and persistence might have been 
more likely candidate criteria for varying levies, but were disregarded. The Danish 
government's policy on authorizing chemicals has already succeeded in removing the most 
hazardous chemicals from the market. The environmental hazard posed by the remaining 
chemicals is less alarming. 
In the Danish study (Dubgaard, 1987, 1991) two different economic approaches were 
chosen. The first was based on damage-threshold models. (For the theory behind this type 
of model, see Section 3.3). The second was an analysis using econometric models, which 
allow historical developments to be analysed. The essence of this method was discussed in 
Section 3.5. The method used in Denmark was based on an ad-hoc model. 
Calculation using damage-threshold models 
The principle of an economic damage-threshold is that it indicates the level of disease at 
which it becomes cost-effective to apply a treatment. To be able to work out the damage 
threshold, the product prices and the cost of chemical treatment must be known. These 
models can be used to assist farm management. 
The Danish researchers used damage-threshold models to run simulations and interpreted 
the results on an aggregated level. To be able to do such an analysis, one needs to have 
data on the varying pressure of diseases and the effects of treatments on different crops. 
The data used for this had been collected from experimental fields throughout Denmark, 
similar to the research done in Sweden and described in Section 4.2. 
Dubgaard (1991) sketches the conceptual model that combines the results of both the 
model simulations and the data on the experimental fields. Figure 4.1 shows this 
conceptual model. On the horizontal axis the area of a particular crop is given, in order 
of decreasing 'disease level' (which means the nearer to the origin, the more profitable 
the crop treatment). The costs and profits of the treatment per hectare are given on the 
vertical axis. Curve R gives the revenues acquired by treating an extra hectare. Line C 
represents the costs of treatment per hectare. 
At the point where C and R intersect, the additional costs of treating one extra area unit 
equal the additional revenues. From the horizontal axis it can be read that in this situation 
it is economically profitable (cost-effective) to treat A, hectare of crop with chemicals. 
The imposition of a levy will result in higher treatment costs, which is reflected by line C 
+ tax in Figure 4.1. This will cause the treated area (and the intersection) to shift from 
A, to A2. 
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Revenue, 
costs/ha 
-C + levy 
Area 
Fig. 4.1 Conceptual model used in Danish research to illustrate the effects of a pesticide 
tax on the area of application" 
1) Explanation: 
AT = total area under a particular crop 
A, = area with pesticide application; no levy 
A2 = area with pesticide application; with a levy on pesticides 
C = costs of pesticide application (per ha) 
R = revenue from pesticide application (per ha) 
Source: Dubgaard (1991) 
In addition to the shifts, as shown in Figure 4.1, substantial price increases of pesticides 
will have other effects. For instance, they may be an incentive for farmers to take a 
different look at crops and consider adopting other methods, such as the use of 
management systems, or improving spraying equipment. Together, these effects are 
termed the "induced technological change". Because relevant data are scarce, it is 
impossible to calculate this change. To determine the induced technological change, the 
Danish researchers used estimates made by experts in crop protection. 
Two levy amounts were investigated: 100 and 200 Danish Kroner per standard dose per 
hectare (30 and 60 Dutch guilders respectively). They caused the price of pesticides to 
increase by an average of 60% and 120% respectively. It turned out that the increase in 
insecticide price was about three times that of herbicides and fungicides (Dubgaard, 
1987). 
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Crop protection experts 'guestimated' the reduction of pesticides use by 'induced 
technology change' to be 15% and 25% for price increases of 60% and 120%, 
respectively. 
The results of the estimates and of the model calculations were combined, resulting in 
total reductions in pesticide use of 20-25% and 40-45% for price increases of 60% and 
120% respectively, which comes down to a price elasticity of -0.3 for the demand for 
pesticides (Dubgaard, 1987). A recent recalculation indicated a price elasticity between 
-0.2 and -0.3, with rather low (absolute) values for herbicides (Rude, 1992, pers.comm.). 
Calculation by way of econometric methods 
The same Danish study used econometric methods to investigate the observed behaviour 
of farmers to obtain reference material for the above-mentioned findings. For that purpose 
regression equations based on annual data on prices and pesticide use in the 1971-1985 
period were estimated. In the regression equations the average number of treatments per 
hectare were reflected as being a function of the index prices of pesticides and of a trend 
variable. 
The price elasticities for herbicide and fungicide/insecticide were found to be -0.69 and 
-0.81 respectively. These price elasticities are substantially higher than the results found 
using the damage threshold models. 
Dubgaard (1987; 1991) noted that the results were aggregated to two groups, because 
statistical data were only available on these two groups. Combining fungicides and 
insecticides was problematical, because the use of these chemicals did not increase 
equally. Moreover, estimation of the trend variable compounded the unreliability of the 
estimates. 
Notwithstanding the doubts expressed by the researcher about the results (also in 
connection with the multicollinearity problems), the results must be regarded as being 
indicative of producers' long-term willingness to adapt to prices of pesticides: producers 
do react to price changes. 
4.5 Results of German research on pesticide use 
Pesticide use in West Germany is quite similar to Sweden and Denmark, although at an 
higher level. Moreover, reductions in amounts used are less clear in West Germany, 
especially for fungicides (see Table 4.9). The government is trying to reduce the number 
of authorized pesticides by applying more strict rules (Gifap, 1990). 
Schulte (1983) investigated the effects of reduced application of fertilizers and pesticides 
on farmers' incomes. Among the instruments he studied were the tax on nitrogen in 
fertilizers and the tax on fungicides. He highlighted the interaction between the input of 
fertilizers and pesticides (see also Section 3.4). 
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Table 4.9 Pesticide use in West Germany during the period 1979-1987 in 1Ö5 kg of active 
ingredient 
Pesticide 1979 1981 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Herbicides 
Fungicides 
Insecticides 
Others 
20 510 
7 112 
2 341 
3 687 
19 507 
7 012 
2 405 
2 871 
19 339 
7 572 
2 152 
2 287 
18 843 
8 546 
2 331 
2 675 
17 390 
8 491 
1 566 
2606 
18 630 
8 689 
1456 
2609 
16 967 
9 206 
1 220 
2464 
Total 33 650 31 795 31 350 32 395 30 053 31 384 29 857 
Source: Industrieverband Pflanzenschutz, 1988 
LP models were constructed for five farms, differentiating between factors such as farm 
size, region, etc. The farms were: three arable farms (in Rheinland, Bayern and 
Schleswig-Holstein), an intensive livestock farm in Südoldenburg, and a mixed farm in 
Hessen. Table 4.10 shows the figures resulting from the investigation on the tax on 
fungicides. Imposition of a 100% levy will substantially reduce the input of fungicides. 
For a mixed farm this would mean that fungicides will no longer be applied. The effects 
not only result in changes in cultivation methods but also in changes the cropping plan. 
Table 4.11 shows the impacts on incomes. In this table income loss is subdivided into the 
levy paid and the income loss caused by changes in yields and costs. The levy paid 
corresponds with the pesticide use (Deutsche Marks) shown in Table 4.10 multiplied by 
the appropriate levy (%/100). 
Table 4.10 The effect of a levy on fungicides (in % of the price) on the use of fungicides (DM, 
per farm expressed in prices relating to no levy) for five German farms; the reduction 
in % is given in brackets 
Levy ( % ) 
Model 
Rheinland 
Bayern 
Schleswig-Holstein 
Südoldenburg 
Hessen 
0 
8090 
7370 
13110 
2670 
1250 
100 
4490 
2400 
2570 
1490 
0 
(45) 
(67) 
(80) 
(56) 
(100) 
200 
4480 (45) 
2400 (67) 
520 (96) 
360 (86) 
0 (100) 
300 
3440 (58) 
0 (100) 
520 (96) 
360 (86) 
0 (100) 
400 
1880 
0 
0 
360 
0 
(77) 
(100) 
(100) 
(86) 
(100) 
Source: Schulte (1983) 
From Table 4.11 it appears that the levy-induced losses are bigger for specialized arable 
farms than for the intensive livestock farm in Südoldenburg and the mixed farm in 
Hessen. The income losses of the arable farms vary with region. The input of fungicides 
appears to be most cost-effective on the farm in Rheinland: even when high levies are 
imposed, fungicide use remains high. For the farm in Rheinland this means that income 
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losses caused by very high levies (from 200%) are higher than those found in other 
regions. 
Table 4.11 The effect of a levy on fungicides (in % of the price) on the income" (DM per farm) 
for five German farms; total income losses as % of labour income before the levy is 
imposed; divided into levies paid and income loss after remuneration (DM) 
Model 
Rheinland 
- levy paid 
- effect on income 
Bayern 
- levy paid 
- effect on income 
Schleswig-Holstein 
- levy paid 
- effect on income 
Südoldenburg 
- levy paid 
- effect on income 
Hessen 
- levy paid 
- effect on income 
Labour 
income 
before lew 
55 400 
64 300 
64 390 
57 330 
25 640 
Income loss due to levy (%) 
100 
11% 
4490 
1500 
7% 
2400 
2170 
14% 
2570 
6160 
4% 
1490 
700 
2% 
0 
510 
200 
19% 
8970 
1510 
11% 
4800 
2170 
16% 
1030 
9570 
5% 
730 
2400 
2% 
0 
510 
300 
26% 
10310 
4040 
13% 
0 
8430 
17% 
1550 
9570 
6% 
1090 
2400 
2% 
0 
510 
400 
31% 
7500 
9800 
13% 
0 
8430 
17% 
0 
11180 
7% 
1460 
2400 
2% 
0 
510 
Source: Schulte (1983) 
1) Effects on income after restitution of the levy 
If the levy is excluded from the calculations, the income effects can be solely ascribed to 
changes in cultivation method and cropping plan as well as to the associated changes in 
input/output relations. These income effects are mentioned in Table 4.11 under the 
heading "effect on income". It appears that the arable farm in Schleswig-Holstein suffers 
the biggest income loss at all levy amounts. From Table 4.10 it appears that fungicide use 
in this model farm decreases dramatically even at a levy of 100%. Although this farm's 
income is obviously very dependent on fungicide use, the input of fungicides seems to 
become unprofitable fairly soon. This is to do with Schleswig-Holstein having less 
favourable conditions (particularly poor soil fertility) than the two other arable farming 
regions, which is why the input of nitrogenous compounds needs to be fairly high. In 
Schleswig-Holstein it appears to become attractive to reduce fungicide use substantially 
even at a low tax, because even then relatively much nitrogen is saved (Schulte, 1983). 
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4.6 Discussion and conclusions 
It is interesting to compare the reduction targets and time schedule of Sweden, Denmark 
and the Netherlands. We will ignore soil disinfectants and the horticultural sector of the 
Netherlands. Both Sweden and Denmark have set the first round of reduction targets at 
the year 1990 and relative to the period 1981-85. However, the targets were quite 
different: 50% for Sweden and 25% for Denmark. These reductions had to be reached 
within a period of about 4 years. Moreover, it is remarkable that the country with the 
largest target reduction has the lowest use of active ingredient per hectare (2.3 and 2.9 kg 
a.i. per hectare for Sweden and Denmark, respectively). Future targets are a 75% 
reduction for Sweden and a 50% reduction for Denmark, both for the year 1997 and 
compared with the 1981-1985 level. This would bring these countries to application levels 
of respectively 0.56 and 1.45 kg a.i. per hectare in 1997. 
By comparison, in the Netherlands the targeted reduction is 25% compared with the 
average of the period 1984-88. This target has to be reached in 1995 and within a period 
of four to five years. The next step is to have reduced the use of active ingredients by 
39% (compared with the reference period 1984-88) by the year 2000. Because the 
Netherlands starts at a much higher level of active ingredient per hectare (7.7 kg a.i. on 
arable land), compared with Denmark and Sweden, it seems that it is not the level of 
pesticide use that is the most important factor determining the reduction percentages but 
'reasonable targets' from a political perspective. The targeted level of pesticide use in the 
Netherlands (4.7 kg a.i. per hectare) is twice as high as the reference level for Sweden in 
the period 1981-85. Reductions are set without a clear insight in the actual environmental 
costs of pesticide use. 
Although it is not absolutely clear from the reported research how much price changes 
will influence pesticide use, the results are certainly interprétable. The levies on pesticides 
being imposed in Sweden amount to an average price increase of 40%. The main purpose 
of the levies is to finance activities other than crop protection or conservation of the 
environment. The objective of the Swedish policy on crop protection was to halve 
pesticide use (in kilograms) by 1990, relative to the average use in 1981-1985. This 
objective was nearly reached. It is difficult to determine the influence of each individual 
factor. However, it seems that the levy has had only minor influence on pesticide use. 
Yet, in the Swedish situation the levy is thought to have more impact on the use of 
fungicides and insecticides than on herbicide use. 
The Swedish study into the possibilities and effects of reducing pesticide use enables the 
level at which a levy will succeed in achieving a certain reduction to be determined. The 
effect of reducing the area treated with pesticides by about one-third was investigated. It 
was found that one additionally treated hectare should provide an increase of revenue 
equivalent to 325 Dutch guilders. Conversely, this means that a levy of 325 Dutch 
guilders per treated hectare (standard dosage) would reduce the area treated with 
pesticides by 33%. This comes down to an implicitly calculated price elasticity of 
circa -0.2. 
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On the basis of the information given in this chapter, the price elasticity of the demand 
for pesticides lies between -0.2 and -0.8, most results lying between -0.2 and -0.5. 
Results deviating from this are either unreliable or less relevant in terms of the method 
used. The results found for Dutch arable farms indicate price elasticities of about -0.4 to 
-0.5. In a Danish study into the effects of levies on pesticides two approaches were 
followed. The first indicated a price elasticity of -0.2 to ^).3, whereas the second resulted 
in a price elasticity of about -0.7 for the demand for herbicides and -0.8 for the demand 
for fungicides and insecticides. 
The German study focused, among other things, on the effects of taxes on fungicides on 
farm incomes. This was done using an LP model. The study, in which levies of 100%, 
200%, 300% and 400% of the fungicide price were investigated, revealed that a levy of 
100% will at least halve the use of fungicides. Implicitly, this is a price elasticity of -0.5. 
Specialized arable farms suffer most from the levy. Income losses for the arable farms 
within this group differ per region. This is largely attributable to differences in natural 
conditions. 
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5.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to elucidate the influence of the price of pesticides on the 
demand for pesticides in Dutch arable farming and in Dutch horticulture. This relation is 
reflected in the own price elasticity of the demand for pesticides. Short-term (one year), 
medium-term (three years) and long-term (ten years) price elasticities will be investigated, 
using econometric models of the arable sector and the horticulture sector. 
The econometric approach produces a model composed of the quantified relationships 
between the key variables of interest: price of pesticides, demand for pesticides, demand for 
other variable inputs (energy, seed, etc.), supply of the output, demand for capital. In Section 
3.5 this model of the production behaviour of farm households was developed, starting from 
neoclassical theory. Therefore, all the relationships within the model have a causal interpreta-
tion. The model is quantified by applying statistical techniques to historical data. We 
developed two versions of this model, to describe how the production side of the Dutch 
arable sector and of Dutch horticulture are assumed to have worked in the past. 
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.2 the model is specified. Using the demand 
function for pesticides the effects of a pesticide levy on farmers' income can be calculated. 
This is described in Section 5.3. The models of the arable sector and the horticulture sector 
are described in Sections 5.4 and 5.5, respectively, paying particular attention to the data 
used. The price elasticities are given and discussed in Section 5.6. The most important 
conclusions are summarized in Section 5.7. 
5.2 Specification of the model 
Farmers are assumed to operate under short-term profit-maximizing behaviour, with respect 
to two variable inputs. The two inputs are pesticides and other variable inputs (energy, 
fertilizer, seed, etc.). In addition to the variable inputs, one quasi-fixed input and two fixed 
inputs are distinguished. The quasi-fixed input (capital) is fixed in the short term, but adjusts 
partially to the optimal level after one year. The fixed inputs (labour and land) are not subject 
to the profit maximization process. The labour input is not very sensitive to price changes; 
see Thijssen (1988). Therefore, we assume that labour is exogenous. The changes in the area 
of land used per farm are very sensitive to the availability of land in the neighbourhood of 
that farm. No information is available on the latter, therefore we also treated land as an 
exogenous variable. 
According to duality theory the short-term profit function (or income function) represents the 
production technology for a given capital stock (see Section 3.5). We decided to use the 
quadratic form for empirical analysis. The profit function is normalized by the output price, 
to ensure that the profit function is linearly homogenous in prices. We also assumed that the 
profit function is linearly homogenous in the quasi-fixed input and the fixed input; therefore, 
using duality theory, the corresponding production function is linearly homogenous in inputs 
(Lau, 1978: 164). This assumption is necessary at the aggregate level, because only constant 
returns technologies satisfy linear aggregation (Chambers, 1988:188). The normalized profit 
function is written as: 
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T = <*„ + a,px + or2Pv + a3k + Vi «4p^ + 'A a5p2 + <*,#„ pv + a7 px k 
a8pv k + a9px g + a1(pv g + a„g + Vi a12k2 + a13px t + 
aMpv t + aijt + a 1 6 kt (5.1) 
where x is the profit normalized by the output price and the labour volume; px is the ratio 
of the price of pesticides to the price of the output; p, is the ratio of the price of the other 
variable inputs to the price of the output; k is the quasi-fixed input (buildings and machinery) 
divided by the labour volume; g is land divided by the labour volume; t is technology. The 
profit function is specified in such a way that the resulting demand functions for pesticides, 
other variable inputs and capital are linear in all the variables. If the normalized profit 
function satisfies certain regularity conditions, it is dual to the production function and its 
parameters contain sufficient information to describe the farm's production technology at 
profit-maximizing points in the set of production possibilities (see Section 3.5). Testable 
conditions of regularity are: the profit function decreases in the normalized prices of the 
variable inputs; increases in the quasi-fixed input; is convex in the normalized prices of the 
variable inputs (a4 > 0 and a5 > 0) and is concave in the quasi-fixed input (an < 0). 
By Hotelling's Lemma, if we differentiate the profit function with respect to the relative 
price, we obtain demand functions for the variable inputs 
x = -a;, - a4px - a6pv - a7k - or9g - a13t (5.2) 
v = -a2 - a5pv - a6px - or8k - or10g - a14t (5.3) 
where x are pesticides per labour unit; and v are the other variable inputs per labour unit. 
The demand function for pesticides gives the relation between the demand for pesticides and 
the normalized prices of pesticides and other variable inputs, capital, land and technology. 
The demand function for the other variable inputs gives the relation between the demand for 
other variable inputs and the normalized prices of pesticides and other variable inputs, 
capital, land and technology. 
Using the definition of the normalized profit (T = q - px x - pv v), the optimal output for a 
normalized profit function is: 
3x 3 T 
q
 -
T
 "
p
* a?; "Pï w, (5.4) 
where q is the output per labour unit. The output supply function, therefore, is the sum of 
Equation (5.1), Equation (5.2) multiplied by px, and Equation (5.3) multiplied by p,: 
q = or0 + a3k - Vi a4px - Vi a5pj - a6px pv + a„g + Vi a12k2 + 
aMt + o16k t (5.5) 
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The supply function of the output gives the relation between the supply of the output and the 
normalized prices of pesticides and other variable inputs, capital, land and technology. 
The quasi-fixed input (capital) is fixed for the period of one year. After one year the quasi-
fixed input adjusts according to the partial adjustment theory; see Section 3.5. The resulting 
demand function for capital at the end of the period is a function of the optimal capital stock 
and the capital stock at the start of the period. 
k,+1 = m k ; + (1-m) k, (5.6) 
where k* is the optimal capital stock and m is the adjustment parameter, which should be 
larger than zero and smaller than one. The optimal capital stock can be calculated using the 
well-known static condition that the marginal return to capital is equal to the user cost of 
capital: 
jr - «3 + «TP« + «sPv, + «A + <V = PB (S-7) 
where p,. are the costs of the quasi-fixed input. Combining Equations (5.6) and (5.7), we 
obtain the demand function for capital 
km = m (Pu - a3 - «7P» - orgp,, - a16t)/or12 + (1-m) k, (5.8) 
The demand function for capital gives the relation between the demand for capital and the 
normalized prices of pesticides and other variable inputs, capital costs, capital, land and 
technology (all lagged by one year). 
The models of the average farms of the two sectors consist of Equations (5.2), (5.3), (5.5) 
and (5.8). The demand functions are linear in the variables. Therefore the elasticities are not 
constant in time, but depend on the level of the variables. In agriculture there is usually a 
considerable time lag between the decision to produce and the actual realization of 
production. Hence, producers base production plans on price expectations. In this study the 
output price is used with a lag of one year. This implies that producers have a rather simple 
form of price expectation. 
There are many cross-restrictions on the parameters of the model. This additional information 
is extremely useful because the models are estimated using aggregate data over a short period 
of time. Another advantage of the strong theoretical framework of the model is its internal 
consistency. For example, if the demand for pesticides and the capital stock are complements 
the parameter a-, in Equation (5.2) should be negative. However, if pesticides and the capital 
stock are complements, the relation between the price of pesticides and the demand for 
capital stock should also be negative. The parameter of the price of pesticides in the demand 
function for the capital stock is equal to - m a7/a12. This parameter is negative if a7 is 
negative and if the theoretical restrictions are satisfied (0 < m < 1 and an < 0). 
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5.3 Effects on income 
Using the econometric model of Section 5.2 the income effects for the farmers of a 
regulatory levy can be calculated directly from the profit function. This is the approach used 
in this chapter. Another approach is to calculate the effects on income by using the demand 
function for pesticides. That approach is unavoidable when the profit function is unknown. 
Other studies (see Chapter 4) mostly only give own price elasticities of pesticides. Using 
these elasticities and the amounts and prices of pesticides, and assuming a functional form, 
a demand curve for pesticides can be derived. 
Assuming a linear relation between the demand and the price of pesticides (see also Equation 
(5.2)): 
x = j8, + ß2 px 0, > 0, ft < 0 (5.9) 
where x is use of pesticides, and px is the price of pesticides relative to the output price. This 
relation is depicted in Figure 5.1 by the line DD'. 
P: 
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Fig. 5.1 The demand curve for pesticides 
The computation of the two parameters (3, and ß2 is straightforward when information is 
available on the average price elasticity (e), the average amount of pesticides used (x), and 
the average price of pesticides (p*): 
ßi = x (1-e) and ß2 = e x / p, 
The effect of a price change of pesticides, say from pj to p* and assuming that output prices 
are constant, gives an effect on gross income that can be measured along the demand curve 
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of pesticides, and is equal to areas a + b in Figure 5.1, because by Hotelling's Lemma the 
amount of pesticides is the first derivative of the profit function to the price of pesticides (see 
also Boadway & Bruce, 1984, pp.220-223). The total revenue from the levy (which is equal 
to area a), minus the administration costs will be returned to the producers. Therefore, the 
net income effect equals area b, if the administrative costs are ignored. This approach makes 
it easy to calculate the effects on income if only the own-price elasticity of pesticides and the 
amounts and prices of pesticides are known. 
In this chapter we calculate the income effects using the estimated models for Dutch arable 
farming and horticulture. But these simulations give the same results in the short term as 
described by Figure 5.1. Differences could emerge in the longer term, because of a shift of 
the demand function for pesticides in response to adjustments in the capital stock. 
5.4 The model of the Dutch arable sector 
This model is based on data covering the period 1970-1988. Most of these data were derived 
from "Bedrijfsuitkomsten van de Landbouw (BUL)(farm results)" (LEI, various years). In 
the BUL six groups of average farms are described: large farms in four areas (northern clay 
area, the Peat Colonies and the northern sand area, central clay area, southwestern clay area) 
and small farms in two areas (clay area, the Peat Colonies and northern sand area). 
We used the following data: 
- calculated costs of pesticides 
- calculated costs of other inputs 
- labour (skilled farm workers) 
- book value of assets 
- area farmed 
Data from the BUL were used to calculate the prices of crops per region. Prices of 
pesticides, prices of other inputs and prices of capital goods were derived from "Maandstati-
stiek van de landbouw"(Monthly Agricultural Statistics) (CBS, various years) and from 
"Landbouwcijfers" (Agricultural Statistics) (LEI, various years). Because the period which 
these data relate to was rather short (only 18 years), only one 'other variable input' was 
worked out. The price of this input differs per region because the share of various 
components in the total input is different. Because of the lack of data, only one input of 
pesticides was distinguished. All amounts were measured per unit of skilled labour. 
We constructed a model with four equations that covers the Dutch arable sector as a whole. 
The equations are: demand equations for the amounts of pesticides, of other inputs and of 
capital goods, and a supply equation for the supply of end products (outputs). We opted for 
one model for the whole Dutch arable sector because the lack of information made it 
impossible to estimate a model for each separate group of farms. To make up for differences 
between the groups, we added a dummy variable to the various equations of each group. This 
type of model is known in the literature as the 'dummy variable model'. The model is 
estimated by a estimation technique (SUR) which takes account of the possibility that the 
error terms of the equations may be correlated (Judge et al., 1988). 
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The estimation results do not contradict the theoretical assumptions. The profit function is 
convex in both the price of pesticides and other variable inputs («4 > 0 and a5 > 0) and 
concave in the quasi-fixed input (a,2 < 0). Therefore there is a negative relationship between 
pesticide price and the demand for pesticides; see Table 5.1. The adjustment parameter of 
the demand function for capital goods is equivalent to 0.54 ( = 1 -0.46; see Table 5.1), and 
therefore also complies with the assumptions made. 
The estimated model yields many relationships between inputs and prices and between inputs 
themselves. We used the model to calculate the price elasticities of pesticides. To illustrate 
how the model works, Table 5.1 shows key elasticities in the calculation of the price 
elasticities of pesticides for the average arable farm. 
Table 5.1 Elasticities based on the model of the Dutch arable sector (standard errors in parentheses) 
Price pesticides Capital lagged Technical change 
one year 
Pesticides 
Other variable inputs 
Supply 
Capital 
Income 
-0.21 
-0.03 
-0.02 
-0.04 
-0.06 
(0.15) 
(0.05) 
(0.01) 
(0.05) 
(0.03) 
0.09 
-0.08 
0.01 
0.46 
0.03 
(0.09) 
(0.06) 
(0.01) 
(0.10) 
(0.01) 
0.06 
0.02 
0.03 
0.05 
0.05 
(0.01) 
(0.01) 
(0.01) 
(0.02) 
(0.01) 
The relationship between the demand for pesticides and pesticide price is negative: -0.21. 
This means that a 1 % rise in the pesticide price will lead to the demand for pesticides falling 
by about 0.21%. This figure is not completely reliable. However, the standard deviation 
sheds some light: the elasticity should lie between -0.06 and -0.36 (with a degree of certainty 
of about 66%). 
The relationship between the demand for pesticides and the amount of capital goods on the 
average arable farm is found to be positive: there is complementarity. This means that an 
increase in capital goods leads to a greater pesticide use; however, the elasticity is small. 
Because of the complementarity observed, the demand for capital goods is negatively related 
to the price of pesticides. This elasticity is also small. The relationship between the demand 
for the other variable inputs and pesticides is also complementary. The amount of capital will 
adjust to price changes in about two years' time. 
A rise in the price of pesticides will not only reduce the use of pesticides and of other 
variable inputs, but also the supply of the output and the farm income. If, however, the levy 
on pesticide use is restituted to the sector and the levy is low, income will remain stable. 
Technological change greatly influences the demand for pesticides. Every year pesticide use 
per unit of family labour has increased by an average of 6%; this cannot be explained by 
changes in the price of inputs and outputs or by changes in the amount of capital goods and 
land available on the average arable farm. 
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5.5 Model of the Dutch horticultural sector 
This model was also estimated on the basis of data for the period 1970-1988. Most of these 
data were derived from the publication "Rentabiliteit en Financiering"(Profitability and 
Financing) (LEI, various years), which is issued for the various categories in horticulture. 
This publication describes an average farm in six categories of horticultural farms: 
floriculture, growing of pot plants, field vegetable farming, greenhouse vegetable growing, 
fruit growing and flowerbulb growing. The following data were used: 
- calculated costs of pesticides 
- calculated costs of other inputs 
(mainly energy, fertilizers, plant material, seeds and hired labour) 
- book value assets 
- crop area 
The prices of crops, pesticides, other inputs and capital goods were derived from 
"Maandstatistiek van de landbouw" (Monthly Agricultural Statistics) (CBS, various years) 
and "Tuinbouwcijfers" (Horticulture Statistics) (LEI, various years). Because the data cover 
a short period, only one output and one 'other variable input' were distinguished. The prices 
of these differ per category, because the share of the various components differ in the total 
output and total 'other variable input', respectively. Given the lack of data, only one input 
of pesticides was distinguished. 
We estimated one model with four equations for the whole Dutch horticultural sector. The 
equations are: demand equations for the amount of pesticides, for the amount of other inputs 
and for the amount of capital goods, and a supply equation for the output. We applied the 
same estimation technique to the horticultural sector as we used for the arable sector (Section 
5.4). Table 5.2 contains the relevant elasticities. The demand equation for pesticides in the 
model of the horticultural sector does not contain a trend variable for technological 
development. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, including of a trend variable in the 
demand equation would cause the price of pesticides to increase the demand for pesticides. 
This is a rather unrealistic connection that is the result of the correlation between the trend 
and the development of the pesticide price. Secondly, the data used in this study do not show 
an upward trend in the demand for pesticides. 
The estimation results do not refute the theoretical assumptions. The profit function is convex 
in the price of pesticides and the price of the other variable inputs (a4 > 0 and a5 > 0), and 
concave in the quasi-fixed input (a12 < 0). As a result, the relationship between the price 
of pesticides and the demand for pesticides is negative; see Table 5.2. The price elasticity 
of pesticides is -0.25, with a 66 % reliability lying between -0.06 and -0.44. The adjustment 
parameter in the demand function for capital goods is equal to 0.12, and therefore also 
complies with the assumptions made. 
In horticulture there is also complementarity between the demand for pesticides and the 
amount of capital goods. Contrary to arable farming, in horticulture it is possible to substitute 
between the other variable inputs (energy, fertilizer and labour) and pesticides. A rise in the 
price of pesticides results in a rise in the demand for other variable inputs. Therefore, when 
there is a rise in pesticide prices the output will rise as well. 
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-0.25 
0.04 
0.01 
-0.01 
-0.04 
(0.19) 
(0.01) 
(0.01) 
(0.01) 
(0.03) 
0.49 
0.49 
0.48 
0.88 
0.44 
(0.25) 
(0.11) 
(0.36) 
(0.07) 
(0.61) 
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Table 5.2 Elasticities based on the model of the Dutch horticultural sector (standard errors in 
parentheses) 
Price pesticides Capital lagged one year 
Pesticides 
Other variable inputs 
Supply 
Capital 
Income 
If a levy is imposed, farmers' incomes will fall. If, however, the levy is paid back to the 
sector, then a low levy will not change incomes in the sector. Contrary to the situation in 
arable farming, in horticulture the amount of capital goods is mainly determined by the 
amount of capital goods already available. 
5.6 Short-term and long-term effects of a levy on pesticides in the Netherlands 
With the help of the models discussed in Sections 5.4 and 5.5, it is easy to determine the 
short-term price elasticities of the demand for pesticides: they are equal to the price 
elasticities in the equations of the demand for pesticides. In the medium term, the amounts 
of capital goods will also partially adjust to a change in the pesticide price. This in turn 
influences the demand for pesticides. The medium-term price elasticity is therefore expected 
to be larger than the short-term price elasticity. In the long run, the amounts of capital goods 
will fully adapt to the changed pesticide price. 
Before embarking on a discussion of the price elasticities found, we must stress that the 
findings have to be interpreted with great care. This study is a first attempt to gain some 
insight into the size of these price elasticities. The model of the horticultural sector pays 
relatively little attention to the large differences that exist between the various categories in 
the sector. For a more reliable result, all. relevant data on individual farms will have to be 
thoroughly investigated. This is also true for the arable sector. 
The short-term and the long-term price elasticities in the arable sector are -0.21 and -0.22, 
respectively; see Table 5.3. The difference is so small because a decrease in the amount of 
capital goods hardly influences the demand for pesticides. The elasticity is 0.09 (Table 5.1). 
Table 5.3 Own-price elasticities of the demand for pesticides in the Netherlands (standard errors 
in parentheses) 
Arable sector Horticulture sector 
Pesticides Income Pesticides Income 
Short-term -0.21(0.15) -0.06(0.03) -0.25(0.19) -0.04(0.03) 
Medium-term -0.22(0.15) -0.06(0.03) -0.26(0.19) -0.05(0.03) 
Long-term -0.22(0.15) -0.06(0.03) -0.29(0.19) -0.08(0.03) 
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In his study on the arable sector, Aaltink (1992) based his models on a profit function and 
a cost function. The difference between these two functions is that a cost function assumes 
that the amount of production is fixed in the short term. In a year's time the amount of 
output will have partially adjusted. Aaltink used the same data set for determining the profit 
function, but normalized the prices and profits by the price of the other variable input. The 
profit function approach yielded a short-term price elasticity of -0.39 (0.16), and the cost 
function approach showed a price elasticity of -0.13 (0.10) (standard errors in parentheses). 
In the cost function approach the output is constant in the short term; this results in a lower 
price elasticity than when the profit function approach is used. In both approaches, the price 
elasticities remained more or less the same in the long term. 
So, it became clear that the profit function approach is influenced by the way it is 
normalized, either by the price of the output (our strategy) or by the price of the other 
variable input (Aaltink's strategy). However, the differences between the short-term price 
elasticity of pesticides are not significant. Summarizing, the price elasticity of pesticides in 
the arable sector is small in both the short and long terms. 
The same is true for the horticultural sector. Here the short-term and long-term price 
elasticities are -0.25 and -0.29, respectively; see Table 5.3. Because the influence of changes 
in pesticide prices on the demand for capital goods is practically negligible, the difference 
between short-term and long-term price elasticities is minimal. Table 5.2 shows an elasticity 
of capital for the price of pesticides of -0.01. 
In the short term, the average farm income will decrease as a result of a levy on pesticides, 
both in arable farming and in horticulture. In arable farming the elasticity is -0.06, which 
means that a 1 % rise in the price of pesticides will cause a 0.06 % drop in income. In 
horticulture, the short term elasticity is -0.04, whereas the income loss will increase slightly 
in the long term. However, if the levy on pesticides is restituted, a low levy will not change 
incomes in either sector. 
5.7 Conclusions 
In arable farming, the short-term and long-term price elasticities of pesticide use are -0.21 
and -0.22, respectively. Small alterations to the model specifications result in a short-term 
elasticity of -0.39; the elasticity remains more or less the same in the long term. For the 
horticultural sector short-term and long-term elasticities are -0.25 and -0.29, respectively. 
The related standard deviations are reasonably high, so the findings will have to be 
interpreted with great care. 
On the basis of these elasticities it is possible to calculate how much the average Dutch 
farmer will reduce pesticide use if a levy is introduced on pesticides. A long-term price 
elasticity of -0.22 for arable farming means that a 1% rise in pesticide price will result in 
pesticide use falling by 0.22%. According to the model calculations for the horticultural 
sector, in the long term a 1% price increase will lead to pesticide use falling by 0.29%. 
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This study used data from the arable and horticulture sectors in the Netherlands during the 
last two decades. Therefore, the elasticities calculated refer to relatively small price changes, 
and hence, to relatively small levies. In addition to trends in prices, there are other important 
differences between the past and present. For instance, the LCPP will encourage farmers to 
reduce pesticide use by means of education and information. Regulatory measures are also 
important. In potato growing, soil disinfection used to be compulsory treatment. Clearly, in 
such cases price changes are not the answer. In the future, soil disinfection will no longer 
be mandatory. It is likely that by means of persuasive measures the LCPP will lead to greater 
price elasticities than the ones given in this chapter. 
The future importance of the role of technological development should also be considered. 
Technological development appears to be crucial to the demand for pesticides. For arable 
farming this can be seen in Table 5.1. 
So far, every year there has been an average increase of 6% in pesticide use per unit of 
family labour, which is explained neither by changes in the price of inputs and outputs nor 
by changes in the amount of capital goods and land available on the average arable farm. If 
the price of pesticides is dramatically increased, there is likely to be a dramatic shift to 
technological development aimed at economizing on pesticide use. The technical possibilities 
for such a development are already available, as will be indicated in Chapter 6. By adopting 
innovative technologies, the long-term price elasticities of pesticides will become much 
greater than those given in Section 5.6. 
In the short term the imposition of a levy will decrease average incomes both in arable 
farming and in horticulture. In the long term, income loss will increase slightly. If the levy 
on pesticides is restituted to the sector, however, a low levy will have little or no impact on 
incomes. 
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6. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS WITH LINEAR PROGRAMMING MODELS 
6.1 Introduction 
Linear programming (LP) is frequently employed to simulate the economic decision-
making process at farm level (see Section 3.4). Environmental aspects of agricultural 
production can also be incorporated into this method (Kneese and Bower, 1979), for two 
reasons: linear programming provides an explicit and efficient optimum-seeking 
procedure; and once the program has been formulated, the results obtained by changing 
variables of interest can be rapidly calculated. This chapter presents the use of linear 
programming to assess the implications of a levy on pesticides. Familiarity with the basic 
characteristics of linear programming is assumed. 
The individual farm was chosen as the starting point to develop the LP model used in this 
study, because it is at this level that the actual decisions are made about cropping pattern, 
production intensity, etc. The environmental effects of production can only be assessed in 
the context of rotation scheme and fertilization practice. Environmental impacts will be 
influenced by specific natural conditions, such as soil type and groundwater level (De 
Koeijer and Wossink, 1990). As well as the regular items of production, labour supply 
and requirements, cultivation operations, investments and financing, the model includes a 
component incorporating the environmental standards selected for the cropping activities. 
The major advantage of using LP models for environmental economic research is that 
several activities producing the same product can be considered at the same time. In the 
present study each crop has variants ranging from an intensive to an 'ecological' 
production system. The environmental impact is represented in the technical coefficients 
of the process in the linear programming matrix. The financial results are given by means 
of the gross margin figures in the objective function. With this range of cropping variants 
it is possible to investigate the effects of a levy system on pesticides. 
In Section 6.2 the structure of the linear programming model is presented. Section 6.3 
focuses on the assessment of farms representative of the different crop-producing regions 
in the Netherlands and on the construction of the cropping variants. Afterwards, the 
results are presented (Sections 6.4 and 6.5) and discussed (Section 6.6). 
6.2 Structure of the linear programming model 
The general structure of the environmental economic LP model used is shown in Scheme 
6.1. The activities x are shown across the top under five headings: 
- production activities 
- variable operations (options for weed control, late blight control etc.) 
- seasonal labour supply 
- 0/1 activities representing new machinery for chemical and mechanical crop care 
- pesticide use. 
The rows of the matrix indicate the type and form of the constraints included: 
- total land 
- rotation restrictions 
- supply of fixed labour 
- several coupling restrictions. 
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Thus, each unit (hectare) of a production activity requires inputs represented by its 
specific column in the matrix. Among the inputs, the type and amount of chemicals (in kg 
of active ingredients) related to a production activity is specified. Hence, the gross margin 
figures of the production activities do not include the costs of these inputs. These are 
given separately for every chemical, in guilders per kg of active ingredient, and are 
linked to the production activities by coupling constraints. In this way the linear 
programming procedure takes account of listing the total use of chemicals, and a levy on 
these inputs can easily be incorporated by raising their prices. The model also registers 
the total input of nitrogen. Here, the costs have not been separated, as a levy on N-
fertilizer is not considered in the calculations. 
As indicated in Scheme 6.1, the linear programming model covers the option of several 
investments in new machinery, namely: (a) a new spraying device, (b) a new mechanical 
technique for weed control in potato and (c) a mechanical technique for haulm killing in 
potato. The innovations considered provide for a reduction in the amounts of pesticides 
used and their costs. On the other hand, labour and tractor hours increase when the new 
machinery is adopted. Both effects are accounted for by linking the investments to 
specific cropping variants using the machinery. The capacity of the new machinery is 
assumed to be infinite, as expressed by the -999 figures. 
The linear programming model optimizes the gross farm result, which is the difference 
between the total of the gross margins of the crops in the optimal plan minus the costs of 
pesticides, contract work, annual costs of additional investments and seasonal labour. 
The matrix described contains about 200 activities and about 210 constraints. The initial 
farm situation is specified by about 70 non-zero right-hand side values, depending on the 
number of crops in the rotation scheme.1 
We investigated how high the levies need to be to bring about a targeted/fixed reduction 
in pesticide use. This can be analysed with LP in two different ways: by gradually 
increasing the price of pesticides (a form of parametric programming; see Gal, 1979) or 
by including the restrictions in the model and then determining the shadow price of 
pesticides. We opted for the first approach. This enables optimization per farm per 
region. 
1
 The software selected is XA-87, developed for solving linear programming problems on a personal 
computer. The XA system derives the LP problem formulations from LOTUS 123 files. This way, the 
advantages of the spreadsheet programme such as formulas, cell references etc., can be used. XA-87 
includes a matrix generator option, called LTS (Look To Spreadsheet) which reads and combines 
spreadsheet files, covering all or part of the problem to be solved. Hence, the normal step of translating the 
linear programming solver input into MPS files can be omitted as the XA system can directly read a 
problem formulation from LOTUS 123. The XA programme was run on a 80386 pc with co-processor. 
Neither of the computations for the present study took more than about 4 minutes cpu time to solve the 
extended model. 
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Pesticide use depends not only on the crops grown, but also on the cultivation method. 
Therefore, for one particular crop, different cropping variants are distinguished and, in 
addition, "fallow land" is added. The cropping variants for a specific crop represent 
different crop protection methods; however, related factors such as cropping frequency, 
crop variety and fertilization can also be included. With reference to Section 3.4 it can be 
said that cropping variants form an extension to the 'technology set' (i.e. the 'activities' 
available at farm level). The extension represents the newest cropping variants, which are 
not yet widespread in practice. If sufficient data are available from research on cultivation 
methods, then a crop may have many cropping variants. To keep the model manageable, 
some cropping variants must be discarded. In the extended LP models each crop has 
cropping variants ranging from intensive to 'ecological'. 
Cropping variants that imply the use of large amounts of pesticides will be made less 
attractive by levies than those that need less pesticide. Running the LP models with levies 
of different sizes reveals how much pesticide use will decrease. Each pesticide used, 
expressed in kg of active ingredients and price, is individually incorporated into the 
model. In this way, for each category of chemical (fungicides, insecticides, etc.) it can be 
determined at which level of the levy the LCPP objective is met. The starting point in this 
determination was the targeted reduction for arable farming for the year 2000 (see Table 
2.13). 
Each cropping variant has a certain gross margin. Aggregating the gross margins of farm 
areas of the cropping variants chosen via linear programming, yields the total gross farm 
result. This result does not equal the farmer's income because the fixed costs are 
excluded when it is calculated. Varying the size of the levy results in different gross farm 
results because of a shift to other cropping variants. These differences in farm balance 
indicate the shifts in incomes caused by the levy. Next, the calculations assumed that the 
levy paid per farm is fully restituted. Thus, the net income effect caused by the changed 
price ratio can be established. 
6.3 Procedure and data 
For the analysis, the Dutch arable farming area was subdivided into 4 regions on the basis 
of the LEI classification used in (Bedrijfsuitkomsten in de landbouw = BUL) the Farm 
Account Statistics (LEI, several years). The four regions are: the northern, central and 
southwestern clay areas, and Peat Colonies (peat area including the northern sandy area). 
According to the 1988 agricultural census (CBS, 1988), 81% of the crop-growing area 
(excluding fodder crops) falls within these areas. A distinction was made between large 
and small farms. One representative large model farm was distinguished per region. Two 
representative small model farms were selected: one for the clay areas (northern, central 
and south-western) and one for the Peat Colonies. All farms of 158 SFU (standard farm 
units) and above were considered to be large; the minimum for a small farm was 79 SFU. 
This classification resulted in six farm types which are considered to represent Dutch 
arable farming. Table 6.1 gives an overview of the different cropping areas per farm 
type, reflected as a proportion of the total cultivated area. 
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Table 6.1 1988 cropping patterns of 6 Dutch farm types; the most important individual crops 
expressed as percentage of the total area per farm type 
Crop 
Cereals 
Incl. wheat 
barley 
oats 
Root crops 
Incl. seed potato 
ware potato 
starch potato 
sugarbeet 
Other 
Northern 
clay area 
45 
30 
14 
1 
42 
16 
4 
1 
21 
13 
Larger 
Peat 
Colonies 
18 
4 
5 
7 
65 
10 
3 
33 
19 
17 
farms 
Central 
clay area 
24 
18 
5 
1 
50 
13 
14 
0 
22 
26 
South-
western 
clay area 
30 
23 
8 
0 
40 
1 
22 
0 
17 
30 
Smaller farms 
Clay 
areas 
38 
25 
12 
1 
36 
3 
13 
0 
20 
26 
Peat 
Colonies 
26 
6 
11 
8 
61 
3 
0 
36 
21 
13 
The crops considered in the analysis were wheat (winter crop) from the category 
"cereals", ware potatoes, starch potatoes and sugarbeet from the category "root crops", 
and spring-sown onions, peas (to be dried) and seed grass from the category "other". In 
the study, the area under seed potatoes is included in the category 'area under ware 
potatoes' because no data are available on environmentally-friendlier cropping variants for 
seed potatoes. Central in the study is the use of pesticides, which is considered to be the 
same in ware and seed potato cropping. 
In 1988, the crops selected for our study (excluding fodder crops) accounted for 71% of 
the total arable area in the Netherlands (CBS, 1988). 
Table 6.2 presents the cropping patterns on which our study with LP models is based. It 
is a simplification of Table 6.1 (which was based on actual statistics) and uses the same 
classification into region and farm size as that table. 
In the analysis the six farm types were incorporated in six LP models. To obtain data at a 
national level the totals of the 6 LP models have to be aggregated. As each model 
represents an average farm from a particular category, the individual totals per farm type 
can be multiplied by the number of farms in the category concerned. Dividing the product 
by the total number of farms considered, gives the average national outcome. 
To determine present pesticide use, activities were formulated for all crops presented in 
Table 6.2, according to the current cropping practice. The data required were derived 
from "Handbook for Farm calculations" (PAGV, 1989). Subsequently, environmentally-
friendlier cropping variants were formulated for the following crops: ware potatoes, 
starch potatoes, winter wheat, sugarbeet, peas, seed grass and spring-sown onions. For 
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this we used De Buck's (1991) cropping variants for ware potato production in the 
Central clay area as well as Verschueren's (1991) variants for sugarbeet, winter wheat, 
peas and spring-sown onions in the same area. De Buck's variants were based on 
information from CABO-DLO in Wageningen (DLO Centre for Agricultural and 
Biological Research). 
Table 6.2 Cropping patterns of six farm types; share of each crop in cropping plan in % (figures 
in brackets are hectares) 
Crop 
Winter 
wheat 
Ware 
potato 
Starch 
potato 
Sugar-beet 
Spring-
sown onion 
Peas 
Seedjgrass 
Total 
Northern clay 
area 
45 
21 
-
21 
-
8 
4 
100 
(30) 
(14) 
(14) 
(5) 
(3) 
(66) 
Larger farms 
Peat Colonies 
18 
-
46 
19 
-
11 
7 
100 
(11) 
(28) 
(11.5) 
(6.5) 
(4) 
(61) 
Central 
area 
24 
27 
-
22 
15 
4 
7__ 
100 
clay 
i 
(11) 
(12) 
(10) 
(7) 
(2) 
__P_L 
(45) 
South-
western clay 
area 
30 
23 
-
17 
9 
10 
9 
100 
(17) 
(13) 
(10) 
(5) 
(6) 
(5) 
(56) 
Clay i 
38 
16 
-
20 
11 
8 
7 
100 
Smaller farms 
areas 
(9) 
(4) 
(5) 
(2.5) 
(2) 
(1.5) 
(24) 
Peat Colonies 
26 
-
39 
21 
-
13 
-
100 
(7) 
(11) 
(6) 
(4) 
(28) 
The integrated cropping variants for winter wheat, sugarbeet, peas and spring-sown 
onions, as used by Verschueren, were formulated according to data obtained from the 
OBS (Onderzoek Bedrijfssystemen/Research Farming Systems) experimental farm at 
Nagele (Vereijken, 1983-1988; Wijnands and Kroonen-Backbier, 1991). These data were 
collected during a number of years for comparing current variants with environmentally-
friendlier cropping practices. The OBS data were corrected. The yields in kilograms were 
related to 1985-1989 averages (Janssens, 1991), thus adjusting for weather influences. 
Since actual yields are usually inferior to those from an experimental farm, they were 
multiplied by the fraction: "Handbook for Farm Calculations 89/90" to "current OBS". 
The data from OBS were used for the quantities of inputs; prices were obtained from the 
Handbook for Farm Calculations (PAGV, 1989). Note that pesticide use of the variants 
mentioned is not corrected and is thus related to the conditions prevailing on an 
experimental farm, i.e. to the expertise and insight available on such farms. De Jong 
(1991), derived the integrated variants for starch potatoes and for seed grass in a similar 
way from data from the OBS at Borgerswold (Boerma, 1989 and 1990). 
Verschueren formulated ecological variants as well. The OBS data were unsuitable for 
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this purpose2. For the 'ecological' variants of winter wheat, sugarbeet, spring-sown 
onions and peas we used the gross margin calculations formulated by Van Hall (1990). 
This source also provided quantities of inputs and outputs; prices are from the Handbook 
for Farm Calculations (PAGV, 1989). No data were available on labour requirements for 
ecological production. They were estimated by replacing the tractor hours required for 
chemical pest control by mechanical methods and additional manual work. 
When feeding the LP models with data on integrated and 'ecological' cropping variants, 
we adjusted OBS yield data for regional differences. The adjustment was based on the 
relationship between current production on the OBS and yields, differentiated into 
regions, as stated in the Handbook for Farm Calculations (PAGV, 1989). Lack of trial 
data ruled out formulation of other, intermediate environmentally-friendly cropping 
variants. Therefore, to be able to calculate the physical yields of these "other" cropping 
variants, relations had to be formulated. 
Cropping variants for ware potatoes were developed in close cooperation with CABO-
DLO in Wageningen. The cropping variants formulated by CABO-DLO for the central 
clay area differ from one another in rotation, crop variety3, fertilization, crop protection 
(weed and late blight control) and haulm- killing method. Each combination has its own 
specific input of means of production: soil, labour, seed material, fertilizers and plant 
protection treatment. We selected the 23 most interesting variants from the large number 
of combinations possible. The gross margins of these cropping variants were calculated 
and the 23 activities were then included in the LP models (De Buck, 1991; De Jong, 
1991). 
Besides the integrated and 'ecological' variants several extra variants that eschewed 
fungicides and the growth-controlling chemical CCC (Besseling et al., 1988, as well as 
sources mentioned) were distinguished at different stages of fertilization. In the case of 
sugarbeet, herbicide use could be drastically cut. For this purpose cropping variants with 
different spraying techniques and mechanical weed control were formulated (Marcelis, 
1987; Van Schaijik et al., 1986). Appendix III gives an overview of the cropping variants 
for each crop formulated for the study. 
After having extended the LP models with cropping variants, their optimal combination 
was determined without a levy. Subsequently, the price of pesticides was increased by 
adding on a levy. Successively increasing the levy (parametric programming), enabled the 
relationship between the size of the levy, choice of cropping variants, pesticide use and 
gross farm result to be assessed. 
2
 The OBS experimental farm in Nagele investigates 'bio-dynamic' agriculture. Like ecological 
production, this type of farming eschews spraying but it is based on the concept of a mixed farm. 
3
 To represent the so-called revised PS (potato sickness) regulation, variants for different rotation 
frequencies of the standard variety Bintje were required and also for the combination of Bintje and a PSR 
(=potato sickness resistant) variety. A fixed combination (50% Bintje and 50% PSR variety) was chosen, as 
it is expected that growing more of the PSR variety will stimulate the development of new pathotypes from 
the present nematode population in the soil. 
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6.4 Reducing pesticide use without a levy 
In the LP models, actual farming practice is reflected by the cropping plans from Table 
6.2, under the assumption that only current cropping variants apply. In the case of the 
optimal situation as presented by the LP calculations, all the cropping variants formulated 
were possible. This may deviate from the current situation. However, relatively profitable 
crops such as sugarbeet and potatoes were limited by the rotation restrictions necessary 
for agronomical reasons. The difference between these two situations (without levies) is 
shown in Section 6.5. Possible explanations are given for any differences. Section 6.5 
also deals with the effect of levies. 
Pesticide use 
The difference in pesticide use between the economically optimal situation and the current 
situation is shown in Tables 6.3 and 6.4. The differences are given per LP model, and 
per crop. In reality, differences per crop can be subdivided into different cropping 
operations. This was not included in the tables (see De Koeijer and Wossink, 1992). 
Tables 6.3 and 6.4 help gain insight into the possibilities of reducing pesticide use in the 
present situation (without a levy). 
Table 6.3 Pesticide use under the present and the optimal situation (kg of active ingredient per 
hectare and per farm) 
Situation 
Current situation" 
Optimal situation' 
Difference per ha 
Total difference per farm 
. 
Northern 
clay 
area 
9.9 
9.1 
-0.8 
-50 
Larger farms 
Peat 
Colonies 
67.4 
4.1 
-63.4 
-3865 
Central 
clay area 
32.6 
7.8 
-24.8 
-1117 
South-
western 
clay area 
10.0 
11.5 
+ 1.6 
+ 88 
Smaller farms 
Clay 
areas 
10.4 
11.4 
+ 1.0 
+24 
Peat 
Colonies 
58.1 
3.8 
-54.5 
-1522 
1) Resulting from optimizing a fixed cropping pattern (see Table 6.2) which includes current 
cropping activities only. 
2) Resulting from optimizing the cropping pattern and after including environmentally-friendlier 
cropping variants. In Appendix IV this situation is indicated as "levy 0". 
From Table 6.3 it appears that pesticide use can be reduced considerably. The shifts in 
cropping pattern mentioned in the table are largely attributable to the method of 
calculation. We shall return to this later. 
In Appendix IV, the shifts in cropping pattern and resulting cropping techniques are given 
in two steps for each area. First, crops with a low profit margin, such as peas, seed grass 
(except for the Peat Colonies), and the 1:2 rotation of starch potatoes, disappeared when 
optimizing the cropping pattern. Next, the environmentally-friendlier cropping variants 
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were added to the models; the results are given as the levy-0 situation. Changing from the 
1:2 rotation with soil disinfection in the case of starch potatoes to the 1:4 rotation without 
soil disinfection (see Appendix III, Table 4) is of major importance to pesticide use. Soil 
disinfectants are used in large amounts but are cheap (see Table 2.6). Not all changes in 
cropping pattern bring about a reduction in the amount of active ingredients used: if the 
percentage of spring-sown onions in the cropping pattern increases, pesticide use rises 
accordingly (south-western clay area and clay areas). 
Table 6.4 Differences in pesticide use in two situations: the optimal model situation and the 
present situation 
Crops and 
explanatory 
factor 
Winter wheat 
Sugarbeet 
Potato: 
- soil disinfection 
- other pesticide use 
Shifts in cropping 
pattern 
Total difference 
(kg a.i.)" 
Northern 
clay 
area 
0 
0 
-52 
2 
-50 
Larger farms 
Peat 
Colonies 
0 
-32 
-3815 
0 
-18 
-3865 
Central 
clay 
area 
0 
-21 
-1062 
-11 
-23 
-1117 
South-
western 
clay 
area 
0 
-16 
-12 
116 
88 
Smaller farms 
Clay 
areas 
0 
-5 
-4 
32 
24 
Peat 
Colonies 
0 
-17 
-1498 
0 
-7 
-1522 
1) By 'difference' is meant the difference in pesticide use that exists between the optimal and the 
current model situation  
The most significant changes in cropping variants take place in ware potatoes. The 
volume of active ingredients used in the optimal cropping pattern decreases especially 
dramatically in the central clay area. This is because in the optimal situation the model 
opts for a potato variant without soil disinfection (see Appendix IV, Table 3). This is 
possible because in this case the variety 'Bintje' is rotated with a variety that is resistant 
to potato sickness. In the central clay area, we assumed that in the basic situation only the 
Bintje variety is grown, and the soil is fumigated every six years. 
A rotation frequency for potatoes needing no soil disinfection and/or the decision to grow 
potato sickness resistant varieties is crucial to total pesticide use. There are other (minor) 
measures that can lead to reduced use of active ingredients in potato growing, for instance 
mechanical crop control (by harrowing and late ridging) instead of chemical crop control 
(with metribuzin), and haulm killing mechanically with a haulm shredder instead of with 
chemicals (diquat). These two measures can bring about a reduction in the total amount of 
herbicides used (see Appendix III, Table 3). Finally, in sugarbeet growing, it is possible 
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to curb spraying with herbicides (Appendix III, Table 2) by using weed harrows and row 
spraying equipment more frequently. Furthermore, the model results obtained show that 
in most areas hand weeding will have to be done twice as often per hectare as in the 
current situation. 
Note that according to Table 6.3 average current pesticide use in the whole of the 
Netherlands is 27.1 kg of active ingredients per hectare, which is higher than the 18.6 kg 
mentioned in the LCPP for Dutch arable farming (see Table 2.12). This discrepancy 
arises because the average use mentioned in the LCPP, includes the area of fodder maize. 
Average pesticide use in this crop is 2.0 kg of active ingredient per hectare (MJP-G, 
1991; see also Table 2.11), and if this is taken into account, the average use in the LCPP 
becomes about 25 kg of active ingredient per hectare. The remaining difference can be 
ascribed to the fact that in reality the whole crop area does not receive the treatments that 
are considered standard in the LP model (see Chapter 9 too). Another point is that the 
number of crops in the model is smaller than in reality. 
Implications to incomes 
From the LP results it can be concluded that applying environmentally-friendlier cropping 
patterns leads to higher farm incomes (see Table 6.5). Research by Verschueren (1991) 
on the Northeast Polder showed as much: where soil disinfection and the use of 
herbicides and fungicides decreased, incomes increased. 
As suggested earlier, potato growing is the one activity where a change in cropping 
patterns is expected to provide the highest possible income improvement. This is mainly 
ascribed to omission of soil disinfection (the costs of this are about 500 Dutch guilders 
per hectare per annum). Moreover, there are cheaper ways of controlling late blight in 
potato varieties resistant to potato sickness, for instance by spraying less often, or by 
using maneb 80, which is cheaper. In the optimal cropping pattern, in the Peat Colonies 
the 1:2 rotation of starch potatoes is abandoned in favour of the 1:4 frequency which, in 
combination with leaving land fallow (yielding 1500 Dutch guilders per hectare per 
annum), is more profitable: the gross margin per hectare of the 1:4 cropping pattern 
appears to be 740 Dutch guilders higher than that of the 1:2 cropping pattern. 
In other areas, besides the money-saving aspect of refraining from soil disinfection, the 
higher yields in kilograms when growing a potato sickness resistant variety are important 
(Appendix III, Table 3). The population (and related with it the pressure of diseases) of 
potato root eelworms is lower when Bintje is rotated with a PSR variety than when solely 
growing Bintje with soil disinfection. So, variety rotation will provide higher yields than 
growing Bintje exclusively (De Buck, 1991). 
Other ways income can be improved in potato growing include mechanical weed control, 
mechanical haulm killing and economizing on nitrogen use (per hectare a dressing of 188 
kg nitrogen by fertilizer according to petiole analysis, instead of 210 kg nitrogen by 
fertilizer plus 44 kg from 9 tons of organic manure). 
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Differences in incomes (Table 6.5) not only relate to different cropping variants, but 
partly result from changes in cropping pattern. As mentioned earlier, the latter are caused 
by the method used to compute the basic situation. The current cropping pattern has not 
been optimized, but is based on 1988 statistics from LEI. Since then, the gross margins of 
certain crops (for instance, seed grass and peas) have decreased relative to those of winter 
wheat, resulting in a lower percentage of these crops in the current cropping pattern. The 
1989 prices were used for the calculations, so in the optimal situation these two crops are 
replaced by winter wheat, leaving land fallow (in the Peat Colonies, Appendix IV, Table 
2) and spring-sown onions (southwestern clay area and small farms in the clay area, 
Appendix IV, Table 4 and 5, respectively), resulting in an increase in the total gross 
margin. 
Table 6.5 Differences in farm incomes between the optimal model situation and the current 
situation: expressed per crop as percentage of total difference 
Crop 
Winter wheat 
Sugarbeet 
Potato": 
- Bintje/PSR variety 
- Weed control 
- Late blight control 
- Haulm killing 
- N-dressing 
Shifts in cropping 
pattern 
Total difference 
(in %f> 
Total difference 
(in guilders) 
Northern 
clay 
area 
1 
15 
62 
40 
4 
9 
4 
6 
22 
100 
23 400 
Larger 
Peat 
Colonies 
0 
16 
65 
19 
100 
29 400 
farms 
Central 
clay 
area 
0 
8 
89 
70 
3 
8 
4 
5 
2 
100 
22 700 
South-
western 
clay area 
0 
20 
33 
5 
13 
7 
1 
47 
100 
15 500 
Smaller farms 
Clay 
areas 
0 
26 
43 
30 
8 
5 
31 
100 
7 800 
Peat 
Colonies 
0 
24 
51 
26 
100 
12 800 
1) Soil disinfection was entirely ascribed to potato growing. Difference in income is subdivided 
into the selected cropping variant (Bintje/PSR) and "other" activities such as weed killing 
technique. 
2) By 'total difference' is meant the difference in income between the optimal and the current 
situation. 
To determine the extent of the income effect resulting from changes in cropping variants, 
the effects of the changes in cropping pattern must be adjusted. By adjusting for the 
percentages mentioned in Table 6.5, this can be approximated, resulting in the overview 
given in Table 6.6. The differences in income between the optimal and the current 
situation in all areas are largely the result of environmentally-friendlier cropping variants. 
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What causes the large difference between the current and the optimal situation? There are 
three main causal factors: (a) the assumptions made in formulating cropping variants, (b) 
the optimization objective and the knowledge available and (c) risk assessment. 
As regards the change in income, the crucial assumption is that growing potato sickness 
resistant potatoes in combination with Bintje not only provides better yields per kg than 
for instance Bintje only (or in the case of starch potatoes: non-resistant varieties) but also 
achieves the same price. If this assumption is justified, current potato growing will 
disappear and farmers will get significantly higher gross margins. It remains to be seen, 
however, whether for instance the potato growing industry is willing to pay these prices, 
should this dramatic change in cropping variant take place. Another assumption made is 
that seed potatoes of potato sickness resistant varieties are available at prices comparable 
to those of other varieties. 
When simulating with an LP model, full knowledge is assumed and profit maximization is 
the starting point. As already mentioned in the description of cropping variants, as far as 
knowledge of disease and infestation control is concerned, there might be a discrepancy 
between the know-how available on experimental farms and grass-roots know-how. That 
knowledge on economically optimal crop protection is sometimes lacking at farm level, as 
can be seen from the large differences in costs per hectare of pesticides use in arable 
farming (see Poppe, 1989). However, to be able to determine the economic optimum, the 
practising farmer needs to know the relationship between yields and the use of pesticides 
and other inputs. 
As farmers do not have full knowledge of diseases, they cannot fully assess the risk 
involved in postponing spraying. Weather conditions are also an important issue. For 
instance, mechanical haulm killing is cheaper than the chemical method. A drawback of 
the first is, however, that 2 weeks must lapse before the potatoes can be lifted. This does 
not pose a problem when it is dry, but when it is raining a farmer will not easily take the 
risk (De Koeijer and Wossink, 1992; De Buck, 1991). Note that departing from LP 
solutions probably means underestimating pesticide use (see Section 3.6). 
Table 6.6 Change in income when environmentally-friendly cropping variants are included in the 
LP calculations as well as current variants 
Change in income in guilders 
R eg'o n Per farm Per hectare 
Larger farms 
- Northern clay area 18 300 280 
- Peat Colonies 23 800 390 
- Central clay area 22 200 490 
- Southwestern clay area 8 200 150 
Smaller farms 
- Clay areas 5 400 230 
- Peat Colonies 9 500 340 
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6.5 Reducing pesticide use with a levy 
The results given in this section reflect the influence of different levies on pesticide use 
and on income. The end result is a margin per category of pesticide within which, 
according to the LP calculations, the optimal levy lies. This is die amount at which the 
reduction targets from the LCPP for the year 2000 are just met. 
Pesticide use 
Table 6.7 gives an overview of the amounts of pesticides used as a total for the six LP 
models, for levies of different sizes. As a point of comparison, figures on current use are 
included. In Section 6.4, we already highlighted the possibility of reducing pesticide use 
without a levy by adopting environmentally-friendly cropping patterns. We also indicated 
that in some cases (large farms in the southwestern clay area and small farms in the clay 
areas) this reduction in use was negated by changes in cropping patterns (see Table 6.4). 
From Table 6.7 it can be seen that levies bring about reductions in all areas. However, in 
each area either different cropping variant changes occur or these changes occur at 
different levies. Appendix IV gives a detailed overview. 
Table 6.7 Amount of pesticide used (kg of active ingredient per hectare) at different levies 
(guilders per kg of active ingredients) 
Area 
Larger farms 
- Northern clay area 
- Peat Colonies 
- Central clay area 
- Southwestern 
clay area 
Smaller farms 
- Clay areas 
- Peat Colonies 
Total 
Current 
situation 
9.9 
67.4 
32.6 
10.0 
10.4 
58.1 
27.1 
0 
9.1 
4.1 
7.8 
11.5 
11.4 
3.8 
8.6 
10 
4.5 
3.5 
6.4 
6.3 
6.5 
3.3 
5.4 
Levy ir 
25 
4.5 
3.0 
6.4 
5.4 
6.5 
2.8 
5.1 
i guilders per 
50 
3.1 
3.0 
5.4 
5.2 
6.1 
2.8 
4.5 
75 
3.0 
3.0 
5.0 
3.0 
2.5 
2.8 
3.4 
kg a.i." 
100 
2.5 
0.6 
4.3 
3.0 
2.5 
0.7 
2.6 
150 
2.4 
0.3 
4.1 
2.1 
2.4 
0.3 
2.2 
200 
2.4 
0.3 
4.1 
2.1 
2.4 
0.3 
2.2 
1) The calculations beginning with levy 0 refer to the LP models extended with new cropping 
variants. 
In each area, a hundred per cent reduction of the use of nematicides can be observed in 
the levy 0 situation, i.e. when optimizing with all cropping variants included. Compared 
with the reduction that can be brought about by employing new cropping variants (for the 
whole of the Netherlands the use of nematicides will fall by 18.1 kg a.i. per hectare as a 
result of changes in cropping pattern and new variants) a levy does not have much power 
to induce reductions. This is because nematicides make up 66% of the total amount of 
active ingredients in the original situation. The targeted reduction (60%) for the total 
quantity of active ingredients is met even without a levy. 
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Table 6.8 Reduction of pesticide use at different levies (guilders per kg of active ingredients); 
reductions related to use in current situation (%); total Dutch arable farming 
Pesticides 
Soil disinfectants 
Herbicides 
Insecticides 
Fungicides 
Other" 
Total 
Current use 
in kg a.i. 
per ha 
18.1 
4.3 
0.3 
4.2 
0.2 
27.1 
0 
100 
22 
27 
-6 
-35 
68 
10 
100 
58 
37 
24 
100 
80 
Levy in guilders per kg a.i. 
25 
100 
62 
39 
27 
100 
81 
50 
100 
71 
43 
31 
100 
83 
75 
100 
88 
50 
39 
100 
88 
100 
100 
89 
52 
55 
100 
90 
150 
100 
91 
56 
63 
100 
92 
200 
100 
91 
56 
63 
100 
92 
1) Particularly growth regulators. 
Table 6.8 shows the reduction percentages achieved by different levies for the Dutch 
arable farming sector, per category of pesticide. At a levy of 0, the increase in fungicides 
and in the category "other" is caused by the same factor as in Table 6.7: changes in 
cropping pattern. Considered per individual category of chemicals, a levy does bring 
about a reduction. The use of herbicides, fungicides, growth-controlling chemicals, 
'other' and, to a lesser extent insecticides, diminishes particularly dramatically (see 
Appendix IV). When distinguishing into the targeted reductions for individual categories 
of pesticide, then it appears that levies are not needed to achieve the targeted 25% 
reduction of nematicides and insecticides. For herbicides (targeted reduction: 45%) and 
for growth-controlling chemicals (targeted reduction: 68%) the levy must be to 10 
guilders, and for fungicides (targeted reduction: 25%) between 10 and 25 guilders. 
The option of leaving land fallow plays an important role in the transition from 'current' 
to 'optimal' cropping pattern. It is also a useful tool when adjusting cropping patterns in 
the light of increasing tax levels (see Appendix IV). For instance, for the tax levels 
formulated, between 40 and 70% of the Peat Colonies is taken out of production. For the 
financial implications of this, see Chapter 8. 
Implications to incomes 
In Section 6.4 we indicated that a farmer can increase his income by applying 
environmentally-friendly cropping patterns as well as the current ones. Table 6.9 gives 
the levy-induced income effects. The figures stated relate to the situation in which the 
levy is 0 guilders and environmentally-friendlier cropping variants can be included in the 
cropping pattern. Per farm full restitution was assumed, implying that restitution differs 
among the arable regions considered. The restitution equals the sum of the amount of 
active ingredients used (per farm) and the levy (amount). This method implies that unless 
a farm introduces adaptations, there will be no effects on income. Note that farms here 
means the representative farm of the region. 
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From Table 6.9 it appears that the income losses resulting from a levy differ somewhat 
per region. At a low levy, income loss in the southwestern clay area is relatively large 
because of a reduction of the area under spring-sown onions. At a levy of 50 guilders, the 
northern clay area suffers substantial income losses compared with other areas because of 
the change to growing winter wheat ecologically. Further we noted that, at a levy of 75 
guilders, incomes in the southwestern clay area are rapidly declining as a result of the 
change to ecological winterwheat growing. At a levy of 100 guilders no starch potatoes 
will be grown in the Peat Colonies any more, causing a dramatic income loss. 
Table 6.9 Difference in income" compared to the situation with a levy of 0 guilders (optimal 
farm management); different levies per kg of active ingredients; in brackets, income 
effects in guilders per hectare 
Region 
Larger farms 
- Northern clay 
- Peat Colonies 
- Central clay 
- Southwestern 
clay area 
Smaller farms 
- Clay areas 
- Peat Colonies 
Total 
25 
-1200 
-700 
-400 
-3500 
-1000 
-300 
-1400 
(-19) 
(-11) 
(-9) 
(-63) 
(-43) 
(-11) 
(-29) 
Levy 
50 
^100 
-700 
-2500 
-4000 
-1500 
-300 
-2600 
in guilders per kg 
(-62) 
(-11) 
(-57) 
(-72) 
(-63) 
MD 
(-52) 
75 
-4800 
-700 
-3400 
-11100 
-6700 
-300 
-5200 
a.i. 
(-73) 
(-11) 
(-78) 
(-198) 
(-279) 
.__LU) .. 
(-118) 
100 
-7200 
-15000 
-6100 
-11100 
-6700 
-6100 
-8700 
(-109) 
(-246) 
(-136) 
(-198) 
(-279) 
(-218) 
(-188) 
1) Income effect after full restitution; restitution differs per area. Restitution has been calculated 
on the basis of the amount of active ingredients used and in the amount of the levy. 
6.6 Relation between levy and pesticide use 
Table 6.8 indicates the relation between the size of the levy and the percentage reduction 
of pesticide use. When comparing these results with the targeted reductions in pesticide 
use (LCPP), margins for the optimal levy amounts can be formulated. Table 6.10 gives 
an overview. 
According to the LP calculations, it is not cost-effective to use soil disinfection chemicals 
in the current situation. The policy proposed in the LCPP should be capable of bringing 
about the targeted reduction. The size of the levies for the other categories of chemicals 
do not differ much, except for the levy on fungicides, which is slightly larger. So, except 
for the difference between soil disinfection chemicals and the other chemicals, roughly 
speaking, there is no need for a possible levy to be differentiated according to types of 
chemicals. The results given in Table 6.10 suggest a levy ranging from 10 to 25 guilders 
per kg of active ingredient for the other categories of pesticide. 
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Table 6.10 Margin levy amounts (guilders/per kg active ingredient), differentiated into category 
of chemical; reduction (%) 
Pesticides 
Soil disinfectants 
Herbicides 
Insecticides 
Fungicides 
Other (mainly for growth control) 
Reduction goal 
LCPP for 2000 
in % 
70 
45 
25 
25 
68 
Levy in 
guilders 
per kg a.i. 
0 
0-10 
0-10 
10-25 
0-10 
Use-reducing 
effect of levy 
100% 
22 à 58% 
27 à 37% 
24 à 27% 
-35 à 100% 
6.7 Conclusions 
The efficacy of levies of various sizes in achieving the LCPP targets was calculated. We 
found that the trajectory of 10 to 25 guilders per kg of active ingredient seems a 
reasonable levy margin for most types of pesticide, with fungicides at the top of the 
trajectory. The special position of fungicides was highlighted earlier in our discussion 
about the Swedish programme (see Section 4.2). 
Another point is that the LP calculations indicate that in the current situation the use of 
soil disinfection chemicals is not cost-effective. In the case of nematicides, the LCPP 
policy is to be preferred to imposition of a levy for achieving the targeted reduction. 
Generally speaking, for the other categories of chemicals it seems unnecessary to 
differentiate a levy according to types of chemicals. 
From Section 6.4 it can be concluded that the economically optimal model situation does 
not comply with the current situation, for various reasons. In some cases, merely 
changing to other cropping variants which enable dosages of pesticides to be reduced is 
already cost-effective. For a number of reasons this is not yet practised on a large scale. 
Model results do not accurately reflect the current situation because the farmer does not 
have full knowledge of how to interpret cropping variants and, moreover, because the 
risks involved in employing certain cropping practices were not included in the 
computations. The model computations indicated that changing cropping patterns could 
cause the average income of large farms to increase by 8200 to 23 800 Dutch guilders, 
that of small farms by 5400 to 9500 Dutch guilders. 
If a levy is imposed, a farmer must know how best to adjust his farming practice. This is 
likely to cause problems because, as mentioned earlier, in many cases (including the 
present situation) crop protection is not economically optimal. On average, this leads to 
more pesticide being used than is economically optimal. 
For a levying system to work successfully, much attention will have to be paid to matters 
such as educating and giving information to farmers and to doing research. As long as 
farmers' knowledge lags behind, it will be difficult to establish adequate levy amounts. As 
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indicated above, the margins may prove insufficient in practice. With respect to this it is 
assumed that after levies have been imposed, more pesticides will be used than is 
economically optimal, as occurs at present. 
Income effects (after restitution) occurring after the imposition of a relatively low levy 
have a minor impact on the Dutch arable farming sector as a whole. For the average farm 
a levy of 25 guilders per active ingredient will result in an income loss of 1300 guilders 
(29 guilders per hectare). At a levy of 50 guilders per kg of active ingredient this loss 
will be 2300 guilders (52 guilders per hectare). These sums do not include administrative 
costs. 
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7.1 Introduction 
The main reason for imposing a regulatory levy is to influence users (in this case, of 
pesticides) in such a way that a certain norm (in this case, environmental) is reached. 
From a social point of view it would be ideal if the regulatory levy equalled the social 
costs of a marginally used quantity (unit) of pesticides: it would then be a so-called Pigou 
levy (Baumöl and Oates, 1988) and its main aim would be not to finance certain 
activities. However, if the levy is used to finance certain activities, it is called a financial 
levy, and the revenue it brings in has to be implemented for some purpose. If regulatory 
levies work effectively, the revenue they bring in will decrease over time. 
A logical option is to use tax money to finance the administrative costs of the system of 
levying and refunding. According to the 'polluter pays principle', curative measures (i.e. 
those intended to mitigate the effects of pollution for instance, removing residues from 
groundwater used as a source of drinking water) could be financed by tax revenue. It 
seems very inefficient to spend all the money raised by the levy to cover the increased 
social costs per unit of pesticide (see Section 7.2). Another option would be to use this 
money to clean up previous damaging emissions. But the people or organizations who 
have to pay for the levy now, are not necessarily those responsible for the emissions in 
the first place. So, although in principle the revenues from a regulatory levy can be used 
to finance additional environmental measures, this may have its drawbacks. This is why 
in the NMP Plus (MVROM, 1990) the option of a regulatory levy is favoured, on the 
condition that revenues are redirected as much as possible to the sector that paid them. 
So, on the condition that the sector cooperates, restitution is the guiding principle. 
In Sweden, a portion of the environmental levies is used to finance general governmental 
activities (see Section 4.2). In the Netherlands opinion on this is sharply divided. The 
government sees environmental levies as a useful additional source of income. Besides it 
would be inconvenient for the government if each levying system had a different spending 
pattern, because this would make it difficult to integrate the policies made by the various 
ministries (Donner, 1991). On the other hand, imposition of regulatory levies does have 
its negative side for the government. Since revenues are bound to decrease over time, 
levies are an unstable source of income for financing governmental activities. If, for 
instance, revenues from regulatory levies were to lead to reductions in other taxes, the 
price of government services would become too low. 
The general philosophy environmental policy-making directed at the Dutch agricultural 
sector is that revenues from regulatory levies must be fed back to the sector as much as 
possible. In recent years, producers in this sector have invested in equipment and 
techniques that benefit the environment, some of which the government made mandatory. 
Therefore, they are unlikely to welcome a levying system without restitution. If levy 
revenues were restituted to the sector, the target group would be more ready to accept a 
levy because their income losses would remain limited. Indeed, depending on the 
restitution basis, individual farmers could even improve their income by using less 
pesticide than other farmers. 
91 
The levy: its level, its revenue and how it could be spent 
The target group's acceptance of a levy does not depend solely on how restitution is 
arranged. Also important is the degree to which income is transferred from one 
agricultural sector or subsector to the other via the system of levying and refunding. 
Other relevant factors are the system's fairness and transparency. 
How this chapter is arranged 
Section 7.2 discusses the theoretical relation between the magnitude of a levy and a) its 
revenues, and b) its effects on income. The determination of the optimum level of the 
levy and the possibilities for restitution are also discussed. Section 7.3 gives empirical 
information on pesticides in the Netherlands, and also deals with the efficiency of levies 
on pesticides from the government's viewpoint. Options for repaying levy revenues to the 
agricultural sector are dealt with in Section 7.4. Section 7.5 deals with income transfers 
from one sector to another under the assumption that a simplified form of restitution is 
employed. The last section (7.6) presents conclusions. 
7.2 Theoretical relations between levies and restitutions 
The size of the levy, its revenues, its restitution and its effects on income need to be 
analysed before we discuss the Dutch approach to levying and refunding. Figure 7.1 
reflects the implications of a regulatory levy for a sector. 
The upper diagram in Figure 7.1 illustrates the revenue (R) as a function of the levy (L). 
This is such that increasing the levy will lead to diminishing returns: the revenues 
increase less than the levy. If producers do not adapt their use of pesticides and other 
inputs, then revenue rises in proportion to the levy. Further it can be seen that there is a 
maximum revenue: R,,«. If the levy exceeds L^, the revenue will decrease. At a given 
moment (not indicated in Figure 7.1) the levy will be so high that pesticides will no 
longer be used. In the discussion we have assumed a levy of L, with a revenue level of 
R,. 
The lower diagram in Figure 7.1 depicts the income effects for the sector. The levy paid 
is the mirror image of the levy revenue from the upper diagram. Curve RS reflects the 
amount refunded to the sector after the costs of administration have been deducted. The 
administrative costs considered to be unrelated to the levy are equal to A. The income 
effects for the sector after full restitution (Y) are caused by farmers/growers switching to 
relatively more expensive inputs (in comparison with the situation without a levy) and/or 
by reduced yields. The higher the levy, the greater the effect on income. The point at 
which an extra levy will not change the use of inputs and the production of outputs is the 
point at which income will remain constant. Total income effect (YN) is the sum of 
income effect (Y) and administrative costs (A). Hence, at a levy of Lj the total (negative) 
income effect for the sector equals YN,. 
As mentioned earlier, the situation for an individual producer may differ from what was 
stated for the sector. Not only the size of the levy paid by an individual farmer is 
important here, but also the basis for restitution. 
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Fig. 7.1 The relation between the magnitude of a levy, its revenue and its effects on 
income 
Optimal levy and destination of the levy 
In theory, the levy should equal the marginal environmental costs (MEC in Figure 7.2) of 
the emission caused by an input. The optimal levy (L^,) is where the marginal net private 
benefit (MNPB in Figure 7.2) of the input equals the MEC. Note that MNPB is another 
name for the marginal revenue curve of an input, which equals the demand curve of an 
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input. For the farmer the optimal input level is where MNPB crosses the horizontal axis. 
If external effects of production are incorporated, the optimal level is x*. 
Although it might be easy to define a theoretical optimum input level and the related levy 
(Pearce and Turner, 1990, Ch.4-6), there are many practical problems because the 
relation between input and emission is unknown or uncertain and the marginal 
environmental costs of emission are unknown. These difficulties are especially relevant 
for pesticide, which is an input with non-point source pollution and for which very 
limited information is available about the costs of external impacts of emissions. In this 
study we use a limit (x*) for the future use of input stipulated by the government. If we 
assume that this limit reflects the optimal level of pesticide application, here 
MPNB=MEC. The optimal levy can be derived from the MPNB curve. 
Costs 
I . 
0 
Benefit* 
\MNPB 
b ^S 
^s— a 
MEC 
x * x° 
Emission or Input (x) 
Fig. 7.2 Optimal levy derived from marginal external costs (MEC) and marginal net 
private benefit (MNPB) of an input 
If x* is the optimal input level induced by a levy L^ , the total revenue from this levy 
equals x ' .L^ or areas a and b. Now the maximum amount to be spent on abating the 
emission to x* is equal to area a, otherwise expenditure on abatement exceeds the total 
costs of emission (=area a). Therefore, the total amount of the regulatory levy exceeds 
the total costs of the emission. A sum that is at least equal to b is to be used for other 
purposes, such as: 
- to cover administrative costs; 
- to abate previous emissions; 
- to stimulate technological developments to reduce emissions; 
- to refund producers who pay the levy though in such a way that it does not influence 
the application of pesticides. 
Within a system of regulatory levies it is common to return the total amount of the levy 
after subtracting administrative costs. 
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7.3 Regulatory levy with restitution: magnitude and efficiency 
Having sketched the theoretical framework for the Dutch situation we will now indicate 
what revenues are to be expected in future at certain levy levels. According to DHV and 
LUW (1991), to achieve the reduction percentages mentioned in the LCPP, levies should 
be between 25 and 90 Dutch guilders per kg of active ingredient (a.i.) for all chemicals, 
except soil fumigants. If a levy system is introduced, DHV and LUW propose that the 
levy does not initially exceed 50 guilders per kg a.i. so as to confine the income loss 
within certain limits. 
We did some computations using levies of 90, 50 and 25 guilders. The revenue was 
calculated on the basis of three variables: (1) current pesticide use (average for 1984-
1988); (2) anticipated pesticide use in the year 1995, and (3) ditto for the year 2000. 
Figures for the years 1995 and 2000 refer to the pesticide use targets in the MJP-G (see 
Table 2.13). We assumed that the desired reductions would be achieved. The 
computations did not include soil fumigants. Table 7.1 shows the total levy revenues. 
Table 7.1 Total levy revenues (million guilders) at 3 levy amounts (guilders/kg a.i.); current 
pesticide use (1984-1988); target use in the years 1995 and 2000; excluding soil 
fumigation chemicals 
Levy (gld/kg a.i.) 1984-1988 1995 2000 
90 680 500 410 
50 380 280 230 
25 190 140 120 
On the basis of these revenues it is possible for the government to assess the suitability of 
a levy system. In this respect the National Taxation Department's unwritten criterion is 
that administrative costs (costs to the government) may not exceed 1.5 to 2 % of tax 
revenues. The magnitude of the administrative costs depends on the levy system. DHV 
and LUW (1991) distinguish two possible systems. The first (I) is based on a levy on 
imported pesticide use or on the production of pesticides in the Netherlands. The 
administrative costs are estimated to be about 3 million guilders. The second system (II) 
is based on a levy at farm level. It requires the pesticide user to keep records of pesticide 
use. The administrative costs of the second system are estimated to be 15 to 21 million 
guilders (excluding the costs of keeping records of pesticide use by farmers). Table 7.2 
gives an overview. In this table we assumed the administrative costs to be 18 million 
guilders (DHV and LUW, 1991, p.147). 
Table 7.2 indicates that a low price elasticity of the demand for pesticides (i.e. a high 
levy) implies a high efficiency rate for the government. However, this is only true for tax 
levying. The main purpose of a regulatory levy is to achieve a certain environmental 
norm. A tax levy, therefore, has a different purpose than a regulatory levy. The principle 
of taxation is to get the highest possible revenue at the lowest possible administrative 
cost. Although a regulatory levy minimizes administrative costs, the main goal is not to 
collect the highest levy revenue possible. On the contrary, attempts will be made to limit 
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levy revenue, in order to avoid unnecessary circulation of money. From Table 7.2 it can 
be seen that relatively low administrative costs are involved when levying according to 
system I. System II would involve such high administrative costs that it is doubtful 
whether it could be maintained over time. 
Table 7.2 Quotient of administrative costs and levy revenues (in per cent) under two 
administrative systems 
Levy (gld/kg a.i.) 
90 
50 
25 
1984-1988 
I 
0.4 
0.8 
1.6 
II 
2.6 
4.7 
9.5 
I 
0.6 
1.1 
2.1 
1995 
II 
3.6 
6.4 
12.9 
2000 
I II 
0.7 4.4 
1.3 7.8 
2.5 15.0 
In this study the efficiency criterion must apply not only to the government but also to the 
target groups (transaction costs). These transaction costs consist of the administrative 
costs for the producers and the effects on their income. This is discussed in more detail in 
Section 8.5. However, it can already be postulated that the lower the price elasticity of 
the demand for pesticides (in which case administrative costs are relatively low) the 
higher the transaction costs will be. The pros and cons are difficult to weigh up; it might 
even be possible that additional administrative costs (for instance in system II relative to 
system I) easily outweigh the transaction costs. 
7.4 Options for restitution 
Levy revenues can be restituted in several ways. However, the following options must not 
be dismissed: subsidizing investments to benefit the environment; research on integrated 
crop protection or alternatives to pesticides; speeding up the authorization of 'better' 
pesticides; establishing a risk fund for farmers who dramatically reduce pesticide use. 
Excluding these options will probably not help to mitigate the environmental burden of 
pesticide use in arable farming but including them would undeniably pose several 
problems. For instance it will not be easy to determine how best to use pesticides without 
distorting economic competitiveness within the EC (DHV and LUW, 1991), or when 
implementing steering policies. When imposing levies on imports of pesticides it is 
difficult to refute accusations that the competition is being distorted, if the revenue is paid 
back to Dutch farmers and growers either directly or indirectly. 
Other options for refunding money raised by taxes are: (1) restitution via the Agricultural 
Board levy, (2) restitution via the tax inspector (on wage and income tax), and (3) 
balancing the levy on pesticides. Factors such as practicability, limiting the opportunity 
for fraud, low administrative costs, limited transfers between sectors, are considered the 
most important objectives. So, what is at stake here is a political weighing up of the pros 
and cons. The various options already mentioned will be elaborated below. 
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Restitution via the Agricultural Board's levy 
The levy imposed by the Agricultural Board (AB levy) is based on the number of SFUs 
(Standard Farm Units). The SFU is a standard measure of the net value added of farms. 
All (approx. 120,000) agricultural and horticultural enterprises in the Netherlands 
(excluding those smaller than 10 SFU) are liable to this levy. The AB levy fluctuates 
annually around 5 guilders per SFU (an average of thousand guilders per farm). The 
number of SFUs is established on the basis of the 'May census'. (This is the annual 
assessment of all agricultural enterprises carried out by the 'Dienst Uitvoering 
Regelingen' of the Ministry of Agriculture and is published by the Central Bureau of 
Statistics (CBS)). If restitution could be linked to the AB levy, the resulting system would 
largely cover agriculture and horticulture, and could be linked to an existing system. 
Restitution through the AB levy need not invalidate the policy proposed in the LCPP 
(1991). In order to avoid income transfers, SFUs must be distinguished according to their 
pattern of pesticide use. Moreover, for many farmers the levy will turn into a net 
payment; this will limit administrative costs. Given that the Agricultural Board serves 
farmers' and growers' interests, it remains to be seen whether it is the most suitable 
organization to collect the levy. Furthermore, the May census might be unable to cope 
with the extra burden of supplying data on which to base restitution. 
Restitution through wage and income tax 
In this form of restitution a uniform rate of restitution is established per sector. The 
compensation per hectare depends on the size of the levy paid by the sector. Identical 
amounts of restitution will be paid for crops in that same sector. This enables restitution 
to be achieved by deducting from the wage and income tax or corporation tax. 
Restitution can thus be easily and reasonably cheaply organized on the basis of the farm 
size per potential levy payer and per sector. Crop areas can be obtained form the May 
census. Income transfers between sectors can easily be avoided. However, in this system 
the tax department would have to make use of these data. Furthermore, here the same 
disadvantage applies against using data from the May census as applies to restitution by 
the Agricultural Board. 
In certain sectors the imposition of a pesticide levy might cause farmers to change to 
cropping schemes that require less pesticides. Restitution by the tax department based on 
the number of hectares will not influence this. Whether a farmer will switch to crops 
from another sector and/or to more extensive cropping practice depends on the sums 
restituted in that sector. 
Balancing the levy on pesticides 
If a levy is incurred by the users then it is possible to regulate both the levy and the 
restitution through the same institution (for instance the Levy Bureau in Assen, which also 
regulates the levy on manure). Although this implies extensive administration for the 
government and the user, the advantage of this system is that it is open and fair to both 
97 
The levy: its level, its revenue and how it could be spent 
(Zachariasse, 1991). Under such a system farmers will be well informed about ways of 
economizing, for instance via advice based on observation of pesticide use and the best 
crop/cultivation combination. The system as a whole provides extensive opportunities for 
refinement (for instance levying on the basis of emissions in a closed system) as well as 
for research into the causes of differences in pesticide use. 
The most difficult point in the levying system will be the monitoring of pesticide use; 
however, this does not play a role in considerations about restitution. Restitution can be 
based either on the levies of the previous year or on estimates of amounts levied in the 
current year. 
7.5 Transfers of income; a pilot study 
Pesticide use is an important criterion in the classification into sectors. Clearly, however, 
the use of pesticides per crop category can differ considerably within these sectors. The 
criterion 'no transfers within sectors' is therefore relative. 
For obvious reasons we departed from the classification into sectors used in the LCPP 
(MJP-G, 1991) (see sector classification A below). The classification concerns is based on 
type of cropping rather than types of farms. 
Classification A 
- arable farming 
- field vegetables 
- bulb and flowers from bulbs 
- nursery stock industry 
- pastures 
- public parks and gardens 
- floriculture 
- vegetables under glass 
- mushrooms 
However, more workable classifications are conceivable, for instance: 
Classification B 
- public parks and gardens 
- pastures 
- closed cultivations; floriculture and vegetables under glass, and mushrooms 
- other cultivations; e.g. arable farming, field vegetables and floriculture, bulbs, fruit 
growing and nursery stock industry 
Unlike classification B, restitution according to classification A can avoid income 
transfers taking place between the different sectors. An illustration of the income transfers 
according to the 2 categories is given in Table 7.3. 
Table 7.3 reflects the income transfers according to the above-mentioned classifications. 
Calculations were based on a levy of 50 guilders per kg of active ingredient (excluding 
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soil disinfectants) covering average use in the 1984-1988 period. Administrative costs 
(system costs) were fixed at 5 million guilders. 
In classification B, the restitution in the sectors arable farming, nursery stock industry and 
vegetables under glass is larger than the levy. This is remarkable, given that the levy 
revenues are not fully paid back because of the administrative costs. For these sectors the 
restitution per hectare according to classification B is higher than that according to 
classification A. The sectors at a disadvantage under classification B are bulbs and 
flowers from bulbs, floriculture under glass, and mushrooms. The mushroom sector 
shows a remarkably high restitution amount per hectare according to classification A, but 
is much worse off in classification B. It is questionable, however, whether a restitution 
per hectare is the right option for closed cultivations. The magnitude of the restitutions 
for these cultivations is likely to lead to incorrect reporting about the size of the area 
under cultivation. Moreover, in this sector there are often several harvests per year. In 
the future restitutions might be linked to the emission level. 
Table 7.3 Net levy and hectare restitution at a levy of SO guilders per kg of active ingredient 
(excluding soil disinfection); net levy is the difference between restitution and levy 
revenue; amounts based on average use over 1984-1988 period 
Sector classification 
Arable farming 
Field vegetables 
Bulbs growing and flowers 
Fruits 
Nursery stock industry 
Pastures 
Public parks and gardens 
Field floriculture 
Floriculture under glass 
Vegetables under glass 
Mushrooms 
Total 
Net levy (mln gld) 
A 
-3.2 
-0.2 
-0.7 
-0.3 
-0.1 
-0.5 
-0.1 
0.0 
-0.2 
-0.1 
0.0 
-5 
B 
56.7 
-0.7 
-45.0 
-16.2 
1.0 
-0.5 
-0.1 
-0.3 
-4.5 
4.5 
-0.3 
-5 
Restitution 
A 
293 
384 
2845 
2786 
324 
30 
8 
533 
2892 
941 
5696 
(gld per ha) 
B 
373 
373 
373 
373 
373 
30 
8 
373 
1986 
1986 
1986 
7.6 Conclusions 
Although in theory it seems easy to fix the optimum rate of a levy on pesticides, the lack 
of factual information makes it impossible to establish the amount. Therefore we based 
our study on the norms the government laid down for the reduction of pesticide use. Once 
the levy rate has been fixed, additional variables can be determined (restitution, income 
effects). 
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Restitutions are an important part of regulatory levies. Although the effectiveness of an 
environmental policy in which restitution is not based on its environmental merits is open 
to question, restitution can add considerably to the willingness of sectors to cooperate in 
the system of regulatory levies. 
If a regulatory levy works properly, levy revenues will be limited. After deducting the 
costs the government incurs from implementing the levy system, the ratio of 
administrative costs to revenues can be unfavourable. Limited levy revenues indicate that 
the financial instrument can be useful in the quest for reducing pesticide use. 
Tax money can be refunded to pesticide users in different ways and by different 
institutions. Although keeping on-farm records of pesticide use is expensive to implement 
and monitor, it is clear that this strategy has far better prospects for levying and refunding 
(as well as for counselling) than other strategies. 
100 
8. REGULATORY LEVY: FUNCTION, LEVEL AND INCOME EFFECTS 
8.1 Introduction 
The following discussion of the regulatory levy is based on arguments used in Chapter 7 
as well as on results from empirical research (see Chapters 5 and 6) and experiences in 
other countries (see Chapter 4). Because insufficient information was available to enable 
us to determine the optimal size of the levy, we took the targeted reductions for pesticide 
use formulated in the Long-Range Crop Protection Plan (LCPP), as starting points. This 
resulted in levies of different sizes, which made it possible to determine upper and lower 
limits for the levy. On the basis of assumptions discussed in Chapter 3, we shall 
investigate which factors are responsible for the large differences, after first discussing 
the calculated levies, income effects in agriculture, and other related subjects. 
Section 8.3 deals with the levy for the arable sector, giving the results of two different 
approaches. In that sction we also describe the experiences gained by other countries in 
studying how levies on pesticides affect pesticide use in arable farming. Price elasticities 
derived from both the econometric research (Chapter 5) and the literature (Chapter 4), 
hint at relatively large levies, thereby providing the upper limit for a levy. The LP study 
(Chapter 6) yielded relatively small levies, indicating the lower limit. 
Section 8.4 focuses on horticulture, in particular on the results available from the 
econometric analysis. Because of the diversity in horticulture, the estimated elasticity is 
an average of various heterogeneous subsectors. 
The income effects of levies are discussed in Section 8.5. These effects are crucial to the 
industry's willingness to cooperate in bringing about policy changes. Therefore much 
attention is paid to the income issue. We used a sensitivity analysis to investigate the 
assumptions that most influence the calculated income effects. In this section we compare 
the income effects following from our analyses with those in the LCPP. 
Chapter 6 indicated that a levy on pesticides increases the total area left fallow. The LP 
models showed that in certain areas a sizeable area is left fallow even without a levy on 
pesticides. Section 8.6 deals with the budgetary consequences of leaving land fallow, and 
indicates its impacts on the total area used for arable production. 
In Section 8.7 we return to the theory to study the consequences of price changes of 
pesticides, as discussed in Chapter 3. Section 8.8 contains some concluding remarks. 
8.2 Basic principles in determining the size of a levy 
As indicated in Chapter 7, from the point of view of the allocation of production factors it 
is desirable to finetune the levy to the marginal external effects (i.e. the marginal 
environmental damage) of the types of pesticides in question. Such an approach would 
require determining the damage level for each type of pesticide. However, this method 
will pose great problems, for three reasons. 
1. Although some effects of pesticide use are known (Van der Vaart, 1987; see also 
Section 2.4), albeit within wide margins of uncertainty, they cannot as yet be 
converted into sums of money equivalent to negative external effects (Eitjes and De 
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Haan, 1987). 
2. In some environmental components (for instance drinking water) it takes a long time 
from the moment the pesticide is used until the damaging effects show up (RIVM, 
1991, pp. 324-327). The benefits of pesticides, therefore, become visible much sooner 
than the disbenefits. 
3. The negative external effects of a particular type of pesticide may partly depend on the 
extent of other polluting substances (other types of pesticide, for instance). The 
existing EC norm for drinking water of 0.5 ng of total pesticides per litre 
acknowledges this (Richtlijn 12, July 1980 No. 80/778/EEC). 
The first reason speaks for itself, but the others show that we know too little about the 
negative external effects of pesticide use to base a levy on them. This means that, for the 
time being, a levy on pesticides must be based on other facts; for instance, on reaching 
quantitative objectives, as formulated in the LCPP (see Table 2.13). Another point is that 
a certain reduction in pesticide use does not necessarily lead to a proportional reduction of 
damaging emissions. If there is a threshold above which emissions become harmful, the 
percentage of emission reduced is greater than the reduction in pesticide use. 
The result of focusing on the amount of active ingredients used in pesticide could be a cut 
back in the use of chemicals containing the most active components (measured in 
kilograms) rather than in the use of pesticides that are the most damaging. This problem 
is discussed in more detail in Chapter 9. 
8.3 A levy for arable farming based on experience and research 
Examination of the situation in Sweden has shown that it is difficult to indicate the 
individual influence of the factors causing a reduction in pesticide use in Sweden. The 
influence of levies - which led to the price of pesticide increasing by about 40% -
appeared to be limited. However, it seemed that the levy affected the use of fungicides 
and insecticides more than the use of herbicides (see Section 4.2). 
Research on the Dutch and Danish arable farming sectors produced price elasticities of 
the demand for pesticides of between -0.2 and -0.8 (see Sections 4.3 and 4.4). Given 
these results it seems justified to conclude that the long-term effects are more significant 
than the short-term effects. The price elasticities for the Netherlands were found to be 
-0.4 to -0.5. 
Two methods were used in our research on the Netherlands: (1) econometric analysis (see 
Chapter 5), and (2) linear programming (see Chapter 6). The econometric analyses 
yielded low short-term price elasticities of the demand for pesticides of -0.21 and -0.39 
(depending on the model specifications). These price elasticities appeared to increase 
hardly at all in the long term. Only if the price of pesticides is raised considerably is 
modern technology likely to be used to cut back pesticide use. Therefore the long-term 
price elasticities will be considerably higher than those mentioned above. The literature, 
discussed in Chapter 4, also contained higher price elasticities than the ones we found in 
our econometric research of Chapter 5. 
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Many studies have shown that technology rather than price is the factor determining input 
use in agriculture. Sections 2.3 and 4.3 concluded that there has been a considerable 
increase in pesticide use per hectare in arable farming in the Netherlands, even after 
adjusting for the share of the various crops. There have been signs, however, particularly 
in the late 1980s, that this trend was levelling off. The econometric analysis also showed 
an upward trend in pesticide use (see Table 5.1). After conversion, this increase appears 
to be 4% per annum and per hectare over the period 1970-1988. Another important factor 
is the size of the area used for arable fanning: if arable farming increases at the expense 
of pasture, pesticide use will rise considerably. The total arable farming area in the 
Netherlands (excluding fodder crops) increased by 1.6% per annum in the period 1985-
1990 (LEI/CBS, 1991, p. 61). It is uncertain whether this trend will continue. So, when 
technological development and expansion of the crop area reach a point where total 
pesticide use in arable fanning remains constant, then the upward trend in pesticide use 
will have come to a halt. 
With the data on the Netherlands mentioned above - and given a price elasticity relating 
to average prices and average amounts of pesticides in the period 1970-1988 of -0.3 - we 
are able to calculate the maximum levy. Converting the data to that of the reference 
period gives a price elasticity that is only slightly different.1 
In 1987, the average price of pesticides used in arable farming (excl. soil disinfectants) 
was approx. 78 Dutch guilders per kilogram of active component (Vijftigschild, 1991; see 
also Table 2.6). This price includes VAT. So, to reach the targeted reduction in the year 
2000, and taking into account the -0.3 price elasticity and the 39% reduction percentage 
(excl. soil disinfectants, see Table 2.13), a levy of 99 guilders per kg of active component 
will be required.2 This is the upper limit for a regulatory levy on pesticides. Following 
the same procedure for soil disinfectants, we arrived at a levy of 12 Dutch guilders per 
kilogram of active ingredient. 
The economic analyses with LP models also provided the upper and lower margins within 
which a levy should lie if it is to achieve the targeted reductions for the year 2000 set in 
the LCPP. The LP models showed that soil disinfection is no longer cost effective. 
1
 When using a linear demand curve for pesticide use (see Section 5.3) it is necessary to convert the 
price elasticity of pesticides in the estimation period into that of the reference period. In our study we had to 
adjust for amounts of pesticides used, crop prices and pesticide prices. We derived the amounts from the 
LCPP covering the period 1984-1988. Differences in pesticide use can be caused by different weather 
conditions. Prices of arable products also fluctuate over the years (see Table 2.3). Therefore we used a 
rather long reference period for the prices of arable products: 1985-1989. Pesticide prices in the database 
(Vijftigschild, 1991) relate to 1987 prices. Conversion gives a price elasticity of -0.31 for the demand for 
pesticides in the reference period. 
2
 In this calculation we did not take into account possible changes in pesticide use resulting from policy 
incentives, technological development and changes in the area of arable land. Furthermore, we considered 
the relation between prices of pesticides and prices of arable products over the period 1970-1988 to be the 
same as that over the period 1990-2000. We will return to this in Section 8.5. 
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Abolition by the Dutch government of regulations that demand soil disinfection in the 1:2 
cultivation of starch potatoes - in the case that varieties resistant to potato sickness are 
grown - is sufficient to achieve the targeted reduction. For the other categories of 
pesticides it seems unnecessary to differentiate into types of chemicals. The LP models 
suggest that differences between various types of pesticides are not very clear. 
According to the LP calculations, the levy for pesticides (excluding soil disinfectants) 
should lie within the trajectory 10 to 25 Dutch guilders per kg of active ingredient, which 
seems rather low. The studies mentioned in the literature and our analysis using 
econometric models showed price elasticities that imply much larger levies. The LP 
calculations are based on the assumption that the average farmer is able to apply a crop 
protection technique that is economically optimal. However, this is not so at the moment. 
In Section 6.4 more explanations have been given on why an LP model tends to 
underestimate pesticide use. All in all, it is likely that the levy margins indicated by the 
LP model underestimate the levy really required. On these grounds we consider a levy of 
25 guilders per kg of active ingredient (excluding soil disinfectants) to be the lower limit 
for a levy.3 
If the policy objectives (DHV-LUW, 1991, p. 128) are to remain feasible, differentiating 
a levy on pesticide use into types of chemicals for reasons other than protection of the 
environment and public health must be avoided as much as possible. The calculations 
done in Chapter 6 do not clearly indicate that differentiation is necessary. However, an 
exception must be made for the use of soil disinfectants. For this category of chemicals 
the targeted reduction is likely to be reached without a levy, because of the severe 
regulations proposed in the LCPP. Chapter 6 also concluded that the use of soil 
disinfectants is not cost effective from an economic point of view. According to the 
econometric approach, the large price difference per kg of active component between soil 
disinfectants and other pesticides does justify differentiation of a levy. 
8.4 Effects of a levy on pesticides in horticulture and in other sectors 
Although the arable sector is responsible for the greater part of total pesticide use in the 
Netherlands, this does not necessarily mean that the levies calculated for this sector would 
have the same effect in other sectors. The LCPP formulated different objectives for the 
other sectors (see Table 2.13). So the question is, should levies in other sectors differ 
from levies in agriculture, and if so, to what extent? To answer this question we have 
only the indications from the econometric analysis for the horticultural sector at our 
disposal; see Section 5.4. 
The sectors fodder crops, livestock farming and public parks and gardens have not been 
taken into account. Fodder crops, of which green maize is the most important, have been 
left out of the analysis. Green maize has been excluded from the LP models altogether 
and has only incidentally been considered in the econometric analysis, because only 10% 
of green maize is grown on specialized farms (LEI/CBS, 1991, p. 21). Pesticide use in 
3
 Price changes in the period 1989-2000 have not been taken into account. The prices used in the LP 
calculations were standardized 1989 prices (see Section 6.3). 
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fodder maize production is about 1.8 kg per hectare, whereas other arable crops use 
almost 7 kg per hectare (excluding soil disinfection) (see Appendix II). 
Livestock farming primarily uses herbicides on pastures (80% of expenditure for 
pesticide) and cleaning agents. Herbicides are often used to improve the quality of the 
sward. For green maize that is not grown in specialized arable farming and for livestock 
farming the price elasticity of the demand for pesticides is assumed to be -0.25. The 
public parks and gardens sector mainly uses herbicides with a low content of active 
ingredient. The price of this type of chemical is high. Since responsibility for this sector 
is largely in the hands of local authorities, we ignored income effects in this sector. 
The econometric method indicated a short-term price elasticity of -0.25 for the 
horticultural sector. Although the price elasticity appears to increase slightly in the long 
term (-0.29), we took a price elasticity of -0.25 as a starting point. As a result, the price 
elasticities for the horticultural sector are somewhat lower than the average price 
elasticities for arable farming. Price elasticities differ in the horticultural subsectors. The 
data used in the analysis in Section 5.4 were not suitable for examining the separate 
subsectors in more detail, therefore we will now discuss two relevant groups of factors. 
Determining factors in explaining differences in price elasticities between sectors are: 
1. The availability of alternative methods of crop protection. The fewer the alternatives, 
the smaller the price elasticity. 
2. The share of pesticide costs in total revenues. If this share is large, a rise in the price 
of pesticides will have a relatively large impact on revenues, probably resulting in a 
relatively high price elasticity. 
For an indication of the first factor see Table 2.13, which gives feasible reduction 
percentages. The differences in reduction percentages largely depend on the availability or 
absence of possible alternatives. Intensity of pesticide use (= use per hectare, see also 
Appendix II) is another aspect possibly playing a role. When these aspects are examined, 
it appears that price elasticities in the nursery stock industry, fruit growing and mushroom 
sectors are relatively small. 
Chapter 2 deals with the relationship between costs of pesticides and total yields (factor 2) 
(see Table 2.7 and Appendix II). Fruit growing and flower bulb growing are the sectors 
with the highest share of pesticides in total yields. In all sectors the relationship between 
costs of pesticide and total revenue fluctuated around 1.5% in the period 1984-1988. It is 
also possible to concentrate on the value added per unit of pesticide (Stolwijk, 1991). A 
high added value signifies that it is difficult to reduce pesticide use by way of a levy. 
From the aforementioned it can be concluded that price elasticities will be relatively small 
in greenhouse systems and in the nursery stock industry. 
It seems likely that price elasticities in the nursery stock industry, in vegetable growing 
under glass, floriculture and mushrooms are lower than in arable farming. This does not 
pose a big problem in the nursery stock industry and fruit-growing sectors, since the 
targeted percentages of pesticide reduction in these sectors are also smaller than in arable 
farming. However, in the other three sectors reduction percentages are comparable to 
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those in arable farming. This means that vegetable growing under glass, floriculture and 
mushroom growing may require larger levies if a reduction similar to that in horticulture 
is to be achieved. 
A calculation based on a price elasticity of -0.25 for the horticultural sector as a whole, 
indicates that to attain the reduction percentages required in the years 1995 and 2000, 
levies need be only slightly higher than those in arable farming (see Tables 8.1 and 8.2). 
For this reason it seems unnecessary to differentiate between the levies for arable farming 
and horticulture. 
8.5 Effects on income 
Overview 
By income effects we mean the effects of a regulatory levy in combination with restitution 
- after deduction of administrative costs - on incomes in agriculture. Two things are at 
issue here. On the one hand there is a certain levy on pesticide use, expressed in Dutch 
guilders per kilogram of active ingredient. On the other hand there are the targeted 
reductions of pesticide use formulated in the LCPP. The levies required to attain these 
targets are derivatives: the size of the levy depends on the model used. The price level -
another variable in our calculations - is also liable to changes and therefore needs to be 
considered. 
To get a better overview, the income effects are often subdivided into subsectors. In the 
case of the analysis based on LP models, this is absolutely necessary because in this 
analysis only specialized arable farming in the most important production areas has been 
taken into consideration. To be able to compare the calculated income effects with one 
another, it is important to know which data the analyses are based on. 
This chapter focuses on the size of a levy. We used the same standards for both 
restitution and administrative costs. Restitution was based on method B in Section 7.5, 
with the distinction that we did differentiate between arable farming and field horticulture. 
Note further that the public parks and gardens sector is not restituted. Administrative 
costs, based on the principle that pesticide users pay levies, have been estimated to be 
approx. 18 million guilders (DHV-LUW, 1991, p. 147). The distribution of administrative 
costs is based on the share of pesticides in total expenditure in the period 1984-1988 (see 
Table 2.14). 
Income effects derived from the demand function for pesticides 
First of all we simulated the effects of a regulatory levy that would be sufficient to attain 
the targets set for 1995 and 2000. We used the assumptions mentioned above. The targets 
were derived from Table 2.13. Because there is a large difference in the targets for soil 
disinfectants and other pesticides, these two groups of pesticides have been distinguished. 
Moreover, a subdivision has been made into arable farming (including green maize) and 
horticulture. Because of important differences between horticulture under glass and in the 
field, both these types of horticulture have been distinguished, although the empirical 
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research gave no separate information on elasticities. 
The levies and income effects for 1995 and 2000 are shown in Tables 8.1 and 8.2, 
respectively. For larger reductions to be achieved in 2000, levies and income effects will 
have to increase substantially between 1995 and 2000. The income effect is a quadratic 
function of the levy (see also Section 5.3). We calculated regulating levies in 2000 of 
about 12 and 100 guilders for soil disinfectants and other pesticides, respectively. For soil 
disinfectants in field horticulture and other pesticides in closed horticultural systems 
(greenhouses) a higher levy is indicated. Because of the quality of the information, 
however, these differences are too small to justify a general subdivision of levies between 
different agricultural sectors. 
Table 8.1 Levy for two different types of pesticide to attain the targeted reduction in 1995 and its 
income effects 
Sector 
Arable farming 
Horticulture 
- Field 
- Under glass 
Levy in gld/kg a.i. 
Soil 
disinfectants 
7.7 
12.0 
7.9 
Others 
63 
74 
130 
Income effects in gld/ha 
Soil 
disinfectants 
25 
84 
165 
Others Total 
58 83 
255 339 
938 1104 
Income 
effect 
sector 
(mln 
gld) 
63 
32 
12 
Table 8.2 Levy for two different types of pesticide to attain the targeted reduction in 2000 and its 
income effects 
Sector 
Arable farming 
Horticulture 
- Field 
- Under glass 
Levy in gld/kg 
Soil 
disinfectants 
11.7 
15.3 
9.9 
;a.i. 
Others 
99 
108 
197 
Income effects in gld/ha 
Soil Others Total 
disinfectants 
55 122 178 
133 496 630 
253 1994 2246 
Income 
effect 
sector 
(mln 
gld) 
130 
59 
25 
Total income effects for the agricultural sector are circa 110 mln guilders in 1995 and 
circa 210 mln guilders in the year 2000. The levy on 'other pesticides' is most important. 
Moreover, there are large differences in the income effects per hectare between the three 
sectors. 
Sensitivity analysis 
Because we had to make several assumptions (see Section 8.3 and Table 8.3, note 1) in 
estimating the consequences of a regulating levy on pesticides, it might be interesting to 
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investigate the influence of each of these assumptions. We limit the analysis to four sets 
of assumptions. Each set has to be compared with the results of the basic assumptions4. 
We calculated the aggregate results for horticulture. 
Table 8.3 Levy required to attain specified reductions (for the year 2000) in the use of pesticides 
(except soil disinfectants) in arable farming and horticulture under different assump-
tions, and its income effects 
Variable 
Arable fanning 
Levy 
Income effect 
(gld/ha) 
Total income 
effect (mln gld) 
Horticulture 
Levy 
Income effect 
(gld/ha) 
Total income effect 
(mln gld) 
Basic1* 
99 
125 
94 
120 
621 
65 
Other 
elasti-
cities21 
119 
146 
110 
150 
762 
79 
Other 
model3' 
390 
299 
220 
554 
1562 
160 
Assumptions 
Other 
Pesticides 
+2%/year 
72 
73 
55 
100 
444 
46 
prices4' 
Arable 
products 
-3%/year 
54 
48 
39 
120 
621 
65 
Other 
techno-
logical 
deve-
lopment" 
40 
34 
26 
54 
172 
18 
1) Period 1970-88 annual growth in the amount of pesticides used (because of technological 
change) is 4% in arable fanning and 0% in horticulture. Price elasticity of demand for 
pesticides is -0.30 in arable farming and -0.25 in horticulture. During the period 1988-2000 
annual price changes of pesticides, arable products and horticultural products are 2.6%, 1.2% 
and 3.1% respectively. During that period the annual change in the amount of pesticides 
(assuming constant prices) is 0%. 
2) Period 1970-88: price elasticities of demand for pesticides in arable farming and horticulture 
are -0.25 and -0.20 respectively. 
3) Log-linear demand function for pesticides with constant price elasticities of demand for 
pesticides as in the basic scenario. 
4) Period 1988-2000: additional annual increase of the price of pesticides of 2% per year; 
additional price decrease of arable products of 3% per year. 
5) Period 1988-2000: annual shift of minus 2% in the demand curve for pesticides. 
The column 'other elasticities' in Table 8.3 illustrates the effects of a smaller reaction in 
pesticide use on prices of pesticides. The reactions show a nearly inverse relation with the 
absolute value of the price elasticity. 
4
 Income effects under the basic assumptions are slightly different from Table 8.2, because of small 
differences in refunding the levy. 
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In the third column a log-linear demand function for pesticides has been assumed, with 
the same elasticity as the linear demand function in the estimated period. Here differences 
are very large. A log-linear demand function with an elasticity of -0.3 is rather extreme 
and cannot exist over a large range of prices (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980, p. 17). 
The higher the price of pesticides, the lower the levy required. Similar reasoning can be 
used to explain the effects of a reduction in the prices of arable products. Both 
developments are probable: large reductions in the use of pesticides could increase the 
marketing margin and the EC is already discussing lowering prices of arable products 
(Commission, 1991). 
The importance of technological development is substantial. If there is an autonomous 
shift of -2% per year in the demand function for pesticides, the regulating levies required 
would be much lower (and vice versa). This illustrates the importance of interpreting 
historical trends in pesticide use. The sensitivity analysis makes clear that the results 
greatly depend on the assumptions. 
Estimated reductions and income effects of different regulatory levies 
To make the information comparable with the results of the LP model, we give some 
information of the reduction in the application of pesticides (excluding soil disinfectants) 
achieved by some levies by 2000. Here the same assumptions as for Table 8.2 have been 
used. The difference is that the levy on soil disinfectants is zero. Moreover, calculation 
starts from a particular levy and results in a percentage reduction. 
Table 8.4 Income effect and reduction percentages for different levies in the year 2000 (excl. soil 
disinfectants) 
Levy (gld/kg a.i.) 
25 
50 
75 
100 
25 
50 
75 
100 
25 
50 
75 
100 
Income effect (gld/ha) 
23 
44 
79 
127 
74 
147 
265 
438 
Reduction (%) 
Arable farming 
Field horticulture 
Horticulture under gh 
161 
251 
401 
611 
10 
20 
30 
39 
9 
19 
29 
38 
iss 
6 
13 
19 
25 
Income effect sector 
(mln gld) 
17 
33 
59 
95 
7 
14 
25 
41 
1.8 
2.8 
4.4 
6.7 
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Table 8.4 shows the results for four different levies in arable farming and horticulture. As 
might be expected from Table 8.2, the effects for closed horticultural systems 
(greenhouses) are limited. 
DHV-LUW (1991, p. 128) advises a levy of 50 guilders per kg a.i. as the starting value. 
The effects of such a levy for different subsectors of agricultural production in the 
Netherlands are shown in Table 8.5. Because price elasticities were not estimated 
separately for the subsectors of horticulture, the results are only indicative. 
Table 8.5 Income effect of a levy of 50 gld per kg a.i. (excl. soil disinfectants) for different 
agricultural sectors, year 2000 
Sector 
Total expenses 
pesticides/ha av. 
1984-1988 
Income 
effect 
(gld/ha) 
Reduction (%) Income effect 
sector 
(mln gld) 
Arable fanning 
Field vegetables 
Bulbs 
Nursery stock 
Fruit 
Floriculture 
Vegetables under glass 
Mushrooms 
414 
874 
2672 
2511 
859 
4067 
2797 
22313 
44 
53 
485 
161 
121 
223 
229 
5643 
19.7 
10.9 
26.6 
11.5 
23.0 
10.2 
14.6 
33.0 
33 
2.4 
8.7 
1.1 
2.8 
1.4 
1.0 
0.5 
Income effects derived from the LP models 
In an LP model, the calculation of the income effects of a regulating levy is straight-
forward. Differences in the balance between revenues and variable costs determine the 
income differences between two different situations; for instance, when there are price 
differences between different types of pesticides. This way the average changes in income 
per farm and/or per hectare can be determined. 
The economic analysis with LP indicated that current crop protection methods are not 
economically optimal in some respects. The model calculations showed that incomes 
could rise substantially if cropping patterns were changed. 
As was shown in the analyses with econometric methods, the LP calculations also in-
dicated that relatively small levies will cause only minor income losses to take place in 
the arable sector (see Table 8.6). 
We assumed full restitution. The income effects in Table 8.6 relate to a situation where 
the levy is zero and all environmentally sound cropping patterns formulated can be 
applied. This situation is 'optimal' and is difficult to achieve in practice. Therefore, 
income loss in the real situation may differ slightly from the income loss calculated. In 
reality, the levy-induced income loss will probably be slightly greater. 
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Table 8.6 Income effects per farm and in guilders per hectare (arable farming) of a regulatory 
levy 
Levy (gld/kg a.i.) Per farm Per hectare 
0 0 0 
25 1400 29 
50 2600 52 
75 5200 118 
100 8700 188 
A comparison with other calculations 
The LCPP estimated the costs that will be incurred in crop protection in the Netherlands 
in the coming years as a result of reducing pesticide use (MJP-G, 1990, Background 
documents). Appendix V gives a brief overview of the costs for the arable sector. For the 
period 1990-2000 an income loss of 328 guilders per hectare per year for the whole 
arable sector has been calculated. Both the econometric and the LP approaches indicate 
income losses that are considerably smaller (see Tables 8.2 and 8.7). Even if large levies 
were imposed (for instance 100 guilders per kg a.i.; excluding soil disinfection for which 
a levy of 12 guilders per kg a.i. is required) income loss would be smaller. The 
econometric method yields an income loss of 178 guilders per hectare, including 
administrative costs. The method with LP models gives an income effect of 188 guilders 
per hectare (see Table 8.6), and therefore remains well below the 328 guilders per 
hectare. The LP calculations also show that a considerable increase in incomes is possible 
without a levy. The difference is largely to do with the assumptions made about expected 
losses in yield. The assumptions made in the LP calculations are more moderate than 
those made in the LCPP. Furthermore, the LCPP estimates a number of essential costs. 
We did not do this in the LP analyses; instead, we calculated these costs afterwards (see 
Appendix V). If these additional costs were included, then the total costs calculated would 
still be far behind the estimates in the LCPP. 
For the horticultural sector, the differences between the costs stated in the LCPP and 
those following from our method, are even bigger. The LCPP arrives at total annual costs 
of 587 million guilders (see Table 8.7), whereas our calculations on the basis of a demand 
function for pesticides show a sum of 84 million guilders in the year 2000. This 
substantial difference is probably because in the LCPP estimates of all investment costs 
involved in transforming horticulture under glass into closed systems are included in the 
cost calculations. The aim of introducing this new technology is not only to cut pesticide 
use, but also to prevent emission of minerals (nitrate, phosphate, etc.). The introduction 
of new technologies may also be helpful in saving labour and reducing energy costs. 
Notwithstanding the enormous increase in the financial burden calculated in the LCPP, it 
is assumed this policy can be pursued without any additional economic instruments, such 
as, for instance, a regulatory levy. This seems inconsistent with assumptions about the 
behaviour of arable farmers and horticulturalists. 
If we compare our results for the bulb sector with De Vroomen et al. (1991, p. 28,79) 
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and take South Holland as representative for the Netherlands, differences are small 
because Vroomen's estimate is 33 million guilders. 
Table 8.7 Income effects of a reduction in the use of pesticides in mln guilders 
LCPP Demand function 
S e c t o r
 1995 2000 1995 2000 
LP 
2000 
Arable farming 
Horticulture 
- Floriculture 
- Bulbs 
- Nursery stock 
- Mushrooms 
-Fruit 
- Vegetables under glass 
- Field vegetables 
Total 
230 
498 
184 
45 
23 
3 
35 
153 
55 
728 
263 
587 
210 
60 
39 
5 
45 
160 
68 
850 
63 
46 
11 
21 
1.7 
0.1 
2.9 
3.8 
5.2 
109 
133 
84 
22 
30 
5.0 
0.1 
8.5 
8.0 
10 
217 
31.0" 
Source: MJP-G (1990), Background documents; own calculations 
1) Excluding administrative costs. Based on a levy of 50 guilders per kg a.i. (see Appendix V) 
8.6 Consequences of set-aside 
The LP model includes set-aside as one of the options. A large share of the representative 
farm area has been put under set-aside in the Peat Colonies and the Northern sand area. 
The share of land under set-aside decreases with the availability of new cropping variants 
and increases with the levy on pesticides (see Appendix IV). As levies increase, set-aside 
(as one of the activities in the LP model) produces a substantial reduction in the 
application of pesticides and a relatively small income reduction. The reduction in 
pesticide use is partly caused by the assumption that no herbicides are required for fallow 
land (see Appendix V). 
Two consequences of set-aside require more attention: the effects on the budget and on 
the delivering and processing industry. The budgetary consequences are quite easy to 
compute. The amount per hectare is 1500 guilders, three-quarters of which is to be paid 
by the national government and one-quarter by the EC. There are, however, differences 
between actual set-aside rules and the ones used in the LP model. Actual set-aside is 
restricted to areas for cereals, whereas in the LP model all land can be taken out of 
production. The results of the calculations are shown in Table 8.8. Here the area 
represented by the six LP farms has been multiplied by the factor 1.5 to give a complete 
representation of all arable land except the area under fodder maize. It will be clear that 
the budget costs of taking land out of production are quite high. With a regulatory levy of 
50 guilders per kg a.i. the budget costs are more than three times the income effects. 
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Table 8.8 Set-aside area in the Netherlands and national budget costs under different conditions 
of optimization 
Set-aside 
Conditions 
Actual1' 
Optimal2' 
Levy" 0 
10 
25 
50 
100 
150 
200 
Area(* 1000 ha) 
0 
93.3 
63.4 
63.4 
92.0 
94.6 
144.9 
158.0 
158.0 
Budget costs national government 
(* 106 glds) 
0 
105 
71 
71 
104 
106 
163 
178 
178 
1) Here a simplification of the actual area has been used, see Chapter 6. 
2) Optimal cropping pattern under the present technology, see Chapter 6. 
3) Optimal cropping pattern with new cropping variants included; levy in guilders per kg a.i. 
(excluding soil disinfectants). 
Table 8.9 Relative production levels (in percentages) of different products in the Netherlands 
compared with the actual situation 
Levy 
Crop Optimal Q 25 50 
Cereals 116 116 122 126 
Sugarbeet 100 100 100 100 
Ware and seed potatoes 100 100 100 100 
Starch potatoes 0 27 27 27 
Onions 119 119 78 55 
Other crops 23 23 0 0_ 
The consequences of set-aside for the delivering and processing industries as well as for 
trade and transport might be substantial. Here, figures compared with actual production 
levels have been given for a number of crops included in the analysis of Chapter 6 (see 
Table 8.9). The reduction in the production of starch potatoes is especially dramatic. 
Input prices and product prices here will probably adjust if such changes take place. 
Moreover, part of the increase in pesticide costs could be shifted to the delivering and 
processing industries, implying that a levy would have less effect than predicted by 
modelling. This is another illustration of the rough methodology of LP modelling. 
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8.7 Evaluation of the methods applied in calculating the effects of a levy 
In Chapter 3 several methods were introduced to analyse the effect of a regulatory levy 
on pesticides. Assuming no uncertainty, three different methods were introduced: crop 
management models, cropping plans at farm level and neo-classical economic models at 
average farm or sector level. Each approach requires different information and (as might 
be expected) gives different empirical results. 
One of the useful aspects of using different models is the range of results that are 
obtained. If one could interpret the reasons behind such results, it would give at least an 
indication of the levy required to attain a particular reduction in the application of 
pesticides. 
The results of crop models have been used only indirectly (through the literature and by 
preparing new cropping variants for the LP models) in this research. The methodology is 
very labour-intensive and often gives incomplete results, unless very broad information on 
many crops, types of soil and other conditions is available. If we interpret the results in 
the literature, crop models often indicate that levies on pesticides are not very efficient. 
This might be because of the limited context in which the problem was studied. Switching 
to new technologies, other crops or other cropping variants is beyond the standard 
methodology of these models. 
LP models provide the opportunity to study problems at farm level and to introduce new 
technologies that still have to be applied in practice. One of the main problems of the LP 
models is the large difference between the actual situation and the model (under the same 
conditions). In our research this difference was very large and made it difficult to derive 
reliable results for the effects of regulating levies. It could be argued that the LP models 
indicate a lower limit for the required levy. Moreover, the models give no indication 
about the time-lag between imposing a levy and the result of such a levy. The final results 
depended heavily on the assumption of set-aside and of constant product prices. 
Ultimately, both assumptions seemed unrealistic. 
The neoclassical economic model resulted in the most useful results, although one might 
question the basic assumption of a concave production function for pesticides. The data, 
however, did not indicate problems in this respect. Effects of new technologies that differ 
from the normal development are difficult to incorporate. Moreover, it is very 
questionable whether a model that has been estimated on a very small range of pesticide 
prices can be used to calculate the effects of levies that more than double the price. 
Sensitivity analysis illustrates large uncertainties. 
Given the rather wide range of results and the important uncertainties with respect to 
models, coefficients, technological development, etc., it seems unjustified to give too 
much attention to the problem of incorporating risk explicitly in the analysis. Therefore 
we restricted ourselves to some reasoning from approaches and models that incorporated 
risk elements. 
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8.8 Concluding remarks 
Given the lack of information on the negative external effects of pesticides, fixing a levy 
on the basis of the LCPP objectives is the only possible way to examine the levy that is 
required. Considering the margins of uncertainty in this study, it seems that a levy of 25 
to 100 guilders per kg a.i. (excluding soil disinfection) will lead to the desired reduction 
of pesticide use by the year 2000. 
It seems delusory to believe that the policy instruments proposed in the LCPP will 
achieve the formulated reductions in pesticide use, (except for soil disinfection), unless an 
extensive list of bans and authorizations in combination with a severe policy towards 
chemicals are pursued (see Chapter 9). The calculations indicate that even if new 
cropping variants are introduced on all Dutch farms, the targeted reductions in pesticide 
use will not be achieved. It is likely that arable farmers and horticulturalists will gladly 
adopt new technologies that lead to a net cost reduction as soon as these technologies 
become available. Starting from the cost calculations in the LCPP, the arable and 
horticultural sectors will suffer considerable income losses. It is inconsistent to assume 
that under such conditions new technologies will be easily adopted. As noted in Section 
8.5, the income losses mentioned in the LCPP have probably been overestimated. 
Nonetheless, the principle still stands that technological changes will be easily accepted 
only if this benefits those who take the decisions (i.e. the farmers and growers). 
A regulatory levy might be an important tool in the process of achieving the technological 
developments proposed in the LCPP work. Imposition of a regulatory levy, in conjunction 
with measures taken by (and information given to) individual farmers and growers will 
provide a useful basis, and will enable policy instruments to be directed more precisely 
and therefore more effectively in the future. The introduction of a regulatory levy will 
probably give new impetus to the investigation of the value of the negative external 
effects of pesticides in money terms. So far, this assessment has not taken place. The task 
set in the LCPP was primarily to concentrate on reduction percentages that were 
technologically feasible. 
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9.1 Introduction 
The previous chapters extensively discussed the feasibility of cutting pesticide use by 
means of a regulatory levy. We investigated this levy option as a supplement to the 
battery of measures put forward in the Long-term Crop Protection Plan (LCPP) (see 
Section 2.5). The proposed regulatory levy increases the chance that the amount of 
pesticides used, expressed in kg active ingredients, will be reduced to an acceptable level. 
Imposing a regulatory levy would, therefore, enforce the "volume policy" pursued by the 
Dutch government. 
The volume policy hardly distinguishes between different types of active ingredient. Its 
main aim is to cut overall pesticide use. The less pesticide used the better: 8600 tonnes 
per year in the Netherlands is better than 20 260 tonnes. In this approach it does not 
really matter which active components are involved. The policy on compounds, however, 
pays less attention to the quantities used but focuses on two categories of compounds: 
chemicals thought to be harmful and those that are harmless or less harmful. 
So, in previous chapters the volume policy was central. This final chapter complements 
the discussion in Chapter 2 and focuses on the policy on compounds (by way of the 
policy on authorized compounds). Sections 9.4 and 9.5 discuss likely consequences of the 
intended policy on compounds for arable farming and horticulture, respectively. In the 
preceding section (9.3), the way of handling data and information are briefly discussed. 
Finally, in Section 9.6, the joint implications of both the volume and compound policies 
for arable farming are given and the extent to which pesticides mentioned in the volume 
policy are involved in the policy on compounds is investigated. The chapter ends with 
some conclusions. 
9.2 Policy on compounds 
In Section 2.4 problems in current pesticide use were listed. The diffusion of chemicals 
into the environment and the effects of this on flora and fauna led to proposals for 
banning these chemicals. The Dutch government can withdraw authorization for using 
certain compounds if they have unacceptable damaging side-effects. Assessing pesticide 
use reveals that a considerable proportion of the pesticides currently used fulfil the 
qualifications for being banned: 65% of the group of chemicals investigated (195 
compounds/active ingredients) are harmful to the environment (see Section 2.5). In this 
and the following section we will deal with this fraction only. Although it is conceivable 
that other problems in agriculture (e.g. resistance to pesticides) might also give rise to 
proposals to ban chemicals, we have not heard of any such proposals (see Sections 2.4 
and 2.5). 
In a study preceding the LCPP, Ruiken (1990) and Ottenheim et al. (1989) examined 
pesticides that can cause environmental damage. Both studies based their conclusions 
about whether or not a pesticide is damaging to the environment on a synthesis of existing 
lists of criteria. Ruiken listed 278 harmful compounds, 10 of which should be banned 
immediately, 104 within one year, and 164 within five years. Ottenheim et al. estimated 
total pesticide use to be 19 660 tons of active ingredient per year in the Nether-
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lands; 60% of which (11 832 tons; 110 components) they deemed to be 'harmful to the 
environment'. They investigated the availability of biotechnological alternatives. The 
Long-term Crop Protection Plan proposes banning certain chemicals on the grounds of 
environmental criteria by tightening up the policy, on authorizing chemicals. This should 
be done in two stages: before 1995, and before 2000. 
The criteria for the first stage are: 
- The presence of the compound has been demonstrated in the upper groundwater (up to 
10 metres below ground level) in a concentration exceeding 0.1 /*g/l. 
- The model computations show that the compound leaches out from the upper ground-
water (up to 2 metres below ground level; up to 10 metres below ground level 
according to additional model computations) in concentrations above 10 fig/l. 
- As a result of application to one or more crops, the compound exceeds the acute 
toxicity limit of 0.1 LC50 for fish and L(E)G50 for algae or crustaceans. 
- The compound exceeds the persistence limit of DT50 of 180 days. This implies that 
50% of the original quantity is still in the soil after 180 days. 
The criteria for the second stage are: 
- The model computations show that the compound leaches out into the upper ground-
water (up to 2 or 10 metres below ground level) in concentrations above 0.1 /ig/1. 
- As a result of application to one or more crops, the compound exceeds the acute 
toxicity limit of 0.1 LC50 for fish, algae and crustaceans. 
- The compound exceeds the persistence limit of DT50 in the soil after 60 days. 
The results of this policy on compounds largely depend on how it is pursued. 
Environmental groups strongly support a ban on all compounds that do not comply with 
the above criteria (see Vogelezang-Stoute and Matser, 1991). Agricultural circles, 
however, support fine-tuning the policy on compounds with the volume policy (Ritsema, 
1991), because this would also take account of consequences for agriculture. Economic 
effects of banning compounds have to be balanced with information about the harmful 
effects of these compounds. Study groups in the different sectors are currently working on 
this. Because of the important economic consequences, clarity is called for (Simons-
Vinkxs, 1991). 
A cutback in pesticides can also be brought about without the policy on authorized 
pesticides or in addition to that policy. Banning of pesticides could be based on informa-
tion similar to the criteria and data used for authorization. This would imply a reduction 
of the amount of harmful compounds applied. 
To support growers and extension officers, three types of "environmental yardsticks" are 
currently being developed (Reus, 1991): 
- one for leaching to groundwater; 
- one for the risk to soil organisms; 
- one for the risk to water organisms. 
The acceptability of an environmental burden can be brought on a one-dimensional scale 
(see e.g. De Vroomen et al., 1991, p. 136-141). In the future this could be an important 
step to solving the problem, but it is not discussed in this chapter any further. 
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9.3 Working method to determine the consequences of a policy on compounds 
In this chapter "banning" means withdrawing authorization for all compounds listed by 
the LCPP. 
We discussed soil disinfectants in earlier chapters. Soil disinfectants have been used in 
such large amounts in the Netherlands that a different banning regulation has been 
proposed for them. Starting 1995, or possibly earlier, liquid soil disinfectants will only be 
available on prescription if a number of conditions are satisfied (see LCPP; Appendix 2). 
In this chapter we assume that these compounds (dichloro propane, metham-sodium and 
dazomet) will be dealt with in this way. 
Before discussing the influence of the LCPP policy on compounds, we shall first consider 
the inventory of pesticide use compiled by Berends (1988). Looking more closely at the 
different Dutch inventories on pesticide use, including the one in the LCPP, they all 
appear to originate from this source. Berends's report obviously contains the best 
information available. He gives information on the intensity of pesticide use in 1987 for 
37 crops, and per crop for 7 regions at most (for sugarbeet). He selected these using two 
criteria: (1) districts where crop protection experts from the extension service are 
stationed, and (2) soil type (sand, clay). The latter is important for weed control. These 
regions differ from the agricultural regions distinguished by the LEI/CBS. The cooper-
ation of these experts is especially important in assessing the likelihood of application (the 
part of the area treated), the period of application (months) and the application frequency 
(number of treatments per year). Drawing on this expertise Berends was able to make a 
valuable inventory of the potential burdens to surface water, which was only partly made 
use of in subsequent inventories, including ours. 
So, how have the consequences of the policy on compounds been determined? By using 
the same database as used for the volume policy. In this database the active components 
involved in each amount of pesticide have been determined (see Chapter 2). So the 
components to be banned can be deleted from this list, to leave an amount of pesticides, 
expressed either in kg active ingredient or in guilders. There is no substitution assumed 
by other compounds that are still on the list. To be able to compare the volume policy 
with the policy on compounds, the effect of the volume policy has been expressed in 
percentages of reduction, related to the use in the period 1984-1988. We have not 
examined whether crops can actually be grown under these circumstances. 
The range of pesticides that will remain in the year 2000 determined in this way is both 
too narrow and too broad. It is too narrow because: 
- authorized substances, applied in unknown amounts, have not been included in the 
database; 
- compounds authorized after 1987 have not been taken into account; 
- no account has been taken of the list of pesticides that have to be excluded for 
agricultural reasons (see Section 2.5); 
- combinations of active ingredients are deleted if one of the ingredients is banned. 
The range is too broad because it does not take account of additional environmental 
criteria which have recently been announced (MVROM, 1991a). 
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9.4 The policy on compounds and arable farming 
In this section we pay attention to the effects of the intended policy on compounds upon 
arable farming, see Table 9.1. In the period prior to 1990 the effects of a ban on dinoseb 
were far-reaching (see 'other pesticides' and several types of potatoes). 
Table 9.1 Anticipated reduction in annual use of pesticides (excluding soil disinfectants) in the 
Dutch arable sector resulting from the proposed policy on compounds. Data give 
percentual reduction in kg a.i. and in guilders for each category of pesticide and with 
1984-88 as reference period 
Category 
Realized com-
pound policy1' 
First phase compound 
policy (1995)* 
Second phase compound 
policy (2000)3 
JE£_ kg guilders _kg_ guilders 
Total 
Pesticide 
- soil treatment 
- herbicides 
- fungicides 
- insecticides 
- others 
Crop 
Ware potatoes1' 
Pulses 
Starch potatoes 
Barley 
Grass seed 
Caraway 
Rapes eed 
Fodder maize 
Seed potatoes 
Sugarbeet 
Winter wheat 
Field beans 
Onions 
Others 
14 
13 
8 
0 
0 
78 
20 
15 
23 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2 
50 
2 
0 
5 
0 
0 
76 
74 
68 
93 
54 
80 
96 
57 
98 
86 
30 
12 
30 
88 
92 
46 
27 
83 
58 
95 
44 
70 
38 
69 
22 
23 
46 
38 
91 
61 
15 
13 
21 
74 
45 
29 
12 
41 
37 
84 
88 60 
100 
77 
98 
76 
86 
98 
79 
100 
97 
83 
12 
76 
92 
99 
51 
78 
89 
90 
95 
100 
52 
92 
63 
26 
50 
51 
100 
96 
44 
13 
62 
80 
98 
34 
70 
54 
68 
84 
1) Compound policy realized in the years 1988 and 1989 (CTB/BB, 1991) 
2) Compound policy intended in the government decisions for 1995 and 2000 (MJP-G, 1991) 
3) Crops printed in italics are included in the LP models in Chapter 6 
From Table 9.1 it can be concluded that in both stages the relatively cheap chemicals will 
be banned: the reduction percentage in guilders is less than the percentage expressed in 
active ingredients. This means that most of the pesticides banned as a result of the policy 
on compounds will be the relatively cheap ones. 
As a general tendency, a policy with a regulatory levy per kg of active ingredient 
parallels a compound policy, because compounds that are banned bear the highest levies 
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per kg a.i. This does not imply that this parallel between reduction volume and com-
pounds holds for all pesticides. A trend towards producing and applying pesticides with a 
low content of active ingredient has been observed (see Chapters 2 and 4). 
The first stage will see a considerable increase in reduction percentages. For the period 
after the ban (in the year 2000) the following can be anticipated: 
- hardly any soil treatment compounds and fungicides are applied anymore; 
- the reduction in the use of herbicides and insecticides is relatively small; 
- pesticide use is minimal in potato and barley, and very low in green maize and onions; 
- no major changes in pesticide use in caraway seeds are necessary, whereas in sugarbeet 
only minor reductions are necessary. 
The reduction percentage of active ingredient (measured in kilograms) in the year 2000 is 
equal to 88%. This number can be compared with the results of a similar calculation 
made by NEFYTO (1991, p.4), where they conclude that the banning of pesticides 
concerns 84% of the total amount of pesticide used in 1990. Table 9.1, however, refers 
to 1984-88 and only to the arable sector. 
Comparing Tables 2.13 and 9.1 reveals that this compound policy for arable farming 
works more drastically (larger reduction percentages) than the volume policy (for soil 
treatment compounds 100% instead of 50%; for herbicides 77% versus 45%, etc.). 
9.5 The policy on compounds and horticulture 
The LCPP distinguishes seven subsectors in horticulture. In the following we restrict 
ourselves to fruit growing, field vegetable farming and greenhouse horticulture. From the 
analysis, the consequences of the policy of compounds for the whole horticultural sector 
can be derived. 
Table 9.2 elucidates the effects of the policy on compounds (excl. soil disinfectants) in 
the horticultural subsectors mentioned above. The part of the authorization policy that has 
already been implemented has not yet proven effective. Therefore, this period has not 
been mentioned separately in the table (compare with Table 9.1). Only the three main 
crops have been included in the table. 
Table 9.2 shows that (similar to arable farming) in field horticulture it is the relatively 
cheap chemicals that are banned. The opposite seems true for greenhouse vegetable 
growing. Note that as far as prices of pesticides are concerned, the database is more 
complete for arable farming than for greenhouse horticulture. For both arable farming and 
horticulture it holds that the amounts applied are reduced considerably in the period 1990-
1995. For the period after the year 2000, when the ban will have become fully effective, 
it can be predicted that: 
- in fruit growing, soil treatment compounds and herbicides are prohibited; insecticide 
use is still considerable; 
- in field vegetable growing, treatment compounds are no longer used; fungicides are 
still relatively widely used; 
- in greenhouse vegetable growing no single category of chemicals has been completely 
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banned; soil treatment compounds and herbicides are still used on a relatively large 
scale; 
in apple and pear growing a much smaller volume of chemicals is applied; 
no big changes in pesticide use are necessary in carrot growing. 
Table 9.2 Anticipated reduction in annual use of pesticides (excluding soil disinfectants) in the 
Dutch horticultural subsectors fruit, field vegetables and vegetables under glass re-
sulting from a policy on compounds. Data give percentual reduction in kg a.i. and in 
guilders for each category of pesticide and with 1984-88 as reference period 
Category 
Compound policy 
first phase" 
kg guilders 
Compound policy 
second phase1' 
kg guilders 
Total Fruits 
Vegetables (field) 
Vegetables (under glass)3 
Ditto, excl. formalin 
Fruits 
Soil treatment 
Herbicides 
Fungicides 
Insecticides 
Other 
Vegetables (field) 
Soil treatment 
Herbicides 
Fungicides 
Insecticides 
Others 
Vegetables (under glass) 
Soil treatment 
Herbicides 
Fungicides 
Insecticides 
Others 
Crops3» 
Apple 
Pear 
Carrots 
82 
51 
30 
53 
100 
99 
92 
27 
21 
100 
51 
46 
36 
0 
13 
12 
55 
66 
0 
83 
82 
23 
66 
33 
52 
52 
100 
99 
91 
24 
21 
100 
33 
31 
40 
0 
32 
32 
47 
60 
0 
70 
51 
25 
84 
67 
34 
60 
100 
100 
92 
41 
21 
100 
67 
46 
56 
0 
13 
16 
60 
79 
0 
85 
83 
23 
69 
57 
59 
59 
100 
100 
91 
33 
21 
100 
57 
31 
67 
0 
32 
35 
50 
72 
0 
72 
53 
25 
1) Intended compound policy with a first phase for 1995 and a second phase for 2000 (MJP-G, 
1991). 
2) Including 62 040 kg formalin out of a total of 144 706 kg active ingredient. 
3) Only the three crops with the greatest use of active ingredient are included. 
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Comparing Tables 2.13 and 9.2 reveals that for field cultivations the policy on com-
pounds could be more drastic (higher percentages of reduction) than the volume policy. 
This is illustrated by herbicide use (in fruit growing 100% versus 55%, in field vegetable 
growing 67% versus 31%). For cultivations under glass the opposite seems true: here the 
volume policy is sometimes more drastic than the policy of compounds (a 50% reduction 
in herbicide use in greenhouse vegetable growing versus 16%; for the category 'other' a 
reduction of 50% versus 0%). 
A complication arises in the category greenhouse disinfectants and glass cleansing 
treatments. In Table 2.12 these chemicals were excluded from the inventory. However, 
they are included in the scheme of the greenhouse horticulture subsector. The plan for the 
greenhouse horticulture subsector aims at a reduction that includes these chemicals (Table 
2.13; other). In the database only the disinfectant that can be transformed into the active 
ingredient formalin is included. This chemical is characterized by its high content of 
active ingredient and its low price. In a small sector like greenhouse vegetable growing 
these characteristics can greatly influence the effect of the policy on compounds and the 
volume policy (as can be seen in Table 9.2). Without formalin the quantitative reduction 
percentage in greenhouse vegetable growing is comparable to that in field vegetable 
farming. An analysis at crop level (not included in Table 9.2) shows that crops such as 
plums, greenhouse strawberries, cauliflower, broccoli, salsify, spinach and chicory, as 
well as carrots (included in the table) have to undergo relatively few changes as a result 
of the policy on compounds (reductions of less than 40% in the year 2000). 
9.6 A synthesis of the volume and compound policies 
Table 9.1 shows which crops have been included in the economic study using linear 
programming (Chapter 6). After the policy on compounds proposed in the LCPP has 
become effective, only 18% (expressed in number of active ingredients; see De Jong, 
1991, Bijlage III) of the group of pesticides we originally started with in the study 
remains. These active ingredients are chloridazon, difenoxuron, ethofumesate, fenmedi-
fam, fluaziflop-p-buthyl glyphosate, metobromuron, iprodion, vinclozolin and chlorme-
quat. The question is: are these chemicals used in current arable farming or will they be 
used in future arable farming (based on models) under a high levy per kg active ingredi-
ent? 
We will now analyse the situation for the central clay area in the Netherlands. Similar 
conclusions may probably be drawn for other areas in the country. We determined the 
possible effects of the policy on compounds for levies of different sizes (see also Section 
6.5; Table 6.7). Strictly speaking, we should have excluded cropping variants in which a 
certain chemical is banned: such variants will simply become impossible. However, we 
did not do so. We determined the influence of the policy on compounds by deleting the 
amounts of future banned pesticides that are applied presently (see Section 9.3). No 
substitution has been assumed. Data are derived from the optimal solutions of the LP 
model. 
Table 9.3 indicates the effects of the policy on compounds for levies of different sizes. 
The degree to which a chemical is used at a levy of 50 guilders has been estimated to be 
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5.7 kg active ingredient per hectare, which means a 29% reduction in use (see Table 9.3 
a and c). 
Table 9.3 Anticipated effect of a policy on compounds and of some levels of regulatory levies 
for large farms in the central clay area of the Netherlands. Effects are in percentages 
of reduction compared with no levy and no compound policy 
Policy 
Levy in guilders per kg active ingredient 
0 25 50 
17 
86 
98 
29 
92 
99 
a) Reduction (%) compared with zero levy and no compound policy 
No compound policy 0" 
Compound policy first phase 77 
_.Ç.2î?îE2HPd_policy_ second phase 93 
b) Reduction compared with situation without compound policy 
No compound policy 0 0 
Compound policy first phase 77 83 
.^25E2ynâ.P°ilcJtJiîc5îLa!.pAa*.e_ 2} 23 PJL 
c) Reduction compared with zero levy 
No compound policy 
Compound policy first phase 
Compound policy second phase 
0 
0 
0 
17 
38 
69 
29 
63 
86 
1) Total amount of active ingredient is 723 ton for an area of 90 200 ha (see also Table 6.7). 
The effect of the policy on compounds seems to be levy-dependent. Similarly, the effect 
of the levy seems to depend on the policy on compounds (see Table 9.3b and 9.3c). 
Ideally, an increasing levy would diminish the effect of the policy on compounds, because 
then both policies (policy on compounds and the volume policy) would be complemen-
tary. However, the opposite is true. Measured in amounts of active ingredient, nearly all 
pesticides used at a levy of 50 guilders appear to be candidates for banning under the 
proposed policy on compounds. Ultimately (i.e. by the year 2000) an amount of 0.1 kg of 
active ingredient per hectare will be used in the central clay area. 
This brings us to the question of which substances survive in the final situation and which 
do not when a levy of 50 guilders is imposed in the context of the policy on compounds. 
In sugarbeet and seed onions the herbicides difenoxuron and fenmedifam will still be used 
in the final scenario. A 99% reduction would be achieved by withdrawing the following 
types of pesticide: 
- Herbicides: mecoprop, metamitron, paraquat, pendimethalin, chloropropylate and 
metribuzin; 
- Fungicides: maneb/chlorothalonil, maneb/vinclozolin, maneb and maneb/fentin-acetate; 
- Insecticides: pirimicarb, parathion; 
- Other: carbofuran and maleic hydrazide. 
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However, these chemicals are essential in the cropping variants for winter wheat, seed 
onion, sugarbeet and potato, selected by the LP model. 
Unfortunately, the conclusion to be drawn from this analysis is that the use of chemicals 
harmful to the environment is not reduced by imposing a levy of 50 guilders. The 
opposite is true: a stringent volume policy increases the proportion of pesticides harmful 
to the environment. 
9.7 Conclusions 
The policy on compounds, proposed in the Long-Term Crop Protection Plan, may have a 
dramatic effect on the amounts of pesticides applied. If banning in the policy on com-
pounds means withdrawing authorization for all substances harmful to the environment 
(excluding soil disinfectants), then higher reduction percentages can be achieved in arable 
farming and in horticulture than by pursuing the volume policy. In the period before 1995 
the amounts applied will be reduced considerably under the assumptions of a full 
application of the reduction and no substitution by remaining or new pesticides. The 
amount of pesticides decreases faster than the money value, because chemicals harmful to 
the environment appear to be relatively cheap. Because of the relative low price of 
substances harmful to the environment, a uniform levy per kg a.i. works in the same 
direction as a policy on compounds. 
Field horticulture shows results similar to arable farming. Different conclusions are to be 
drawn for greenhouse horticulture: here volume policy and policy on compounds do not 
work in the same direction. The effects of different categories of pesticides differ per 
subsector. 
Analysing the effects of a levy in relation to the policy on compounds (for arable farming 
in the central clay area of the Netherlands) indicates that the higher the levy the more 
dramatic the impact of a policy on compounds. A number of herbicides, fungicides and 
insecticides are irreplaceable in the volume policy and will have to be banned in the 
policy on compounds. 
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SUMMARY 
The application of pesticides in the Netherlands - measured in active ingredient per hectare -
is very much higher than in other countries. This became clear from the Long-term Crop 
Protection Plan (LCPP) that made a detailed inventory of the application of pesticides in the 
Netherlands. Additional information from other sources like OECD, FAO, and individual 
countries illustrates the exceptional position of the Netherlands. 
Several reasons can be given for the high application of pesticides. One is the intensive 
cropping scheme, with a large share of potatoes which use large quantities of soil 
disinfectants and fungicides. Moreover, the important share of horticulture in total plant 
production leads to large amounts of pesticides being used per hectare, although not per unit 
of production or value added. 
Trends in pesticide application are not very easy to derive, but sources indicate that in the 
1970s there was a substantial increase in the use of pesticides in arable farming. Although 
this increase seems to have levelled off there is still a slight upward trend. 
The LCPP sets out the objectives of future crop protection policy in the Netherlands. It sets 
reduction targets for each group of pesticides and for each sub-sector of agricultural 
production. These targets are mainly based on reductions that can be achieved by technologi-
cal change, and on an understanding of the best practices and assumptions about the applica-
tion of integrated production in arable farming and closed systems in greenhouses. Most of 
the targets have a technical basis and it is not clear how farmers will adopt these major 
reductions in pesticide applications if production costs increase substantially. As well as 
aiming to reduce the amounts of pesticide used by about half, the LCPP also advocates a 
policy related to chemical compounds; this involves prohibiting any more pesticides whose 
benefit to agricultural production is outweighed by the threat they pose to the environment. 
This study investigates the policies to reduce the amount of pesticides used and the policy 
related to chemical compounds. We considered two questions. The first is whether a 
regulatory levy on pesticides could be a useful instrument to attain the targeted reductions 
in the LCPP. To find the answer, the analysis concentrates on the relation between the 
quantity and price of pesticides, e.g. the demand function of pesticides. Experience from 
other countries, literature research, econometric models and linear programming models are 
used to elucidate this relation. The second question is: What are the effects of the policy 
related to chemical compounds. The LCPP contains a long list of pesticides that will not be 
authorized for use in the Netherlands in the future. Therefore, applying this list and 
comparing it with present application of pesticides in arable farming and a number of sub-
sectors in horticulture indicates the effect of this compound-related policy. The central 
element of this study is the analysis of the first question; the second question is analysed in 
the last chapter. 
According to economic theory the optimal levy is equal to the marginal social costs of 
emission at the optimal level of pollution. Unlike revenue oriented taxes, which are aimed 
at financing the implementation of policy, the main objective of a regulatory levy is to 
encourage behavioral change. Because of lack of information and because pesticides lead to 
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so-called "non-point source pollution", we study the efficacy of a levy on pesticides to 
achieve the goal set in the LCPP. 
Remarkably, there is no uniform economic theory on the optimal application of pesticides; 
several models have been applied to different questions. We have tried to reconcile these 
different approaches on the basis of two different production functions. Production functions 
describe the relation between the input of pesticides and the product output under different 
conditions. It has been shown that different approaches such as threshold models, 
programming models and neo-classical economic theory assume particular type of production 
functions and concentrate on specific aspects of the question of optimal use of pesticides 
under different conditions. 
Because risk elements play an important role in many analyses on the application of 
pesticides, we discuss the effect of introducing uncertainty in the different models and also 
the consequences of the risk-averse behaviour of agricultural producers. Different models can 
give contradictory conclusions on the consequences of introducing uncertainty in such 
models, but we explain that these conclusions depend on the form of the production function 
that has been assumed. 
Experience from other countries (mainly Sweden) is considered, when evaluating the effects 
of regulatory levies. The information is limited and sometimes rather scattered, but there are 
some indications about the price elasticity of demand for pesticides. It appears that if a 
substantial reduction is necessary, the levies should be high. 
To analyse the relation between the quantity and price of pesticides in the Netherlands, two 
different approaches are developed. Both are based on the assumption of rational behaviour 
of producers, maximizing the difference between revenue and variable costs, and that the 
farmer is a price taker in the output and variable inputs markets. 
The first approach is econometric, based on historical data on prices and quantities. The basis 
is a profit function for both arable farming and horticulture, together with the related demand 
functions for inputs (in this case, pesticides and other variable inputs) and the supply function 
of output. Long-term adjustments in the application of pesticides are partly based on a partial 
adjustment model for capital investments. With such a model based on economic theory, a 
demand function for pesticides can be estimated, and the consistency of the assumptions can 
be tested. Price elasticities of demand can be derived. They indicate a short-term price 
elasticity of about -0.3 for the arable sector. This means that a 1% rise in the price of 
pesticides will reduce the application of pesticides by 0.3%. Long-term price elasticities are 
not very different, because investments in capital goods are only slightly affected by prices 
of pesticides. The econometric approach yields short-term and long-term price elasticities for 
horticulture of -0.25 and -0.29, respectively. 
The other approach is based on linear programming (LP). It enables the effects of different 
levies for different pesticides to be investigated. The LP approach indicates that even without 
a regulatory levy a considerable reduction in pesticide use is possible without any loss of 
income. This is particularly true for soil disinfectants, whose use is already unprofitable 
under current circumstances according to the LP calculations. Obviously there is a large 
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difference between the actual behaviour of arable farmers and optimal behaviour according 
to the LP models. This difference between model and reality has been considered, but it is 
difficult to give a clear explanation. The LP approach indicates that for pesticides (except soil 
disinfectants) a levy between 10 and 25 guilders per kg of active ingredient would suffice to 
reach the target level in the year 2000. There were no clear differences between the various 
categories of pesticides. The levies calculated via the LP approach appear to be quite low 
compared with other experiences and studies. This is because of the model and the empirical 
information we used. 
A regulatory levy always gives a surplus revenue above the optimal costs of abatement. One 
of the principles of a regulatory levy - as formulated in the Dutch National Environmental 
Policy Plan - is to return the revenue of the levy (after deducting administrative costs) to the 
sector. Several ways of levying pesticides and returning the levies are discussed. The most 
feasible in the long term seems to be to levy and restitute each individual producer. This 
requires much administration, however, with attendant high costs and the need for intensive 
checking. 
To attain the reduction targets set in the LCPP for the year 2000 without a restrictive 
compound-related policy, a regulatory levy on pesticides is a useful and even an unavoidable 
instrument. Experience from other countries, literature research, econometric models and 
linear programming models indicate how big the regulatory levy should be. The LP model 
provides a lower limit for the levy (25 guilders per kg of active ingredient), because optimal 
behaviour and full information are assumed. The results depend heavily on the assumption 
of set-aside and constant product prices and, as already mentioned, there is a great difference 
between actual behaviour of arable farmers and optimal behaviour according to the LP 
models. The econometric model provides an upper limit to the levy (100 guilders per kg of 
active ingredient), because the effect of a probable increase in technological change is not 
taken into account. However, it is very questionable whether a model that has been estimated 
on a very small range of prices of pesticides can be used to calculate the effects of levies that 
more than double the price. 
Sensitivity analysis illustrates the large uncertainties. Clearly, there is a large difference 
between soil disinfectants and other pesticides. Because the first category has a very low 
price per kg of active ingredient and because regulations about the use of soil disinfectants 
have been changed, it seems probable that a large reduction in application can be achieved 
with a very small levy. 
The acceptability for the agricultural sector of a regulatory levy on pesticides depends on the 
income effects this levy would have in the sector. For a given demand function of pesticides 
it is easy to derive the income effects for producers. The total income effects for the 
agricultural sector are 110 mln guilders in 1995 and about 220 mln guilders in the year 2000. 
A sensitivity analysis indicates that the results greatly depend on the assumptions. We also 
calculated income effects and reduction percentages for different levies in the year 2000. The 
LP model indicates that the income effects for the arable sector of a particular regulatory 
levy are quite similar. However, the econometric study and the LP model indicate income 
effects that are substantially smaller than in the LCPP. This suggest that a regulatory levy 
is more efficient than other types of policy in achieving particular target levels. 
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The compound-related policy is investigated in the last chapter of the book. For all sectors 
this policy will reduce the application of pesticides quite severely. Here we assumed no 
substitution between different pesticides; therefore this might be considered as a maximum 
estimate of the effects of a compound-related policy. The percentual reduction in active 
ingredient is much larger than the reduction in the money value of pesticides. Cheaper 
pesticides are more often on the 'black list'. This illustrates that a levy per kg of active 
ingredient is more in line with a compound-related policy than a percentual levy on the price 
of pesticides. In this chapter the pesticides applied in new cropping variants and in optimal 
production plans under a levy are compared with the pesticides that will be authorized in the 
future. Here we found that a large part of the pesticides that will not be authorized in the 
future are incorporated in the optimal production plans. This illustrates the different effects 
of a volume policy and a compound-related policy. If the main purpose is to reduce the 
environmental burden of pesticides, a policy directed at the volume of pesticides will not 
always work in the right direction. 
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APPENDIX I. PRICES OF PESTICIDES AND AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS 
Trends in pesticide and in product prices are important when analysing the effect of regulatory 
levies. Here, we present a number of price series (see Table 1.1). Different sources give very 
different prices for pesticides. Because these series are not easily accessible, we give them here 
(see Table 1.2). The prices shown in the first column of Table 1.2 have been used in Section 4.2 
(analysis for the Netherlands) and in Chapter S. Prices of pesticides, according to recent 
information from the CBS are different (see Table 1.1). 
Table 1.1 Price indices (base year is 1980) of pesticides, arable products, horticultural products and 
general prices in the Netherlands 
Year 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
Annual increase 
1970-80 
1980-90 
Fungi-
cides 
73 
66 
67 
66 
77 
91 
89 
84 
85 
87 
100 
103 
114 
114 
121 
129 
128 
123 
121 
118 
119 
<*) 
3.2 
1.8 
Pesticides" 
Insecticides and 
Nematicides2' 
79 
77 
79 
75 
81 
93 
93 
93 
96 
97 
100 
103 
116 
119 
122 
128 
133 
134 
127 
128 
128 
2.4 
2.5 
Herbicides 
71 
67 
65 
67 
73 
90 
95 
95 
92 
95 
100 
107 
113 
118 
122 
122 
123 
123 
117 
112 
117 
3.5 
1.6 
Total 
78 
74 
75 
72 
80 
91 
93 
92 
91 
94 
100 
105 
114 
117 
121 
125 
126 
125 
120 
116 
119 
2.5 
1.8 
Arable 
pro-
ducts 
76 
67 
74 
85 
85 
98 
138 
112 
91 
93 
100 
104 
105 
129 
130 
103 
99 
93 
94 
103 
102 
2.8 
0.2 
Horticul-
tural 
products 
66 
71 
72 
74 
74 
82 
89 
95 
92 
89 
100 
107 
102 
109 
118 
121 
109 
117 
115 
114 
118 
4.2 
1.7 
General 
prices 
46 
50 
54 
59 
64 
71 
79 
85 
89 
94 
100 
106 
110 
113 
115 
117 
116 
116 
118 
119 
122 
8.1 
2.0 
Source: CBS, Maandstatistiek van de Landbouw, several years 
CBS, Nationale rekeningen, several years 
CBS, private information, 5 January 1992 
" Before 1975 prices are based on price indices used by Eurostat (EC indices of purchase prices 1968-1977) 
2)
 Before 1975 insecticides only 
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APPENDIX IL DATABASE ON PESTICIDE USE IN THE NETHERLANDS: 1984-1988 
Outline 
The database contains information on types of pesticides used in the Netherlands. A pesticide has 
been defined as follows: an active ingredient or combination of active ingredients authorized by 
the Dutch government for a certain type of disease or pest control whose price can be estimated 
relatively accurately. Using the database, data relevant for tackling pesticide use in terms of 
certain compounds can be generated. 
The classification according to application that has been used in the database largely conforms 
with that of the LCPP: soil disinfection, soil treatment, weed control and other types of crop 
protection. The database is based on the pesticides authorized per 1 January 1987. Pesticide prices 
are therefore 1987 prices (excl. 5% VAT). Some of the compounds mentioned in the LCPP 
inventory of active ingredients are absent; this results in a 1.3% deviation (compare Tables 2.5 
and 2.12). The database comprises all sectors and crops (and livestock) in Dutch agriculture and 
horticulture distinguished in the LCPP. Although data were available for some regions, no 
regional subdivision has been made. 
The data presented in Chapters 2 and 9 have been derived from the database and are aggregates 
for sectors (crops), applications and a phased-in ban (see Tables 2.5, 2.6, 2.11, 2.14, 9.1 and 
9.2). This appendix provides more details on the database. Three tables containing data in a more 
disaggregated form have been included. 
The basis of the database: a compound and a crop 
Table II. 1 depicts the use of benomyl. Similar information can be given for other compounds. 
What we have done here is to take the pesticide we wish to use for the database from the Crop 
Protection Guide and quantify it. We have listed the two authorized formulations of the pesticide 
benomyl, both with the same application, ignoring differences in brands. Benomyl seems to be 
applied in five sectors: arable farming, flowers from bulbs and bulb growing, mushrooms, fruit 
growing and field vegetable farming. The amounts of benomyl used as a soil treatment have not 
been registered. The presentation of the data differs per sector, because the data were collected by 
different study groups. Thus, for example, from the presentation of the Study Group on flowers 
from bulbs it can be derived whether the compound is in liquid or solid form, whereas the Study 
Group on arable farming did not make this distinction. In general we only included formulations 
in the database if their price was known. In two cases, fungicides, insecticides and other chemicals 
from the LCPP were not included in the database: if they were not authorized per 1 January 1987 
(excl. methyl bromide); and if it was unclear what is the active ingredient. The sectors for which 
it is difficult to determine the amounts used are discussed below. 
The Study Group for Bulb Flower Growing used the terms 'carbamate mix' and 'BCM chemi-
cals', where BCM obviously stands for butyl carbomyl (pers. comm. Weggemans, 1992, PD). 
Our database uses the terms zineb/maneb (50/20) and 1/3 benomyl (50), 1/3 carbendazim (50) and 
1/3 thiophanate-methyl (50) respectively, which are arguable but also justifiable. 
For apple and pear growing, the Study Group for Fruit Growing mentions only total amounts of 
active ingredients (herbicides, fungicides and insecticides/acaricides). According to the 'Back-
ground Document') the estimates have been derived from the Berends Report. The results of our 
enquiries among members of the Study Group (Van der Scheer, Van Maurik) suggest that the 
Berends method is debatable. It is thought that Berends did not ask all the specialists the same 
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questions. The Study Group made a better estimate. It is in the files of the Secretariat of the 
LCPP. Though the database does use the Berends estimates, wherever possible it is based on the 
amounts given in the LCPP. 
The only sector that did not include an appendix listing pesticide use is the Study Group for 
Floriculture. According to De Goeij, the data available are unreliable because the sector has very 
many crops and there might be an overlap with, for instance, the sector "flowers from bulbs". 
The database uses the Berends estimates (1988) for roses, chrysanthemums, gerberas and 
gypsophila. 
The Study Group on Growing Vegetables under Glass makes frequent reference to Berends 
(1988). The chemicals used to clean glass have not been included in the database. 
The Study Group on Livestock Farming does not distinguish soil treatment, although soil-borne 
pests can be a major problem in pasture management. In accordance with the LCPP, disinfectants 
have not been included in the database. 
Table II. 1 The use of benomyl in several crops (in agriculture and horticulture) in the period 1984-1988 
Appli- Name2' Quantity Factor2> Quantity Price4' Value 
Crop cation" of active of (gld/ (guilders) 
ingredient compound kg a.i.) 
&£! &2 
Wheat 
Anemone (bulb) 
Gladiolus (bulb) 
Hyacinth (bulb) 
Iris (flower) 
Iris (bulb) 
Crocus (bulb/conn) 
Lily (bulb) 
Narcissus (bulb) 
Tulip (flower) 
Tulip (bulb) 
Other flowers from bulbs 
and bulb growing 
Mushrooms 
Cherry 
Fruit tree growing 
Brussels Sprouts 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
82 
82 
82 
82 
82 
82 
82 
82 
82 
82 
82 
82 
82 
82 
82 
82 
325 
31 
155 
138 
190 
7 
52 
849 
565 
3 695 
737 
27 
238 
50 
67 
2 861 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
650 
62 
310 
276 
380 
14 
104 
1698 
1 130 
7 390 
1474 
54 
476 
100 
134 
5 722 
58.5 
58.5 
58.5 
58.5 
58.5 
58.5 
58.5 
58.5 
58.5 
58.5 
58.5 
58.5 
58.5 
58.5 
58.5 
58.5 
38 025 
3 627 
18 135 
16 146 
22 230 
819 
6 084 
99 333 
66 105 
432 315 
86 229 
3 159 
27 846 
5 850 
7 839 
334 737 
Notes: 
1) 3 = other crop protection: fungicides and bactericides. 
2) 82 = benomyl spraying powder containing 50% active ingredient; the latter was chosen because the 
price was known and the authorized use is identical to that of benomyl spraying powder containing 
75% active ingredient = 81; to convert active ingredient to formulated product, multiply by 2. 
3) Data derived from study group reports to the LCPP as well as from the Report "Pesticides and Surface 
Water"; the best country-wide estimate available, also serving as a basis for the targeted percentages of 
reduction in the LCPP. 
4) Price derived from the "Handleiding 1987". 
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The Study Group on Arable Fanning lists per crop only the total amount of active ingredient 
applied in controlling above-ground fungi and insects, and weeds. The Berends report contains 
specification of the active ingredients concerned. For sugarbeet, winter wheat, peas, summer and 
winter barley it specifies per region whether they are grown in clay or sandy soil. The correspon-
ding sub-areas have not been specified, however. In the database it has been assumed that the 
pesticide use in these areas are similar to the shares with respect to ware potatoes. Table II.2 
shows the use of pesticides in sugarbeet. A similar overview can be given for other crops. From 
this table it can easily be seen which data were used for Table II.3: in general, totals from Table 
II.2 are incorporated in Table II.3. The prices are known for sectors (notably arable farming) in 
which price used to be considered as influencing the choice of pesticides. In fruit growing (pers. 
comm. Van Maurik, 1992), however, pesticide prices hardly play any role. 
Table II.2 Applications of different types of pesticides in sugarbeet in the period 1984-1988 
Application" Name2' Quantity a.i. Factor Quantity of Price Value (guilders) 
(kg) compound (kg) (gld/kg) 
0 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
4 
4 
4 
5 
178 
649 
237 
450 
451 
483 
513 
559 
735 
880 
971 
1064 
1 045 
726 
828 
864 
4 600 
14 500 
154 466 
30 239 
8 437 
94 478 
1 877 
512 
207 910 
35 452 
1407 
21533 
613 
766 
4 500 
97 602 
20 
7.1 
1.5 
5 
7.1 
6.4 
8 
2.8 
1.4 
2 
5.3 
2.5 
2 
2 
4 
2 
9 200 
102 950 
231 699 
151 195 
59 903 
604 659 
15 016 
1 434 
291 074 
70 904 
7 457 
53 833 
1226 
1532 
18 000 
19 520 
14 
17 
53.75 
44 
34.8 
44.75 
108.5 
74.75 
59.75 
11.25 
70.5 
25.75 
8 
85 
9 
102.5 
1 288 000 
1 750 150 
12 453 821 
6 652 580 
2 084 614 
27 058 499 
1 629 236 
107 162 
17 391 672 
797 670 
525 726 
1 386 187 
9 808 
130 220 
162 000 
2 000 800 
Notes: 
1) 0 = soil disinfection (no distribution among individual crops); 1 = soil treatment; 2 = herbicides; 
3 = fungicides and bactericides; 4 = insecticides and acaricides; 5 = others 
2) 178 = carboniran granulate 5% 
649 = lindane spraying poweder 14% 
237 = chloridazon spraying powder 6596 
450 = liquid ethofumesate 200 g/1 
451 = liquid ethofumesate/fenmedifam 50/90 g/1 
483 = liquid phenmedipham 157 g/1 
513 = liquid fluazifop-p-butyl 125 g/1 
559 = liquid glyphosate 360 g/1 
735 = metamitron spraying powder 70% 
880 = propham spraying powder 50% 
971 = liquid sethoxydim 190 g/1 
1064 = liquid tri-allate 400 g/1 
1045 = thiram spraying powder 50% 
726 = liquid mercaptodimethur 500 g/1 
828 = parathion spraying powder 25% 
864 — pirimicarb spraying powder 50% 
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Outcome of the database: a disaggregated overview 
Table II.3 gives an overview of the use of pesticides per type of crop. The picture is somewhat 
confused because in the sectors "arable fanning" and "growing vegetables under glass" soil 
disinfectants have been ascribed to the sector as a whole rather than to individual crops. In some 
crops, estimated pesticide use is far too low. The table indicates ratios only. The database differs 
from previous inventories by showing the relationship between the amount of active ingredient 
used and its costs (the estimated price of an amount of active ingredient per crop). These data 
largely depend on the composition of pesticide use. Finally, the table shows the relationship 
between costs of pesticides and output value. A high proportion means that if pesticide prices rise, 
profitability will decline markedly and a pesticide use is also likely to decline. 
Sources 
Adviesprijzen over 1991, CEBECO Agrochemie B.V., 7/1991, Rotterdam. 
Bestrijdingsmiddelen en oppervlaktekwaliteit, A.G. Berends, Instituut voor Onderzoek Bestrijdingsmiddelen, 
1988, Wageningen, 110 p. plus bijlagen. 
Gewasbeschermingsgids 1987, CAD Gewasbescherming/Plantenziektenkundige Dienst, Wageningen, 575 p., 
in particular p.81-167. 
Handleiding 1987. De chemische bestrijding van ziekten, plagen en onkruiden in landbouwgewassen, 
december 1986, CAD Gewasbescherming, Wageningen, 76 p., in particular p.71-76. 
Meerjarenplan Gewasbescherming, beleidsvoornemen augustus 1990, Ministerie van Landbouw, Natuurbe-
heer en Visserij (LNV), Den Haag, 138 + 133 (bijlagen) p., in particular p.36-40 and p.80-94. 
Meerjarenplan Gewasbescherming, regeringsbeslissing juni 1991, Ministerie van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer 
en Visserij (LNV), Den Haag, 298 p., in particular p.35-39 and p.85-102. 
Rapportage werkgroep Akkerbouw, november 1990, LNV, Den Haag, 103 p., in particular p.34-36 and 
p. 85-88. 
Rapportage werkgroep Bloembollenteelt, november 1990, LNV, Den Haag, 124 p., in particular p.29-42 
and p.81-99. 
Rapportage werkgroep Bloemisterij, november 1990, LNV, Den Haag, 79 p., in particular p.26-28. 
Rapportage werkgroep Boomteelt, november 1990, LNV, Den Haag, 112 p., in particular p.21-28 and 
p.51-72. 
Rapportage werkgroep Eetbare paddestoelen, november 1990, Den Haag, 51 p., in particular p. 15/16 and 
p.37-39. 
Rapportage werkgroep Fruitteelt, november 1990, LNV, Den Haag, 76 p., in particular p.32-33 and p.61-
64. 
Rapportage werkgroep Groenteteelt onder glas, november 1990, LNV, Den Haag, 69 p., in particular p.26-
27 and p.56-61. 
Rapportage werkgroep Openbaar Groen, november 1990, LNV, Den Haag, 55 p., in particular p.24-27 and 
p.44-60. 
Rapportage werkgroep Veehouderij, november 1990, LNV, Den Haag, 70 p., in particular p.21-27 and 
p.44-60. 
Rapportage werkgroep Vollegrondsgroenteteelt, november 1990, LNV, Den Haag, 102 p., in particular 
p.27-35 and p.60-98. 
Verslag van de werkzaamheden van de Commissie Toelating Bestrijdingsmiddelen en het Bureau Bestrij-
dingsmiddelen over 1988/1989, CTB/BB, 8/1990, Wageningen. 
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APPENDIX III. CROPPING VARIANTS 
In the LP analysis, "cropping variants" which differ in economic and environmental value are 
defined for every crop. The variety of the cropping variants with regard to environmental 
parameters is represented in the technical coefficients in matrix A. Financial differences are given 
by means of the gross margin figures (excl. costs of pesticide use) c in the objective function (see 
Scheme 6.1 in Chapter 6). 
For ware potato, 23 cropping variants had to be distinguished to account for the different cropping 
frequencies and for the combination with a variety resistant to potato sickness. For the other crops 
there are fewer alternatives: 4 for starch potato, 8 for sugarbeet, 14 for winter wheat, 3 for peas 
and 3 each for seed grass and spring-sown onions. 
The cropping variants range from intensive to the ecological production system, representing a 
discrete set of production alternatives which cover both: (a) consecutive points on a non-linear 
production function (Table III. 1), and (b) points on different production functions using different 
technology (Tables III.2 to III.7). 
Table III. 1 Winter wheat cropping variants 
variant 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
yield 
(kg/ha) 
7500 
7430 
7290 
6760 
6270 
5880 
6480 
6720 
6880 
6600 
6110 
5740 
6629 
5500 
straw 
(kg/ha) 
4700 
4656 
4568 
4236 
3929 
4685 
4061 
4211 
4312 
4136 
3829 
3597 
4154 
3447 
nitrogen 
(kg/ha) 
160 
130 
100 
50 
20 
-
160 
130 
100 
50 
20 
-
140 
-
pesticides (kg a.i./ha) 
F 
2.475 
2.475 
2.475 
2.475 
2.475 
2.475 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
ccc 
0.9 
0.9 
0.9 
0.9 
0.9 
0.9 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
H 
2.24 
2.24 
2.24 
2.24 
2.24 
2.24 
2.24 
2.24 
2.24 
2.24 
2.24 
2.24 
0.829 
-
I 
0.125 
0.125 
0.125 
0.125 
0.125 
0.125 
0.125 
0.125 
0.125 
0.125 
0.125 
0.125 
-
-
total 
5.74 
5.74 
5.74 
5.74 
5.74 
5.74 
2.365 
2.365 
2.365 
2.365 
2.365 
2.365 
0.829 
-
gross margin 
(gld/ha) 
2526 
2533 
2512 
2362 
2205 
2075 
2294 
2422 
2518 
2466 
2309 
2187 
2386 
1866 
labour 
(h/ha) 
14.1 
13.5 
13.5 
12.9 
12.9 
12.3 
13.1 
12.5 
12.5 
11.9 
11.9 
11.3 
12.6 
9.8 
Source: Verschueren (1991), modified 
Remarks: 
- Per hectare, variants 1-12 require 150 kg seed, variant 13 requires 180 kg and variant 14 requires 175 kg. 
- The output price is 0.41 guilders per kg for all variants. 
F = fungicides 
CCC = growth control 
H = herbicides 
I = insecticides 
D = others (see Table III.7) 
Gross Margin = output in guilders per ha minus variable cost including pesticides but excluding the costs for contract 
work, i.e. harvesting and straw removal. 
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Table III.2 Sugarbeet cropping variants 
variant 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
yield 
kg/ha 
61000 
61000 
61000 
61000 
61000 
61000 
53483 
50000 
nitrogen 
kg/ha 
140 
140 
140 
140 
140 
140 
93 
142.52 
pesticides (kg 
H 
5.81 
3.63 
2.07 
2.60 
1.03 
2.88 
1.80 
-
a.i./ha) 
I 
0.38 
0.38 
0.38 
0.38 
0.38 
0.38 
0.30 
-
total 
5.56 
4.01 
2.45 
2.98 
1.41 
3.26 
2.10 
-
gross margin 
gld/ha 
4441 
4610 
4730 
4731 
4807 
4648 
4059 
3898 
labour' 
h/ha 
29.7 
29.2 
28.7 
45.7 
45.2 
30.7 
37.7 
77.7 
Source: Verschueren (1991), modified. 
1
 In variants 2, 3 and 5, all requiring row spraying, there are two options: (a) contract work or (b) investment in own 
machinery. In the latter case the labour requirements for row spraying (1 h/ha for one treatment) should be added. 
2
 For the ecological variant the manure used (142.5 kg/ha) is translated into cost of the equivalent amount of N 
fertilizer. 
Table III.2a Differences in method of weed control and use of herbicides for the sugarbeet cropping variants 
variant pre-
emergence 
post-
emergence 
harrowing manual 
(It treatments) weeding 
(h) 
herbicides 
(kg a.i./ha) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
total 
total 
row 
total 
— 
5 0 % 
— 
total 
row 
row 
— 
row 
LD 
row + total 
2 times 
2 times 
3 times 
3 times 
3 times 
2 times 
4 times 
15 
15 
15 
30 
30 
15 
20 
5.18 
4.63 
2.07 
2.60 
1.03 
2.88 
1.80 
Source: Verschueren, 1991. 
Remarks: 
Total = spraying total field (0.5 hours/ha) 
Row = row spraying (1.0 hours/ha) 
LD = low dosage system, treatments repeated (2 to 3 times) with a reduced dose of herbicides plus mineral oil 
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Table III.3 Ware potato cropping variants 
vari- variety rotation yield 
ant kg/ha 
soil bait nematicides gross margin' 
fumigation crop (kg a.i./ha) (gld/ha) 
1:3 variants: 
1 Bintje 
2 Bintje 
3 Bintje 
PSRvar2 
4 Bintje 
PSRvar 
S Bintje 
PSRvar 
6 Bintje 
PSRvar 
1:4 variants: 
7 Bintje 
8 Bintje 
9 Bintje 
10 Bintje 
PSRvar 
11 Bintje 
PSR var 
12 Bintje 
PSR var 
13 Bintje 
PSR var 
1:5 variants: 
14 Bintje 
IS Bintje 
16 Bintje 
17 Bintje 
18 Bintje 
19 Bintje 
PSRvar 
20 Bintje 
PSR var 
21 Bintje 
PSRvar 
1:6 variants: 
22 Bintje 
23 Bintje 
PSR var 
1:3 
1:3 
1:6 
1:6 
1:6 
1:6 
1:6 
1:6 
1:6 
1:6 
1:4 
1:4 
1:4 
1:8 
1:8 
1:8 
1:8 
1:8 
1:8 
1:8 
1:8 
1:5 
1:5 
1:5 
1:5 
1:5 
1:10 
1:10 
1:10 
1:10 
1:10 
1:10 
1:6 
1:12 
1:12 
49400 
46960 
50980 
53520 
50690 
53220 
50490 
53010 
50770 
53310 
53000 
51320 
50290 
54090 
56790 
53890 
56580 
53750 
56440 
53930 
56640 
56410 
55260 
52690 
54180 
55200 
57020 
59870 
56930 
59770 
57060 
59920 
56580 
59450 
62430 
1:3 
1:6 
1:6 
— 
infected 
— 
— 
— 
_-
— 
1:4 
1:8 
— 
1:8 
— 
infected 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
1:5 
1:10 
_ 
— 
— 
infected 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
areas 
1:6 
1:4 
areas 
1:8 
1:10 
1:5 
areas 
1:10 
174 
87 
174 
0 
34.8 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
174 
87 
0 
174 
0 
34.8 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
174 
87 
0 
0 
0 
34.8 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
4813 
4780 
5065 
6298 
5373 
6250 
5699 
6217 
5744 
6265 
5387 
5475 
5667 
5561 
6820 
5884 
6786 
6219 
6764 
6251 
6796 
5931 
6104 
6050 
6288 
6451 
6383 
7313 
6726 
7298 
6747 
7321 
7237 
7128 
7721 
Source: De Buck (1991) based on information from DLO Centre for Agrobiological Research (CABO, 
Wageningen) and on KWIN 89/90 (PAGV, 1989). 
1
 Gross margin considering the first method for each operation as presented in Table III.3a. 
2
 PSR: resistant to potato sickness, in this case to nematode pathotype A. 
Note that a fixed combination of 50% Bintje and 50% PSR variety is chosen, as it is expected that growing more of 
the PSR variety will stimulate the development of new pathotypes from the present nematode population in the soil. 
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Table III.3a Ware potato cropping variants (continued) 
Optional methods for N dressing, weed control, haulm killing and late blight control 
Options kg a.i./ha labour h/ha2 
N dressing: 
method 1 
method 2 
method 3 
current practice (210 kg N and 44 kg N by 9 tons manure 
per ha applied in autumn before potato growing) 
"Neeteson" fertilizer only (185 kg N per ha)2 
split fertilization supported by petiole analysis (188 kg N per ha) 0.8 
0 6 
0.6 
Weed control: 
method 1 
method 2 
method 3 
Haulm killing-
method 1 
method 2 
1 kg metribuzin per ha total field spraying 
0.S kg metribuzin per ha under-leaf spraying3 
late ridging + hoeing + 0.125 kg metribuzin per ha4 
chemical : 5 1 diquat per ha 
mechanical5 
Late blight control: 
method 1 Bintje : 
PSR var: 
method 2 Bintje : 
PSR var: 
27 1 per ha maneb/fentin 
20.25 1 per ha maneb/fentin 
14 1 maneb 80% + 4.5 1 maneb/fentin per ha 
10 1 maneb 80% + 2.25 1 maneb/fentin per ha 
0.70 
0.35 
0.0875 
1.00 
-
11.88 
8.91 
13.18 
8.99 
2.5 
3.0 
3.0 
0.5 
2.8 
6.0 
4.5 
4.5 
3.0 
1
 Excluding contract work. 
2
 Yield reduction of 750 kg/ha compared with option 1 which is accounted for in the costs. 
3
 In the case of own mechanization, row spraying accessories are required: annual costs 612 guilders per farm. The 
option of contract work is also offered at 70 guilders per hectare. 
4
 To account for the risk of unsuccessful mechanical weed control it is assumed that over four years a chemical treat-
ment is required once. Investment in earther/ridge hoe: annual costs 756 guilders per farm. 
5
 Investment in a haulm shredder: annual costs 2415 guilders per farm. 
Source: De Buck (1991) based on information from DLO Centre for Agrobiological Research (CABO, Wageningen). 
Remarks: In the reference situation (standard cropping variants) it is assumed that for every operation the first method 
mentioned is applied; hence, the level of pesticide use is high. 
Table III.4 Starch potato cropping variants 
va-
ri-
ant 
1 
2 
3 
4 
rotat- yield 
ion fre- kg/ha 
quency 
1:2 
1:2 
1:4 
1:4 
45000 
45000 
41868 
42315 
planting nitrog 
material (kg/ha 
(kg/ha] 
2200 
2163 
2250 
1975 
1 
200 
215 
197 
204 
en pesticides (kg a.i 
) H 
1.85 
1.5 
1.5 
-
F 
5.94 
9.95 
11.23 
11.20 
I 
0.25 
-
-
-
i./ha) 
N 
131 
126 
126 
-
total 
139.04 
137.45 
138.73 
11.20 
gross 
margin 
(gld/ha) 
1788 
2024 
1585 
2527 
labour 
(h/ha) 
27.7 
31.5 
34.4 
34.4 
Source: KWIN 88/'89 (PAGV, 1989) and Boerma (1989 and 1990). 
Remarks: 
- Output price: 113 guilders per 1000 kg. 
- Variants 1 and 2 require soil disinfection 1:2 
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Table III.S Pea cropping variants 
va-
riant 
1 
2 
3 
yield straw nitrogen 
(kg/ha) (kg/ha) (kg/ha) 
4900 2000 20 
4223 1724 
3500 1429 
pesticides (kg a.i./ha) 
F H I total 
0.5 2.47 0.75 3.72 
0.15 2.15 0.21 2.51 
gross margin 
(gki/ha) 
2350 
1974 
1888 
labour 
(h/ha) 
14.16 
15.8 
26.8 
Source: Verschueren (1991), modified. 
Remarks: 
- Sowing rate for variants 1 and 3: 140 kg seed/ha; variant 2: 175 kg seed/ha. 
- Output price: 0.65 guilders per kg. 
Table III.6 Seed grass cropping variants 
variant yield seed 
(kg/ha) (kg/ha) 
1 1300 8 
2 1300 11 
3 1162 10 
nitrogen pesticides (kg 
(kg/ha) H I 
130 6.13 0.25 
181 2.855 -
159 2.515 -
a.i./ha) 
total 
6.38 
2.855 
2.515 
gross margin 
(gld/ha) 
2586 
2559 
2360 
labour hours 
per ha 
14.4 
16.1 
17.2 
Source: KWIN 88/'89 (PAGV, 1989) and Boerma (1989 and 1990). 
Remarks: Output price 2 guilders per kg. 
Table III.7 Onion cropping variants 
variant yield nitrogen 
(kg/ha) (kg/ha) 
1 51000 120 
2 38773 32 
3 25000 
pesticides (kg 
F H 
10.05 5.6 
3.42 2.5 
a.i./ha) 
I 
0.75 
D 
2.25 
2.25 
gross margin 
total (gld/ha) 
18.65 4142 
8.17 3053 
2005 
labour 
(h/ha) 
48.3 
69.1 
126.2 
Source: Verschueren (1991), modified. 
Remarks: 
- Sowing seed variant 1: 6.0 kg/ha; variants 2 and 3: 6.7 kg/ha as against 6.0 kg/ha. 
- Output price 0.13 guilders per kg. 
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APPENDIX IV. CHANGES IN CROPPING PATTERNS AND CROPPING VARIANTS 
PER REGION 
The cropping patterns under the heading "current situation (fixed)" correspond to the situation 
derived from statistical information (see Table 6.2). This situation differs from the optimal 
cropping pattern, given under the heading "current situation (optimal)", which is assessed by LP 
computations accounting for agronomical constraints, to the rotation. The difference between both 
situations with respect to pesticide use is presented in Table 6.3. In both instances only standard 
cropping activities were included. 
Next, model computations were done for all cropping variants for the various crops included (zero 
levy situation). This zero levy situation expresses the changes in farming practice if the most 
modern techniques were to be introduced on the representative farms. Further, the changes in 
cropping patterns and in the selected variants that would occur in response to a levy increasing 
from 10 to 200 guilders per kg a.i. are presented. 
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Table IV. 1 Changes per farm in cropping pattern and cropping variants in hectares, Northern Clay Area 
(larger farms) 
Crop and Current situation Levy in guilders per kilogram active ingredient 
variant no. Fixed Optimal 0 10 15 25 SO 75 100 150 200 
Winter wheat 1 
Winter wheat 2 
Winter wheat 13 
integrated 
Winter wheat 14 
ecological 
Sugarbeet 1 
Sugarbeet 4 
Sugarbeet 5b 
Green peas 1 
Seed grass 1 
Ware pot. 16 Bintje 
Ware pot.20 Bintje 
Ware pot.20 AM-var. 
Ware pot.23 Bintje 
Ware pot.23 AM-var. 
Set-aside 
30 
14 
5 
3 
14 
33 
33 
33 33 33 
33 33 33 33 33 
14 
14 
14 14 14 14 14 
14 14 14 14 
7 
7 
5 
7 
7 
5 
7 
7 
5 
7 
7 
5 
7 
7 
5 
7 
7 
5 
5.83 
5.83 
7.33 
5.83 
5.83 
7.33 
5.83 
5.83 
7.33 
Total 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 
Table IV. la Ware potato: changes in variable methods, Northern Clay area (larger farms) 
Current situation Levy in guilders per kilogram active ingredient 
Fixed Optimal 0 10 15 25 50 75 100 150 200 
N Dressing 1 x , x 
N Dressing 2 
N Dressing 3 x x x x x x x x x 
Weed control 1 x x 
Weed control 2 
Weed control 3 
Late blight contr. Bintje l x x 
Late blight contr. AM 1 
Late blight contr. Bintje 2 
Late blight contr. AM 2 
Haulm killing 1 x x 
Haulm killing 2 
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X X 
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Changes in cropping patterns and variants per region 
Table IV.2 Changes per farm in cropping pattern and cropping variants in hectares, Peat Colonies 
(larger farms) 
Crop and 
variant no. 
Current situation Levy in guilders per kilogram active ingredient 
Fixed Optimal 0 10 IS 25 50 75 100 150 200 
Winter wheat 1 
Sugarbeet 1 
Sugarbeet 4 
Sugarbeet 5b 
Green peas 1 
Seed grass 1 
Seed grass 2 
Starch pot. 1 1:2 
Starch pot.4 1:4 
Set-aside 
11 
11.5 
6.5 
4 
28 
11.5 
11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 
11.5 11.5 
10 10 
10 10 
14 14 14 14 14 14 
39.5 25.5 25.5 25.5 35.5 35.5 35.5 49.5 49.5 49.5 
Total 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 
Table IV.2a Changes per farm in cropping pattern and cropping variants in hectares, Peat Colonies 
(smaller farms) 
Crop and 
variant no. 
Winter wheat 1 
Sugarbeet 1 
Sugarbeet 4 
Sugarbeet 5b 
Green peas 1 
Seed grass 1 
Seed grass 2 
Starch pot. 1 1:2 
Starch pot.4 1:4 
Set-aside 
Total 
Current situation 
Fixed 
7 
6 
4 
11 
28 
Optimal 
6 
4.5 
18 
28 
0 
6 
4.5 
5.5 
12 
28 
Levy 
10 
6 
4.5 
5.5 
12 
28 
in guilders per 
15 
6 
4.5 
5.5 
12 
28 
25 
6 
5.5 
16.5 
28 
kilogram active ingredient 
50 
6 
5.5 
16.5 
28 
75 100 
6 6 
5.5 
16.5 22 
28 28 
150 
6 
22 
28 
200 
6 
22 
28 
149 
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Table IV.3 Changes per farm in cropping pattern and cropping variants in hectares, Central Clay area 
(larger farms) 
Crop and 
variant no. 
Winter wheat 1 
Winter wheat 2 
Winter wheat 9 
Sugarbeet 2a 
Sugarbeet 3b 
Sugarbeet 5b 
Green peas 1 
Seed grass 1 
Onion 1 
Ware pot.2 Bintje 
Ware pot.5 Bintje 
Ware pot.5 AM-var. 
Set-aside 
Total 
Current situ-
ation 
Fixed Optimal 
11 
10 
2 
3 
7 
12 
45 
17.5 
10 
5.5 
12 
45 
0 
17.5 
3.29 
6.71 
5.5 
6 
6 
45 
Levy 
10 
17.5 
2.51 
7.49 
5.5 
6 
6 
45 
in guilders per 
15 
17.5 
2.51 
7.49 
5.5 
6 
6 
45 
25 
17.5 
2.51 
7.49 
5.5 
6 
6 
45 
kilogram active 
50 75 
20.1 21.2 
10 10 
2.87 1.84 
6 6 
6 6 
0.5 
45 45 
ingredient 
100 
22.5 
10 
6 
6 
0.5 
45 
150 200 
22.5 22.5 
10 10 
6 6 
6 6 
0.5 
45 45 
Table IV. 3a Ware potato: changes in variable methods, Central Clay Area (larger farms) 
Current situation Levy in guilders per kilogram active ingredient 
Fixed Optimal 0 10 15 25 50 75 100 150 200 
N dressing 1 
N dressing 2 
N dressing 3 
Weed control 1 
Weed control 2 
Weed control 3 
Late blight Bintje 1 
Late blight AM 1 
Late blight Bintje 2 
Late blight AM 2 
Haulm killing 1 
Haulm killing 2 
x x x x x x x x 
x x x x x x x 
x x x x x x x 
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Table IV.4 Changes per farm in cropping pattern and cropping variants in hectares, Southwestern 
Clay Area (larger farms) 
Crop and 
variant no. 
Current situation Levy in guilders per kilogram active ingredient 
Fixed Optimal 0 10 15 25 50 75 100 150 200 
Winter wheat 1 
Winter wheat 2 
Winter wheat 13 
integrated 
Winter wheat 14 
ecological 
Sugarbeet 2a 
Sugarbeet 3b 
Sugarbeet 5b 
Green peas 1 
Seed grass 1 
Onion 1 
Ware pot. 12 Bintje 
Ware pot. 12 AM-var. 
Ware pot. 23 Bintje 
Ware pot. 23 AM-var. 
Set-aside 
17 24.47 
10 
6 
5.5 
5.5 
6.52 
6.52 
24.47 
28.5 28.5 28.5 28.5 
10 
9.42 3.07 3.07 
0.58 6.90 6.9010 
28.5 28.5 28.5 28.5 
10 10 
9.5 9.5 5.47 5.47 3.13 2.38 
6.52 6.52 6.52 6.52 6.52 6.52 6.52 
6.52 6.52 6.52 6.52 6.52 6.52 6.52 
10 
6.52 
6.52 
10 
2.33 3.08 5.47 5.47 
4.33 
4.33 
9.83 
10 
4.33 
4.33 
9.83 
Total 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 
Table IV.4a Ware potato: changes in optional methods, Southwestern Clay Area 
Current situation Levy in guilders per kilogram active ingredient 
Fixed Optimal 0 10 15 25 50 75 100 150 200 
N dressing 1 
N dressing 2 
N dressing 3 
Weed control 1 
Weed control 2 
Weed control 3 
Late blight Bintje 1 
Late blight AM 1 
Late blight Bintje 2 
Late blight AM 2 
Haulm killing 1 
Haulm killing 2 
x x x x x x x x 
x x x x x x 
x x x x x x 
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Table IV.S Changes per farm in cropping pattern and cropping variants in hectares, Clay Areas 
(smaller farms) 
Crop and 
variant no. 
Winter wheat 1 
Winter wheat 2 
Winter wheat 13 
integrated 
Winter wheat 14 
ecological 
Sugarbeet 2a 
Sugarbeet 4 
Sugarbeet Sb 
Green peas 1 
Seed grass 1 
Onion 1 
Ware pot.22 Bintje 
Ware pot.23 Bintje 
Ware pot. 23 Am-var. 
Set-aside 
Total 
Current situation 
Fixed 
9 
5 
2 
1.5 
2.5 
4 
24 
Optimal 
9 
5 
3 
4 
24 
0 
12 
5 
3 
2 
2 
24 
Levy 
10 
12 
5 
3 
2 
2 
24 
in guilders 
15 
12 
5 
3 
2 
2 
24 
25 
12 
5 
3 
2 
2 
24 
per kilogram active 
50 75 
12 
12 
5 5 
2.92 
2 2 
2 2 
0.08 3 
24 24 
100 
12 
5 
2 
2 
3 
24 
ingredieni 
150 
12 
5 
2 
2 
3 
24 
t 
200 
12 
5 
2 
2 
3 
24 
Table IV.5a Ware potato: changes in variable methods, Clay Areas (smaller farms) 
Current situation Levy in guilders per kilogram active ingredient 
Fixed Optimal 0 10 15 25 50 75 100 150 200 
N dressing 1 
N dressing 2 
N dressing 3 
Weed control 1 
Weed control 2 
Weed control 3 
Late blight Bintje 1 
Late blight AM 1 
Late blight Bintje 2 
Late blight AM 2 
Haulm killing 1 
Haulm killing 2 
x x x x x x x 
x x x x x x x x x 
x x x x x x x x x 
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APPENDIX V. ADDITION TO THE LP COMPUTATIONS 
The LCPP outlines the strategy to reduce pesticide use and estimates the costs this entails per 
agricultural sector. This Appendix presents a comparison of the LCPP estimates for arable 
farming with those obtained by the LP computations. 
The total changes in costs as given in the LCPP are made up of increased expenditure and yield 
reductions as well as savings on inputs. The cropping variants used in the LP models usually 
cover several of these aspects. Hence, changes of costs and returns are difficult to separate. The 
items listed under the heading 'LP results 2000' - which means resulting differences between total 
revenue and variable costs - do not add up to the 31.0 mln guilders given as the 'total'. Further-
more, as the LP approach is restricted to farm level some costs mentioned in the LCPP are 
omitted. For example, the costs of implementing an information system and additional costs of 
inspecting sprayers. These are indicated by '-'. 
The quantification of the additional costs for the LP computations pertains to the situations with a 
levy of SO guilders per kg active ingredient (except soil disinfection). There were no unambigous 
data on 'yield and quality reduction attributable to additional mechanical operations' that could be 
included in the cropping variants. The costs of shredding small potatoes left in the field and 
transporting soil wastes were left out, as they are irrelevant for a levy imposed on pesticide use. 
Finally, reduction in the quality of seed potato is disregarded, as in the LP models growing seed 
potatoes is considered to be equivalent to growing ware potatoes (see Section 6.3). 
In the LP result set-aside plays an important role. For example, in the case of a levy of 50 
guilders per kg a.i., set-aside accounts for more than SO per cent of the arable land in the Peat 
Colonies (see Appendix IV). A premium of 1500 guilders per hectare set-aside is assumed in the 
computations. Without this premium the cropping patterns change; more seed grass is grown in 
the Peat Colonies. The major part of the former set-aside area remains fallow, however, and 
income losses caused by a levy become more dramatic. 
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Appendix V 
Table V. 1 Comparison of the annual additional costs of the LCPP for the arable sector accor-
ding to MJP-G (1990) and a regulatory levy of SO guilders per hectare according to 
LP results (all amounts in million guilders) 
MJP-G (1990) 
1990-1995 1995-2000 
LP results 
2000 
Infestations of the soil 
Ware potato: 
higher costs seed material 
PSR varieties 
lower product prices PSR variety 
separate storage 
Starch potato: 
lower yields 
Sugarbeet: 
lower yields 
All root crops: 
pesticide applications 
and operation methods 
shredder (remnant potatoes) 
transport of soil wastes 
nematode bait crops 
soil sampling (nematode control) 
Diseases due to fungi/viruses etc. 
Ware potato: 
reduction of N dosage 
risks of rotting in storage 
lower yields caused by reduced 
Ndose 
lower yield because of greater 
damage 
2.0 
8.1 
15.0 
7.0 
6.6 
15.0 
12.5 
15.0 
36.0 
-3.2 
7.0 
4.2 
1.3 
15.0 
6.6 
14.0 
12.0 
15.0 
4.2 
24.0 
-3.2 
7.0 
4.2 
4.9 
4.01 
0.02 
0.0 
0.04 
_ 6 
_ 7 
0.0 
7 
1
 Assuming 50% Bintje and 50% PSR variety. 
The PSR variety has a higher yield per hectare that compensates for the lower product price. 
The change-over from a 1:2 cropping frequency to 1:4 without soil fumigation results in lower yields; 
as the 1:2 rotation is not profitable according to the LP computations this is not regarded as additional costs. 
4
 Also used without imposing a levy. 
5
 In the LP computations the common method of soil fumigation is preferred to the innovative 
techniques of growing a bait crop or disinfecting of the infected areas. 
According to the LP computations the current practice of manuring and supplementing with fertilizer 
is abandoned in favour of a split application of N-fertilizer supported by petiole analysis. 
This is accounted for in the cropping variants, see Appendix III. 
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Addition to the LP computations 
Table V.l (continued) 
Starch potato: 
reduction of N dosage 
lower yields caused by reduced N dose 
Onion: 
reduction of N dosage 
risks of lower quality 
Cereals: 
yield reduction 
reduction of N dosage 
Weeds 
All crops: 
commitment of casual labour 
additional investments in machinery 
MJP-G (1990) 
1990-1995 
-1.7 
2.0 
-0.6 
1.3 
24.0 
-6.0 
30.0 
36.0 
1995-2000 
-1.7 
2.0 
-0.6 
1.3 
43.0 
-10.8 
50.0 
42.0 
LP results 
2000 
. 3 
_ 3 
0.0» 
0.0« 
22.1 
<-0 .1 
0.0 
. 9 
reduction of yield and quality 
by additional mech. treatments 99.0 150.0 
Growth regulation 
Seed/ ware and starch potato: 
additional investment in machinery 19.0 
reduced quality of seed potatoes 
more expensive germination control 
Adaptations of spraving techniques 18.7 
Cost of inplementing information svstem 4.3 
Savings on pesticide use -121.2 
Total 230.0 
19.0 
3.5 
11.7 
18.7 
4.3 
-191.4 
263.0 
7 
_ 11 
-
-85.6 n 
ca. 31.0 '3 
The share of onion in the cropping patterns is reduced (see Appendix IV) the method of growing 
onions is unchanged. 
9
 The LP computations assume availability of a weed harrow and a hoeing machine in the basic 
situation. The innovative combination of earther/ridge hoe for environmentally friendlier weed control in 
potato is used without imposing a levy (see results levy 0 computations, Appendix IV). 
The investment in a haulm shredder is profitable without imposing a levy (see results levy 0 
computation runs in Appendix IV). 
11
 Includes the annual costs of the row-spraying machinery. 
12
 Assessed by multiplying the savings on pesticide use (from comparing cropping patterns and 
cropping variants of the levy 0 with the levy SO situations for the representative farm per region, see 
Appendix IV) by a representation factor (hectares under arable crops per region divided by the the hectares 
represented by the model) and summing the results. 
13
 Resulting from multiplying the costs per hectare (see Table 8.6) by total hectares under arable crops, 
viz. 597 700 ha. 
155 
Some more English-language titles in this series 
The world coffee market and the International coffee agreement 
M.Th.A. Pieters and H J. Silvis 
1988, paperback, Wageningen Economic Studies 9. Price US$ 18.00 
Farmers and finance: experience with institutional savings and credit in West Java 
HAJ. Moll 
1989, paperback, Wageningen Economic Studies 11. Price US$ 24.00 
The idea of environmental welfare economics 
JJ. Krabbe 
1989, paperback, Wageningen Economic Studies 12. Price US$ 11.00 
Decision making under risk 
A study of models and measurement procedures, with special reference to farmer's marketing behaviour 
A. Smidts 
1990, paperback, Wageningen Economic Studies 18. Price US$ 43.00 
Foot-and-mouth disease and export 
P. Berentsen, AA. Dijkhuizen and A J. Oskam 
1990, paperback, Wageningen Economic Studies 20. Price US$ 13.00 
Depletable resources and the economy 
WJ.M. Heijman 
1991, paperback, Wageningen Economic Studies 21. Price US$ 37.00 
Issues of environmental economic policy 
WJ.M. Heijman and J J. Krabbe, editors 
1992, paperback, Wageningen Economic Studies 24. Price US$ 33.00 
Micro-economic models of Dutch dairy farms 
G J. Thijssen 
1992, paperback, Wageningen Economic Studies 25. Price US$ 19.00 
